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These are appeals filed under the formal procedure pursuant 
to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 62C, § 39, from the refusal of 
the Commissioner of Revenue (“Commissioner”) to: (1) grant 
abatements and refunds of self-assessed corporate excise 
(“Refund Claims”)1 to Comcast of Massachusetts I, Inc. (“Mass 
I”), Comcast of Brockton, Inc. (“Brockton”), Comcast of 
California/Massachusetts/Michigan/Utah, Inc. (“CA/MA/MI/UT”), 
Comcast of Georgia, Inc. (“Georgia”), Comcast of 
Georgia/Massachusetts, Inc. (“GA/MA”), Comcast of 
Massachusetts/New Hampshire/Ohio, Inc. (“MA/NH/OH”), Comcast of 
Milton, Inc. (“Milton”), Comcast of Needham, Inc. (“Needham”), 
and Comcast of Southern New England, Inc. (“Southern NE”) 
(collectively “appellants”);2 and (2) grant abatements of 
                                                 
1  The Refund Claims generally included the tax years 2003 through 2008. 
2 For administrative ease only, references to “appellants” shall also 
encompass additional members of the Massachusetts corporate excise returns 
filed by Mass I as the principal reporting corporation whose underlying 
adjustments contribute to any of the issues in dispute.  
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corporate excise deficiency assessments (“Deficiency Assessments 
Claims”)3 to Mass I.  
 Chairman Hammond heard the appeals. Commissioners 
Scharaffa, Rose, Chmielinski, and Good joined him in the 
decisions for the Commissioner. 
 These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to 
requests by the appellants and the Commissioner under 
G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.       
 
 Joseph X. Donovan, Esq., David J. Nagle, Esq., Anne N. 
Ross, Esq., Daniel P. Ryan, Esq., Jeffrey A. Friedman, Esq., 
Daniel H. Schlueter, Esq., and Maria M. Todorova, Esq. for the 
appellants. 
 
 Celine E. de la Foscade-Condon, Esq., Brett M. Goldberg, 
Esq., and Jamie E. Szal, Esq. for the Commissioner.   
 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
The appeals of these consolidated matters
4
 encompassed seven 
days of trial in October and November 2015,
5
 a statement of 
agreed facts with more than 700 accompanying exhibits spanning 
thousands of pages, a first supplemental statement of agreed 
facts, trial exhibits, post-trial exhibits, post-trial briefs, 
reply briefs, and hundreds of requested findings of fact. The 
                                                 
3 The Deficiency Assessments Claims generally included the tax years 2002 
through 2008. 
4 The Board allowed the appellants’ Uncontested Motion to Consolidate on March 
2, 2015, which consolidated the appeals for Docket Nos. C321986, C321987, 
C321988, C321989, C321990, C321991, C321992, C321993, C321994, and C322268.  
5 The Board also considered and denied motions for summary judgment and 
partial summary judgment filed by the appellants and the Commissioner, as 
well as a post-decisions motion filed by the appellants, discussed infra.  
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appellants presented testimony from eight fact witnesses and two 
expert witnesses, while the Commissioner presented testimony 
from one expert witness.
6
 
On the basis of this extensive record, the Appellate Tax 
Board (“Board”) made the following findings of fact: 
I. Introduction 
Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) primarily offered three 
services during the tax years 2002 through 2008: video 
programming (“Video”), high-speed internet (“Internet”), and 
telephone. Services were delivered to subscribers through a 
single, converged network located throughout the United States, 
one of the largest fiber networks in the world. Comcast was also 
engaged in the cable content business, including E! 
Entertainment, Style, and the Golf Channel. Comcast ventured 
into the broadcast industry business with its purchase of 
NBCUniversal in 2011.  
Ralph Roberts founded Comcast in the 1960s as one of the 
first cable television companies in the country. The company — 
known for such offerings as the Triple Play
7
 and On Demand
8
 — is 
currently run by his son Brian Roberts.  
                                                 
6 The appellants called upon David Scott, John Schanz, Jennifer T. Gaiski, 
Peter Kiriacoulacos, Mark Reilly, Kevin Casey, Thomas J. Donnelly, and 
William Dordelman as fact witnesses, and Professor Richard D. Pomp and Dr. 
Michael I. Cragg as expert witnesses. The Commissioner offered Professor 
Peter D. Enrich as an expert witness.  
7 Triple Play is Comcast’s bundled package of Video, Internet, and telephone 
services. 
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During all times relevant to these appeals, Comcast was the 
direct or indirect parent company of myriad entities that held 
cable franchise licenses with municipalities, including 
subsidiary corporations such as the appellants. Comcast acquired 
the appellants through its purchase of AT&T Broadband in 
November 2002. At the time, AT&T Broadband was the largest cable 
company in the United States. After the AT&T Broadband 
acquisition, Comcast’s subscriber base expanded from 
approximately 8.2 million subscribers to roughly 24 million 
subscribers. Comcast acquired substantial cable operations in 
Massachusetts and throughout New England as a result of the 
acquisition. It had not previously provided cable services in 
Massachusetts prior to the AT&T Broadband acquisition. Comcast 
chose to maintain the structure whereby individual entities held 
cable franchise licenses with municipalities, rather than 
consolidate the entities. 
II. Background 
A. Issues  
The parties presented a series of concessions and 
alternative arguments from which the Board identified the 
following six issues
9
 as requiring its determination: (1) whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 On Demand is Comcast’s video-on-demand service offering access to a library 
of programs. 
9 The Refund Claims concerned issues one, two, and three, while the Deficiency 
Assessments Claims concerned issues five, and six. Issue four skirted both 
  ATB 2017-501
the appellants properly recomputed the sales factors of their 
apportionment formulas by calculating sales of Video and 
Internet services using costs of performance provisions (“Costs 
of Performance Issue”); (2) whether certain intercompany 
interest expenses qualified for an exception to the add-back 
statute (“Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue”); (3) whether 
the appellants were entitled to Massachusetts corporate excise 
adjustments based upon federal changes (“Federal Changes 
Issue”); (4) whether certain intercompany interest expenses 
should be disallowed on the basis that they were associated with 
non-unitary dividends income allocable to Pennsylvania 
(“Allocable Expenses Issue”); (5) whether certain reimbursements 
should be removed from Comcast’s sales factors for the tax years 
2007 and 2008 (“Comcast Sales Factor Issue”); and (6) whether a 
processing error by the Commissioner justified an abatement 
(“Processing Error Issue”).10  
The Board issued decisions for the Commissioner on June 7, 
2016. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
the Refund Claims (for the tax years 2004 through 2008) and the Deficiency 
Assessments Claims (for the tax year 2003).  
10 Though the appellants neglected to address this issue during the trial of 
these matters, in their post-trial brief, or in their reply brief, or to even 
specifically characterize this as an “issue” in their request for findings of 
fact, request no. 272 suggested that they nonetheless still sought a 
determination from the Board. Request no. 272 stated as follows: “According 
to the Commissioner’s records, Mass I made payments totaling $43,785,658 for 
the 2004 tax year. Mass I had sufficient funds to cover its 2004 nonincome 
measure and any deficiency assessment resulting from the MASSTAX system’s 
error should be abated.”  
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B. Conceded Issues 
The Board’s decisions — and consequently these findings of 
fact and report — reflected no determination11 on two additional 
issues: (1) whether Comcast Phone of Massachusetts, Inc. 
(“Comcast Phone”) was a utility corporation subject to 
G.L. c. 63, § 52A and thus required to file separate returns 
(“Comcast Phone Issue”) and (2) whether wage reimbursements 
should be removed from the sales factors of payroll companies 
(“Payroll Companies Sales Factor Issue”).12  
The Commissioner disavowed the Comcast Phone Issue, 
emphasizing in his reply brief that “[a]s . . . stated in his 
Proposed Findings of Fact and as was communicated to the 
Taxpayers prior to trial, the Commissioner concedes that Comcast 
Phone of Massachusetts, Inc. was a utility corporation and 
should file a return as such pursuant to G.L. c. 63, § 52A(2).”13 
The concession of the Payroll Companies Sales Factor Issue 
involves a more complex account. Upon audit, the Commissioner 
made adjustments to Mass I, Comcast of Willow Grove, Inc. 
                                                 
11 The Board’s decisions and these findings of fact and report also reflected 
no determination on claims that were raised in any petition or amended 
petition but implicitly abandoned by lack of subsequent reference or analysis 
by the appellants.   
12 The Commissioner conceded certain additional issues, but raised alternative 
issues in their stead, discussed infra, in the Board’s findings and analysis 
of the Comcast Sales Factor Issue and the Allocable Expenses Issue. 
13 In his response to the appellants’ Motion to Alter, Amend, or Clarify 
Decision, discussed further below, the Commissioner stated that “the issue 
has been conceded, it is moot and the Board does not need to waste time and 
resources to address it. The Appellants’ request that a decision should be 
issued in their favor on that particular point seems futile.” 
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(“Willow Grove”), and Comcast Cable Communications Holdings, 
Inc. (“CCCH”) for the tax years 2003 through 2008. All three 
entities served as payroll entities, described by Thomas J. 
Donnelly, the Vice President for State and Local Tax for Comcast 
during relevant time periods, as “[an] entity to which we report 
the payroll, and [which] made the W-2 issuances to the 
employees.” The Commissioner’s auditor took the position that 
employees should not be considered employees of the payroll 
entities. As a direct result of this position, the auditor (1) 
removed Willow Grove and CCCH
14
 from the Mass I combined returns 
for the tax years 2003 through 2008 on the basis that both 
entities had no employees in Massachusetts and therefore no 
nexus with the Commonwealth and (2) adjusted Mass I’s 
apportionment percentage to 100 percent for the tax years 2003, 
2004, 2007, and 2008
15
 on the basis that it had no employees 
outside of the Commonwealth and therefore was not taxable in 
another state.
16
  
The Commissioner ultimately conceded the issue of nexus for 
Willow Grove and CCCH, as well as Mass I’s right to apportion 
                                                 
14 CCCH incurred losses during the tax years 2003 through 2008 and its removal 
from the Mass I combined returns increased the combined group’s taxable 
income. Willow Grove incurred losses during certain of the tax years 2003 
through 2008. 
15 Mass I reported its apportionment percentage as 100 percent for the tax 
years 2005 and 2006. 
16 In the Commissioner’s audit narrative for the tax years 2002 through 2004, 
for instance, the auditor noted that Mass I was the paymaster for affiliates 
in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Florida, and Rhode Island, and included the 
reimbursements for wages from these affiliates in its sales factor 
denominator (but not its sales factor numerator).  
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its income,
17
 but maintained that the issue properly before the 
Board was instead whether the sales factors for all three 
entities should be adjusted to remove reimbursements for payroll 
expenses — the Payroll Companies Sales Factor Issue. As stated 
in his post-trial brief, the Commissioner contended that these 
payroll companies “were indeed the employers for regulatory and 
wage reporting purposes, but reimbursement of the wages they 
paid were not ‘sales’ for sales factor purposes.”18 
The appellants agreed with the Commissioner, conceding that 
payroll reimbursements should be removed from the sales factors 
of Mass I, Willow Grove, and CCCH.
19
 The Commissioner’s 
                                                 
17 As the appellants pointed out, the transcript for their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment heard before the Board on September 21, 2015 contained a 
concession by counsel for the Commissioner: “A simple way to handle this 
would be to simply allow what is conceded, that is, that these companies 
[Willow Grove and CCCH] have Massachusetts nexus and one company [Mass I] has 
[the] right to apportion, without them going the extra step of making 
conclusions as to the tax consequences of that. That’s our problem.” During 
the motion session, counsel for the Commissioner further stated that “[w]e do 
admit what [counsel for the appellants] said were the primary purposes of the 
motion, which is just to establish the nexus of the two companies [and] the 
right to apportion of the third company.” The statement of agreed facts 
included the Commissioner’s concession that Willow Grove and CCCH had nexus. 
In his requested findings of fact, the Commissioner stated that he 
“subsequently concluded that the employees could not be said to be employees 
of the individual entities that received services, and must be employees of 
the paymaster entities. However, the Commissioner continues to maintain that 
reimbursement of payroll expenses at no markup are not ‘sales’ for purposes 
of the Massachusetts sales factor numerator or denominator.”     
18 The Commissioner’s concession negated the auditor’s original basis for the 
assessment — no Massachusetts nexus for Willow Grove and CCCH, and no 
taxability in other states for Mass I. The Commissioner’s concession starkly 
undercut his argument in the Costs of Performance Issue that Mass I was not 
taxable in other states and hence not entitled to apportion, discussed infra, 
in the Board’s findings and analysis. The Board does not, however, construe 
Mass I’s right to apportion as in any way conceding the appellants’ proposed 
apportionment adjustments in the Costs of Performance Issue. 
19 The appellants’ reply brief stated that the Commissioner “argues that 
payroll reimbursements should be removed from the payroll companies’ sales 
factor. [The appellants do] not contest that adjustment.” 
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concession of his auditor’s original basis for the adjustments 
and the appellants’ subsequent agreement with the Commissioner’s 
argument regarding the Payroll Companies Sales Factor Issue left 
no remaining dispute requiring a determination by the Board.    
C. The Appellants’ Post-Decisions Motion to Alter, Amend, or 
Clarify Decision and the Tax Implications Resulting from the 
Board’s Decisions  
 
On September 2, 2016, after the Board issued its decisions 
in these appeals, the appellants filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, 
or Clarify Decision. At the heart of the motion was the 
appellants’ belief that they were entitled to adjustments on 
certain issues irrespective of the Board’s decisions for the 
Commissioner and that the Board should reverse portions of its 
decisions to instead find for the appellants. According to the 
appellants’ motion, the Commissioner reduced the amount of the 
deficiency assessments to account for his concession of the 
Comcast Phone Issue for the tax years 2007 and 2008, but billed 
the appellants
20
 for the remainder of the deficiency assessments 
without acknowledging any other potential reductions. The 
Commissioner ostensibly had not, for instance, considered 
whether the Comcast Sales Factor Issue equated dollar for dollar 
                                                 
20 Pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, § 32, the Commissioner may collect a tax “after [] 
the thirtieth day following the date of a decision with respect to such tax 
by the [Board] . . . to the extent that the commissioner prevails before the 
[Board] . . . . For purposes of this paragraph, the date of a decision by the 
[Board] shall be determined without reference to any later issuance of 
finding of facts and report by the [B]oard or to any request for a finding of 
facts and report.” 
  ATB 2017-506
with the auditor’s original basis for the assessment against 
Comcast (whether Comcast had nexus with the Commonwealth during 
tax years 2007 and 2008).
21
 The Board recognizes that an 
alternative argument may not necessarily comport numerically 
with the original basis for an assessment or an abatement.
22
  
The Board issued an order on September 30, 2016, in which 
it denied the appellants’ motion and held that “[t]o the extent 
necessary, the Board will address the issues raised in the 
Motion in its Findings of Fact and Report.” These findings of 
fact and report explain in detail the rationale underlying the 
Board’s decisions for the Commissioner. It is incumbent upon the 
Commissioner and the appellants to calculate and resolve any 
                                                 
21 Even though the parties’ respective concessions regarding the Payroll 
Companies Sales Factor Issue left no remaining dispute requiring a 
determination by the Board, the appellants’ motion suggested that the 
Commissioner neglected to entertain any potential tax implications of his 
change in theory (from the auditor’s original basis for the deficiency 
assessments) and that he billed the appellants for the original deficiency 
assessment amount. Similarly, the appellants’ motion intimated that the 
Commissioner, despite conceding the Comcast Phone Issue, only considered tax 
implications for the tax years 2007 and 2008 (in which the auditor had 
included Comcast Phone in the Mass I combined returns), but not for the tax 
years 2003 through 2006 (in which Mass I sought an abatement and refund on 
the basis that it had incorrectly included Comcast Phone in the Mass I 
combined returns). If an issue has been conceded, then proper treatment must 
be accorded to any resultant tax ramifications, for all applicable tax years.    
22 The Commissioner did not introduce any evidence demonstrating that the tax 
implications of any new arguments resulted in parity with the original 
deficiency assessment amounts. The Commissioner cannot seek an amount greater 
than the original deficiency assessment amounts through these appeals. 
Seeking a greater amount would be akin to a new deficiency assessment or a 
new abatement, over which the Board would not have jurisdiction. Commissioner 
of Revenue v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 406 Mass. 466, 468 (1990) (“By the terms 
of § 39, the board had jurisdiction to ‘make such abatement as it [saw] fit,’ 
only if the board were to find that the taxpayer ‘was entitled to an 
abatement’ from the Commissioner. Because the taxpayer failed to file a 
timely abatement application, the taxpayer was not entitled to an abatement 
from the Commissioner. Therefore, the board lacked jurisdiction to grant an 
abatement.”).  
  ATB 2017-507
numerical consequences of their respective concessions in 
accordance with the Board’s decisions and these findings of fact 
and report, adjusting for any conceded issues and alternative 
arguments for any applicable tax year.  
III. The Appellants and Their Procedural Histories 
Based upon the following, the Board determined that it had 
jurisdiction to hear and decide these appeals:   
A. Mass I (Docket Nos. C322268 and C321986) 
Mass I originated as Continental Cablevision of 
Massachusetts, Inc. in 1972. Continental Cablevision of 
Massachusetts, Inc. engaged in numerous mergers during 
subsequent years. Its name changed to MediaOne of Massachusetts, 
Inc. in 1997 after its purchase by MediaOne. In 2000, AT&T 
merged with MediaOne and became part of AT&T Broadband, an 
operating segment of AT&T. Upon Comcast’s purchase of AT&T 
Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of Massachusetts, Inc. was renamed 
Comcast of Massachusetts I, Inc. 
Mass I was the principal reporting corporation for 
Massachusetts corporate excise returns filed on Form 355C: 
Combined Corporation Excise Return (“Form 355C”)23 on September 
                                                 
23 During the tax years 2002 through 2008, Massachusetts offered the election 
to file a combined corporation excise return with a designated principal 
reporting corporation pursuant to the relevant version of G.L. c. 63, § 32B 
for purposes of reporting the net income measure of the corporate excise for 
the combined group. Despite use of the term “combined,” each entity that 
participated in the filing first had to determine its taxable net income 
separately before adding each entity’s taxable net income together to arrive 
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15, 2003, September 14, 2004, September 13, 2005, September 5, 
2006, September 5, 2007, September 9, 2008, and September 10, 
2009, for each of the tax years 2002 through 2008, 
respectively.
24
   
Docket No. C322268  
The Commissioner conducted an audit of Mass I’s Forms 355C 
for the tax years 2002 through 2008.
25
 The appellants and the 
Commissioner jointly executed a set of valid, consecutive Forms 
A-37: Consent Extending the Time for Assessment of Taxes (“Forms 
A-37”)26 for the tax years 2002 through 2004; a set of valid, 
consecutive Forms A-37 for the tax years 2005 through 2008; and 
a valid Form B-37: Special Consent Extending the Time for 
                                                                                                                                                             
at the combined net income of the group taxable under G.L. c. 63. This 
separate-entity calculation is in contrast with the unitary-combined 
reporting regime enacted in Massachusetts for tax years beginning on or after 
January 1, 2009. See G.L. c. 63, § 32B (as rewritten by St. 2008, c. 173, § 
48). See also Combined Reporting, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/ 
current-tax-info/guide-to-corporate-excise-tax/combined-reporting-unitary-tax 
-years-on-or.html (last visited June 20, 2017) (“For tax years beginning on 
or after January 1, 2009, a corporation subject to tax and engaged in a 
unitary business with one or more corporations subject to combination shall 
calculate its taxable net income derived from this unitary business as its 
share, attributable to the commonwealth, of the apportionable income or loss 
of the combined group engaged in the unitary business, determined in 
accordance with a combined report.”). 
24 The tax year 2002 is a short year beginning November 19 and ending December 
31. The tax years 2003 through 2008 are calendar years beginning January 1 
and ending December 31. 
25 The parties stipulated that Mass I was also included as a nexus taxpayer in 
CCCH’s New Hampshire unitary returns for the tax years 2002 and 2003 and as a 
nexus taxpayer in Comcast’s New Hampshire unitary returns for the tax years 
2004 through 2008.  
26 Pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, § 27: “If, before the expiration of the time 
prescribed under section twenty-six for the assessment of any tax, the 
commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to extend the time for the 
assessment of the tax, the commissioner or his duly authorized representative 
may examine the books, papers, records, and other data of the taxpayer, may 
give any notice required by section twenty-six and may assess the tax at any 
time prior to the expiration of the extended time.” 
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Assessment of Taxes (“Form B-37”) for the tax years 2002 through 
2004.
27
 By Notice of Intent to Assess dated July 23, 2012, the 
Commissioner proposed the assessment of additional tax in the 
amount of $7,506,626, plus interest, to Mass I for the tax years 
2002 through 2004. By Notice of Intent to Assess dated January 
6, 2013, the Commissioner proposed the assessment of additional 
tax in the amount of $24,331,085, plus interest and penalties,
28
 
to Mass I for the tax years 2005 through 2008.  
The Commissioner issued a Notice of Assessment to Mass I 
dated November 14, 2012, assessing additional tax in the amount 
of $7,506,626, plus interest, for the tax years 2002 through 
2004. The Commissioner issued a Notice of Assessment to Mass I 
dated February 12, 2013, assessing additional tax in the amount 
of $14,286,806, plus interest and penalties,
29
 for the tax years 
2005, 2006, and 2008. The Commissioner issued a Notice of 
Assessment to Mass I dated February 18, 2013, assessing 
additional tax in the amount of $10,044,279, plus interest and 
penalties, for the tax year 2007.  
Mass I filed a Form CA-6: Application for Abatement/Amended 
Return (“Form CA-6”) with the Commissioner on January 9, 2013, 
                                                 
27 The Forms A-37 and Form B-37 encompassed Mass I and affiliates with an 
attached schedule that included all of the appellants. 
28 The appellants did not set forth an argument for the independent abatement 
of penalties, therefore the Board did not abate the penalties. To the extent 
that any penalties attached to an issue conceded by the Commissioner, it was 
incumbent upon the Commissioner to make the necessary adjustments to 
penalties. 
29 See footnote 28, supra. 
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seeking abatements of the Commissioner’s deficiency assessments 
for the tax years 2002 through 2004. Mass I filed a Form CA-6 on 
April 5, 2013, seeking abatements of the Commissioner’s 
deficiency assessments for the tax years 2005 through 2008.  
By Notice of Abatement Determination dated January 29, 
2014, the Commissioner denied the Forms CA-6 for the tax years 
2002 through 2008. Mass I timely filed a Petition Under Formal 
Procedure with the Board on March 26, 2014, which was assigned 
Docket No. C322268, appealing the Commissioner’s denial of Mass 
I’s Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2002 through 2008. Mass I filed 
an Uncontested Motion to Amend Petition, along with its Amended 
Petition Under Formal Procedure, which was allowed by the Board 
on September 4, 2014.
30
  
Docket No. C321986 
On November 29, 2010, Mass I filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2003 through 2008, claiming abatements and refunds 
of self-assessed corporate excise in the amount of $89,916,983.
31
 
                                                 
30 The issues before the Board for Docket No. C322268 were the Allocable 
Expenses Issue, the Comcast Sales Factor Issue, and the Processing Error 
Issue. See footnote 9, supra. 
31 The Forms A-37 and Form B-37, referenced supra, also extended the statute 
of limitations to file abatement claims. See G.L. c. 62C, § 37 (stating that 
“where the commissioner and the taxpayer have agreed to extend the period for 
assessment of a tax pursuant to section 27, the period for abatement or for 
abating such tax shall not expire prior to the expiration period within which 
an assessment may be made pursuant to such agreement or any extension 
thereof”); 830 CMR 62C.37.1 (“If the Commissioner and the taxpayer have 
agreed to extend the period for assessment of a tax pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, 
§ 27, the application for abatement may be made within the assessment 
extension period.”). 
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By letter dated February 14, 2012,
32
 Mass I supplemented its 
Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2003 through 2008, incorporating 
the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue and requesting an 
additional abatement and refund of self-assessed corporate 
excise in the amount of $37,399,439.
33
  
By Notice of Abatement Determination dated October 9, 2013, 
the Commissioner denied the Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2003 
through 2008. Mass I timely filed a Petition Under Formal 
Procedure with the Board on December 4, 2013, which was assigned 
Docket No. C321986, appealing the Commissioner’s denial of Mass 
I’s Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2003 through 2008.34 35                
B. Brockton (Docket No. C321987) 
Brockton originated as Continental Cablevision of Brockton, 
Inc. in 1981.  Its name changed to MediaOne of Brockton, Inc. in 
1997 after its purchase by MediaOne. Upon Comcast’s purchase of 
AT&T Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of Brockton, Inc. was renamed 
Comcast of Brockton, Inc. 
Brockton reported its Massachusetts income for each of the 
tax years 2003 through 2008 as part of the Forms 355C filed by 
                                                 
32 See footnote 31, supra.  
33 This amount was contingent upon the Commissioner’s agreement with the costs 
of performance methodology proposed by Mass I and the basis for the Costs of 
Performance Issue. If the proposed costs of performance methodology was 
denied, Mass I sought an abatement and refund of $71,463,647 rather than the 
$37,399,439.  
34 The issues before the Board for Docket No. C321986 were the Costs of 
Performance Issue, the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue, the Federal 
Changes Issue, and the Allocable Expenses Issue. See footnote 9, supra. 
35 The petition sought relief in the amount of $127,316,422. See footnote 33, 
supra.     
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Mass I. It reported its non-income measure
36
 of the corporate 
excise for each of the tax years 2004 through 2008 by filing a 
Form 355C on September 13, 2005, September 5, 2006, September 5, 
2007, September 9, 2008, and September 10, 2009, respectively.  
 On November 29, 2010, Brockton filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2004 through 2008, claiming abatements and refunds 
of its self-assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise 
in the amount of $816,219.
37
 By Notices of Abatement 
Determination dated October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the 
Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 through 2008. Brockton timely 
filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board on 
December 4, 2013, which was assigned Docket No. C321987, 
appealing the Commissioner’s denial of its Forms CA-6 for the 
tax years 2004 through 2008.
38
  
C. CA/MA/MI/UT (Docket No. C321988) 
CA/MA/MI/UT originated as UACC Midwest, Inc. in 1984. UACC 
Midwest, Inc. engaged in numerous mergers during subsequent 
years. It was acquired by Tele-Communications, Inc. in or around 
1991. AT&T merged with Tele-Communications, Inc. in 1999, 
resulting in UACC Midwest, Inc. becoming part of AT&T Broadband. 
                                                 
36 During relevant tax years, the Massachusetts corporate excise consisted of 
both a net income measure and a non—income measure (based upon either 
tangible property or net worth). Any corporation filing as part of a combined 
group was still required to separately file a Form 355C to report its non-
income measure. 
37 See footnote 31, supra.  
38 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321987 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
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Upon Comcast’s purchase of AT&T Broadband in 2002, UACC Midwest, 
Inc. was renamed Comcast of California/Massachusetts/ 
Michigan/Utah, Inc.  
CA/MA/MI/UT reported its Massachusetts income for each of 
the tax years 2003 through 2008 as part of the Forms 355C filed 
by Mass I.
39
 It reported its non-income measure of the corporate 
excise for the tax year 2003 by filing a Form 355C on September 
14, 2004.  
 On December 7, 2010, CA/MA/MI/UT filed a Form CA-6 for the 
tax year 2003, claiming an abatement and refund of its self-
assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise in the 
amount of $66,595.
40
 By Notice of Abatement Determination dated 
October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the Form CA-6 for the 
tax year 2003. CA/MA/MI/UT timely filed a Petition Under Formal 
Procedure with the Board on December 4, 2013, which was assigned 
Docket No. C321988, appealing the Commissioner’s denial of its 
Form CA-6 for the tax year 2003.
41
  
D. Georgia (Docket No. C321989) 
Georgia originated as U S West Cable Corporation in 1993. 
It was renamed U S West Multimedia Communications, Inc. in 1993, 
which in turn was renamed MediaOne Group, Inc. and then MediaOne 
                                                 
39 The parties stipulated that CA/MA/MI/UT also filed (unspecified) returns in 
six other states – Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, and 
Ohio. 
40 See footnote 31, supra. 
41 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321988 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
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of Colorado, Inc. in 1998. Upon Comcast’s purchase of AT&T 
Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of Colorado, Inc. was renamed 
Comcast of Georgia, Inc. Georgia merged with Comcast MO 
Investments Holdings, Inc. in 2004. Georgia’s name changed to 
Comcast of Georgia/Virginia, Inc. in 2006.   
Georgia reported its Massachusetts income for each of the 
tax years 2003 through 2008 as part of the Forms 355C filed by 
Mass I. It reported its non-income measure of the corporate 
excise for each of the tax years 2003 through 2005 by filing a 
Form 355C on September 14, 2004, September 13, 2005, and 
September 5, 2006, respectively.
42
  
 On November 29, 2010, Georgia filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2003 through 2005, claiming abatements and refunds 
of its self-assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise 
in the amount of $345,604.
43
 By Notices of Abatement 
Determination dated October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the 
Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2003 through 2005. Georgia timely 
filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board on 
December 4, 2013, which was assigned Docket No. C321989, 
                                                 
42 The parties stipulated that Georgia also filed (unspecified) returns in 
Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, 
Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.  
43 See footnote 31, supra.  
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appealing the Commissioner’s denial of its Forms CA-6 for the 
tax years 2003 through 2005.
44
 
E. GA/MA (Docket No. C321990) 
GA/MA originated as Colony Communications, Inc. in 1969. 
Colony Communications, Inc. engaged in numerous mergers during 
subsequent years. Its name changed to MediaOne Enterprises, Inc. 
in 1997 after its purchase by MediaOne. Upon Comcast’s purchase 
of AT&T Broadband in 2002, MediaOne Enterprises, Inc. was 
renamed Comcast of Georgia/Massachusetts, Inc. 
GA/MA reported its Massachusetts income for each of the tax 
years 2003 through 2006 as part of the Forms 355C filed by Mass 
I. It reported its non-income measure of the corporate excise 
for the tax year 2003 by filing a Form 355C on September 14, 
2004.
45
  
 On November 29, 2010, GA/MA filed a Form CA-6 for the tax 
year 2003, claiming an abatement and refund of its self-
assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise in the 
amount of $348,967.
46
 By Notice of Abatement Determination dated 
October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the Form CA-6 for the 
tax year 2003. GA/MA timely filed a Petition Under Formal 
Procedure with the Board on December 4, 2013, which was assigned 
                                                 
44 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321989 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
45 The parties stipulated that GA/MA also filed (unspecified) returns in 
Arizona, Florida, Rhode Island, and Georgia.  
46 See footnote 31, supra. 
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Docket No. C321990, appealing the Commissioner’s denial of its 
Form CA-6 for the tax year 2003.
47
  
F. MA/NH/OH (Docket No. C321991) 
MA/NH/OH originated as Cablevision Enterprises, Inc. in 
1966. Cablevision Enterprises, Inc.’s name changed to 
Continental Cablevision of Ohio, Inc. in 1967. Continental 
Cablevision of Ohio, Inc. engaged in numerous mergers during 
subsequent years. Its name changed to MediaOne of Ohio, Inc. in 
1997. Upon Comcast’s purchase of AT&T Broadband in 2002, 
MediaOne of Ohio, Inc. was renamed Comcast of Massachusetts/New 
Hampshire/Ohio, Inc. 
MA/NH/OH reported its Massachusetts income for each of the 
tax years 2003 through 2006 as part of the Forms 355C filed by 
Mass I. It reported its non-income measure of the corporate 
excise for each of the tax years 2003 through 2005 by filing a 
Form 355C on September 14, 2004, September 13, 2005, and 
September 5, 2006, respectively.
48
  
 On November 29, 2010, MA/NH/OH filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2003 through 2005, claiming abatements and refunds 
of its self-assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise 
                                                 
47 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321990 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
48 The parties stipulated that MA/NH/OH also filed (unspecified) returns in 
Ohio; filed as a nexus taxpayer in CCCH’s New Hampshire unitary returns for 
the tax years 2002 and 2003; and filed as part of Comcast’s unitary returns 
for the tax years 2004 and 2005.  
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in the amount of $464,595.
49
 By Notice of Abatement Determination 
dated October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the Forms CA-6 
for the tax years 2003 through 2005. MA/NH/OH timely filed a 
Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board on December 4, 
2013, which was assigned Docket No. C321991, appealing the 
Commissioner’s denial of its Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2003 
through 2005.
50
  
G. Milton (Docket No. C321992) 
Milton originated as Milton Cablesystems Corporation in 
1981. Its name changed to MediaOne of Milton, Inc. in 1997 after 
the purchase of Continental Cablevision by MediaOne. Upon 
Comcast’s purchase of AT&T Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of 
Milton, Inc. was renamed Comcast of Milton, Inc. 
Milton reported its Massachusetts income for each of the 
tax years 2003 through 2006 and the tax year 2008 as part of the 
Forms 355C filed by Mass I. It reported its non-income measure 
of the corporate excise for each of the tax years 2004 through 
2006 and the tax year 2008 by filing a Form 355C on September 
13, 2005, September 5, 2006, September 5, 2007, and September 
10, 2009, respectively.  
 On November 29, 2010, Milton filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2004 through 2006 and the tax year 2008, claiming 
                                                 
49 See footnote 31, supra. 
50 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321991 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
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abatements and refunds of its self-assessed, non-income measure 
of the corporate excise in the amount of $244,156.
51
 By Notice of 
Abatement Determination dated October 9, 2013, the Commissioner 
denied the Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 through 2006 and 
the tax year 2008. Milton timely filed a Petition Under Formal 
Procedure with the Board on December 4, 2013, which was assigned 
Docket No. C321992, appealing the Commissioner’s denial of its 
Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 through 2006 and the tax year 
2008.
52
  
H. Needham (Docket No. C321993) 
Needham originated as Continental Cablevision of Needham, 
Inc. in 1982. Its name changed to MediaOne of Needham, Inc. in 
1997 after the purchase of Continental Cablevision by MediaOne. 
Upon Comcast’s purchase of AT&T Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of 
Needham, Inc. was renamed Comcast of Needham, Inc. 
Needham reported its Massachusetts income for each of the 
tax years 2003 through 2008 as part of the Forms 355C filed by 
Mass I. It reported its non-income measure of the corporate 
excise for each of the tax years 2004 through 2007 by filing a 
Form 355C on September 13, 2005, September 5, 2006, September 5, 
2007, and September 9, 2008, respectively.  
                                                 
51 See footnote 31, supra. 
52 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321992 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
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 On November 29, 2010, Needham filed Forms CA-6 for each of 
the tax years 2004 through 2007, claiming abatements and refunds 
of its self-assessed, non-income measure of the corporate excise 
in the amount of $95,647.
53
 By Notices of Abatement Determination 
dated October 9, 2013, the Commissioner denied the Forms CA-6 
for the tax years 2004 through 2007. Needham timely filed a 
Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board on December 4, 
2013, which was assigned Docket No. C321993, appealing the 
Commissioner’s denial of its Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 
through 2007.
54
  
I. Southern NE (Docket No. C321994) 
Southern NE originated as Whaling City Cable TV, Inc. in 
1970. Its name changed to Colony Cablevision of Southeastern 
Massachusetts, Inc. and then Continental Cablevision of Southern 
New England, Inc. as a result of mergers in 1993 and 1995. Its 
name changed to MediaOne of Southern New England, Inc. in 1997 
after the purchase of Continental Cablevision by MediaOne. Upon 
Comcast’s purchase of AT&T Broadband in 2002, MediaOne of 
Southern New England, Inc. was renamed Comcast of Southern New 
England, Inc. 
Southern NE reported its Massachusetts income for each of 
the tax years 2004 through 2006 and the tax year 2008 as part of 
                                                 
53 See footnote 31, supra. 
54 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321993 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
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the Forms 355C filed by Mass I. It reported its non-income 
measure of the corporate excise for each of the tax years 2004 
through 2006 and the tax year 2008 by filing a Form 355C on 
September 13, 2005, September 5, 2006, September 5, 2007, and 
September 10, 2009, respectively.  
 On November 29, 2010, Southern NE filed Forms CA-6 for each 
of the tax years 2004 through 2006 and the tax year 2008, 
claiming abatements and refunds of its self-assessed, non-income 
measure of the corporate excise in the amount of $1,077,366.
55
 By 
Notice of Abatement Determination dated October 9, 2013, the 
Commissioner denied the Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 
through 2006 and the tax year 2008. Southern NE timely filed a 
Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board on December 4, 
2013, which was assigned Docket No. C321994, appealing the 
Commissioner’s denial of its Forms CA-6 for the tax years 2004 
through 2006 and the tax year 2008.
56
  
IV. Findings on Individual Issues 
A. Costs of Performance Issue 
The Costs of Performance Issue
57
 concerned the question of 
whether certain receipts derived from sales of Video and 
                                                 
55 See footnote 31, supra.  
56 The issue before the Board for Docket No. C321994 was the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
57 The Costs of Performance Issue included the tax years 2003 through 2008 for 
Docket No. C321986; the tax years 2004 through 2008 for Docket No. C321987; 
the tax year 2003 for Docket No. C321988; the tax years 2003 through 2005 for 
Docket No. C321989; the tax year 2003 for Docket No. C321990; the tax years 
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Internet services to subscribers located in Massachusetts should 
be included in total sales in the Commonwealth for purposes of 
determining the sales factor under G.L. c. 63, § 38.
58
 The 
appellants originally included these receipts in determining 
their sales factors, but later concluded this was an error on 
the basis that the costs of performing the alleged income-
producing activities were greater outside of Massachusetts. They 
subsequently amended their returns to source these receipts 
outside of Massachusetts, claiming that Pennsylvania was the 
state with the highest costs of performance.
59
  
The appellants identified thirteen entities as relevant to 
the Costs of Performance Issue (collectively referenced as 
“Cable Franchise Companies” and each a “Cable Franchise 
Company”): Mass I, Comcast of Boston, Inc. (“Boston”), Brockton, 
CA/MA/MI/UT, Georgia, GA/MA, Comcast of Massachusetts II, Inc. 
(“Mass II”), Comcast of Massachusetts III, Inc. (“Mass III”), 
Comcast of Massachusetts/Virginia, Inc. (“MA/VA”), MA/NH/OH, 
Milton, Needham, and Southern NE.
60
  
                                                                                                                                                             
2003 through 2005 for Docket No. C321991; the tax years 2004 through 2006 and 
the tax year 2008 for Docket No. C321992; the tax years 2004 through 2007 for 
Docket No. C321993; and the tax years 2004 through 2006 and the tax year 2008 
for Docket No. C321994. 
58 All statutory and regulatory sections throughout these findings of fact and 
report reference those in effect during relevant tax years, with any 
deviations during that time frame noted.   
59 The Refund Claims consisted of the Costs of Performance Issue, along with 
the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue, the Federal Changes Issue, and the 
Allocable Expenses Issue. See footnote 9, supra.   
60 The Costs of Performance Issue included income adjustments for the tax 
years 2003 through 2008 as reported on the Mass I combined returns for the 
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The Commissioner separated the Cable Franchise Companies 
into what he defined as “Mass CableCos” (Mass I, Mass II, Mass 
III, Boston, Brockton, Milton, Needham, and Southern NE), 
entities that held cable franchise licenses solely with 
Massachusetts cities and towns, and “Part-Mass CableCos” 
(CA/MA/MI/UT, GA/MA, MA/NH/OH, and MA/VA), entities that held 
cable franchise licenses with Massachusetts cities and towns, as 
well as jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts. Definition-wise, 
the Commissioner omitted Georgia entirely.
61
  
Each of the thirteen Cable Franchise Companies was included 
in the combined returns filed by Mass I as the principal 
reporting corporation. Eight of the Cable Franchise Companies 
also filed for abatements of the non-income measure of the 
corporate excise based upon the Costs of Performance Issue.
62
 
The appellants mainly relied upon the testimony and 
documents entered into evidence to establish Pennsylvania, among 
other states, as the primary situs for all relevant activity of 
                                                                                                                                                             
thirteen Cable Franchise Companies (Docket No. C321986) and non-income 
adjustments to GA/MA, CA/MA/MI/UT, Georgia, Southern NE, Needham, MA/NH/OH, 
Brockton, and Milton (Docket Nos. C321987, C321988, C321989, C321990, 
C321991, C321992, C321993, and C321994). But see footnote 61, infra. 
61 Georgia’s inclusion by the appellants in the Costs of Performance Issue was 
enigmatic as it held no Massachusetts cable franchises and hence had no 
Massachusetts subscribers. As stated by Mr. Donnelly, Georgia “does not own 
directly franchises in Massachusetts.” The only cable franchise license 
included in the record for Georgia was an agreement between Georgia and 
Forsyth County, Georgia. The record was unclear as to whether Georgia was a 
member of a disregarded entity that held Massachusetts franchises. In any 
event, the Board’s decisions for the Commissioner rendered the mystery 
surrounding Georgia as moot.  
62 This is the sole issue under consideration for Docket Nos. C321987, 
C321988, C321989, C321990, C321991, C321992, C321993, and C321994. 
  ATB 2017-523
the Cable Franchise Companies. As they argued in their post-
trial brief: “Without content, the [Cable Franchise Companies] 
would have had no Video service to deliver. Without a network, 
they would not have had the means to deliver the services. And 
without franchises, they would have been legally prohibited from 
providing them. Each of these crucial activities was performed 
outside Massachusetts at Comcast’s Corporate Headquarters in 
Pennsylvania, at network facilities in Colorado, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania, and at Division Headquarters in New Hampshire. And 
each of the activities was undertaken by individuals who were 
officers of the individual [Cable Franchise Companies]. 
Consequently, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that 
substantial income-producing activities of the taxpayers 
occurred outside Massachusetts.” 
The Commissioner alleged that the eight entities he defined 
as the Mass CableCos (though not the four entities that he 
defined as the Part-Mass CableCos) had not established that they 
were taxable in another state and therefore not entitled to even 
apportion their income in the first instance. As an additional 
option, he alleged that even if the income of the Mass CableCos 
was apportionable, the Mass CableCos did not engage in any 
income-producing activities outside of the Commonwealth under 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(f). As a further alternative, the Commissioner 
alleged that even if the Mass CableCos had business activities 
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and income-producing activities in other states, their Video 
sales were still Massachusetts sales because the greatest costs 
of performance were incurred in Massachusetts. The Commissioner 
divided this argument into sublevels: the Cable Franchise 
Companies were licensees under the agreements with programmers, 
the amounts paid to programmers were not costs of performance 
but rather costs of independent contractors, and alternatively 
the amounts paid to programmers were costs of performance 
incurred in Massachusetts. Lastly, the Commissioner contended 
that even if the Mass CableCos had business activities and 
income-producing activities in other states, Internet sales were 
Massachusetts sales because the appellants failed to 
substantiate that the greatest costs of performance were 
performed outside of Massachusetts.
63
   
In his opening statement, the Commissioner conceded that 
the income-producing activities “should be viewed on an 
operational (rather than transactional) basis.” The parties 
purportedly agreed that the income-producing activities were the 
                                                 
63 The Commissioner largely ignored the entities that he defined as the Part-
Mass CableCos, except for MA/NH/OH. For instance, the Commissioner’s post-
trial brief stated as follows: The appellants “have not proffered evidence 
that the Mass CableCos conducted any business activities, let alone any 
income-producing activities, outside of Massachusetts, or that the Mass 
CableCos or MA/NH/OH incurred the greatest proportion of their costs of 
performance of their income-producing activities in a state outside of 
Massachusetts. As such, the Mass CableCos’ income for all years at issue is 
allocable to Massachusetts, and MA/NH/OH’s sales should be sourced 100% to 
Massachusetts.” 
  ATB 2017-525
provisions of Video and Internet services.
64
 In actuality, the 
appellants advocated that the income-producing activity was the 
operation of a national enterprise. Regardless, the 
determination of the income-producing activity and whether to 
use an operational, transactional, or procedural approach (all 
three approaches are delineated in 830 CMR 63.38.1) are 
determinations for the Board to make, not the parties.
65
  
Summary of Testimony and Documentary Evidence 
1. Philadelphia Headquarters 
From the 1960s through the present, the Comcast 
headquarters has been located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 
headquarters is currently located in the Comcast Center at 1701 
JFK Boulevard and was previously located at 1500 Market Street. 
Several thousand employees worked at the headquarters during the 
tax years 2003 through 2008, including the majority of Comcast’s 
senior executive officers. Personnel at the headquarters are in 
charge of setting companywide business and marketing strategies, 
content acquisition, content packaging and branding, and 
procurement, among other activities.  
                                                 
64 Both the appellants’ and the Commissioner’s requested findings of fact 
stated that Video and Internet services were income-producing activities. 
65 While the parties are free to concede an issue in its entirety, the Board 
will not be bound or controlled by concessions and agreements “‘on a 
subsidiary question of law.’” Goddard v. Goucher, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 
(2016) (quoting Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 
(1917). See also AT&T Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2011-524, 551 (“It bears repeating that 830 CMR 
§ 63.38.1(9)(d)(2) does not offer a choice of an income-producing activity 
but requires a determination of the correct income-producing activity based 
on a specific set of facts.”). 
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The appellants stressed that the senior leadership team of 
Comcast’s cable division was located at headquarters in 
Philadelphia, including Steve Burke, the President of Comcast 
Cable; David Watson, the Chief Operating Officer; and David 
Scott, the Executive Vice President of Finance and 
Administration. They stressed that each of these individuals was 
also an officer of the Cable Franchise Companies. As stated in 
their post-trial brief, “Mr. Burke, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Scott 
were responsible for, among other things, setting companywide 
business strategy, including making decisions about what 
services to offer, pricing, and budgeting.”  
The appellants elicited copious testimony about the offices 
on the 53
rd
 floor of the Comcast Center.
66
 According to Mr. Scott, 
who occupied an office on the 53
rd
 floor, “The [Comcast Center is 
the] largest building in Philadelphia. It’s about 60 stories.” 
John Schanz, the Executive Vice President and Chief Network 
Officer for Comcast Cable, also testified that his office is 
located on the 53
rd
 floor of the Comcast Center. Similarly, Peter 
Kiriacoulacos, the Executive Vice President and Chief 
Procurement Officer for Comcast Cable and NBCUniversal, 
testified that his office is on the 53
rd
 floor and that “the 53rd 
floor is where all the executives sit.” 
                                                 
66 Despite the copious testimony, in actuality, Comcast did not move into the 
building until March 2008, as stated by Mr. Scott. 
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To further support Philadelphia as the hub of activity, the 
appellants paradoxically introduced a picture taken in 
Charleston, South Carolina in 2006. Mr. Scott testified that 
“[e]veryone [in the picture] is located in Philadelphia with the 
exception there’s four of the division presidents there.” 
Mr. Scott stated that “[w]e actually walked away from that 
meeting [with] what we call triple play pricing, which we still 
advertise today.” He added that “[t]his is where we put the 
pricing together for video, high speed internet and telephone,” 
a national pricing for the three products. 
2. The National Network 
In their post-trial brief the appellants stressed that 
“[t]he network provided the physical and technological means by 
which Comcast carried Video and Internet traffic to its 
customers” and that “[w]ithout it, Comcast would have had no way 
of delivering its services.” 
As testified to by Mr. Schanz, “We use our national network 
to deliver all services to all customers. So that includes cable 
television and it includes broadband for internet access. It 
includes phone service for residential customers as well as 
business class customers.” He described the network as “a single 
converged network of video, voice and data.” According to 
Mr. Schanz, “There isn’t any one location. It’s a national 
network that has literally thousands of locations that pulls 
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together lots of infrastructure.” He explained that the “network 
has probably north of a million moving parts if you kind of 
count every device and every piece of infrastructure that brings 
that network together. It’s one of the largest single converged 
video, voice and data networks on the planet.”  
Regarding the physical structure of the network, Mr. Schanz 
testified that the physical assets are located throughout the 
country and that there is “[a] lot of infrastructure” comprising 
cables, switches, routers, servers, storage arrays, and other 
equipment that allows information to be transmitted. He stated 
that the network basically involves “really almost every type, 
kind of communications or applications infrastructure you would 
use in the tech world.” He also noted that Comcast spends 
billions every year investing in the speed and capabilities of 
its network.   
Comcast’s national engineering and technical operations 
(“NE-TO”) group was responsible for operating and managing 
Comcast’s national network. The NE-TO management team, including 
Mr. Schanz, was located in Philadelphia. The NE-TO had national 
operating centers in New Jersey and Colorado that provided 
round-the-clock monitoring of network services. According to 
Mr. Schanz, the NE-TO group functions included engineering 
design, implementation of new products, and capacity of 
deployment.   
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According to Mr. Schanz, Comcast received Video content 
from content providers at the Comcast Media Center (“CMC”) in 
Colorado.
67
 Content providers sent their content to the CMC 
either through an uplink to a satellite, from which the CMC 
would receive the downlink, or through a direct fiber link 
between the content provider and the CMC. Advantages of 
receiving the content at the CMC as opposed to various local 
facilities included consistency in signal quality as well as 
economics, noted Mr. Schanz. National content was received at 
the CMC.
68
 At the CMC, the content was “encoded and groomed into 
video multiplexers for distribution nationally across [the] 
converged backbone” and sent to each converged regional area 
network (“CRAN”) throughout the country. CRANs did not conform 
to state or municipality boundaries. The CRAN that served 
Massachusetts subscribers also served subscribers in New 
Hampshire and Connecticut. Next, the content was routed to a 
headend
69
 where the “entire channel lineup is assembled,” 
including hundreds of national channels. Upon finalization of 
                                                 
67 Historically, Mr. Scott explained, the CMC was an asset owned by AT&T 
Broadband. It “became Comcast. And we really kind of liked the technology and 
the distribution, so we actually converted the Comcast system over to that 
platform.”  
68 Local programming did not travel on the national network during the tax 
years 2003 through 2008. Signals were acquired locally into satellite farms 
according to Mr. Schanz. 
69 A “headend” is defined in MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM as “equipment or a facility 
which receives communications signals (such as cable television broadcasts) 
for distribution to a local region.” Headend, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/headend (last visited June 14, 
2017). 
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the channel lineup, the channels were sent through a hub to 
hybrid fiber co-axial cables, connecting the CRANs to a 
subscriber’s premises and transmitting the signals to a 
subscriber’s set-top box to display the content. 
The national network also distributed Internet services to 
subscribers. Mr. Schanz stated that the national network was 
“absolutely mission critical. It carries a tremendous amount of 
internet traffic for all the customers, whether they are 
residential or commercial. Mission critical.” Starting with a 
cable modem in a subscriber’s premises, a signal would travel a 
path through the national network to the global internet. The 
signal from subscribers traveled through a hybrid fiber co-axial 
network, known as the “access area” of the network. The access 
area connected premises to CRANs. From the CRANs, the signal 
traveled through one of Comcast’s aggregation routers, 
connecting the CRANs to the national network. 
3. Content Acquisition 
Comcast maintained a dedicated content acquisition 
department at its headquarters in Philadelphia. “Content 
acquisition,” according to Jennifer T. Gaiski, the Senior Vice 
President of Content Acquisition for Comcast Cable, “is the 
process by which we go out — Comcast Cable goes out and licenses 
the right to redistribute what I call channels — cable TV 
channels for programmers. So Home & Garden, MTV, HBO. There’s a 
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signal where it comes from the air that we need the right to 
then redistribute to our customers. And, essentially, that’s 
what I do.” Content acquisition is Comcast’s largest cost.  
According to Ms. Gaiski, the content acquisition department 
is “a department of about 25, 27 people. So in Comcast 
standards, it’s a pretty small group.” She personally works on 
all contract negotiations and renegotiations, which take place 
in Philadelphia and can be “extremely contentious” and lengthy, 
taking months to even years. Ms. Gaiski stated that the 
department is small “[b]ecause you need to be an expert. You 
really need to understand what you’re doing. You need to know 
everything that’s going on in the marketing department, in the 
finance and planning department, in the engineering department, 
in the new business development department because these 
contracts cover all of those things. These contracts are 
anywhere from 40 pages to 200 pages.” Additionally, she stated 
that the contracts are “[e]xtremely confidential. So that’s 
another reason. You don’t want a bunch of people in the room who 
don’t really know what they’re talking about who could also then 
take that information and proliferate it in different ways, 
maybe leave the company and go work for a competitor or go work 
for a programmer.” The contracts are kept “in a fireproof locked 
separate filing room that only, like, three people have keys 
to.”  
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When the AT&T Broadband deal closed, Comcast had two sets 
of contracts. Ms. Gaiski testified that she and others in the 
programming department spent about four years living with two 
sets of contracts and renegotiating with the programmers.  
Regarding payments to programmers, Ms. Gaiski is “the one 
who tells accounting what to pay.” The fee provision is in the 
contract. Programmers can be paid in different ways. Some might 
be paid annually, some monthly. Some programming is free, while 
some might have a flat fee arrangement. Some programming is 
based upon the aggregate of subscribers. Programmers want a 
guarantee regarding level of service — “you would look at how 
many customers take that level of service over how many total 
customers we have,” testified Ms. Gaiski. Ms. Gaiski does not 
handle subscriber numbers. She verifies the payment process, not 
subscriber accounts. She “calculate[s] the rates and give[s] 
that guidance to the accounting department” and “[t]he 
accounting department actually makes the payment to the 
programmer. We pay about 500 programmers a month out of 
Philadelphia.” No programmer is paid from an office outside of 
Philadelphia. “There’s not a payment that leaves the company to 
a programmer that I haven’t approved,” stated Ms. Gaiski.70 She 
                                                 
70 William Dordelman, the current Senior Vice President and Treasurer for 
Comcast who served as Vice President of Finance and Treasurer during relevant 
time periods, when asked where Comcast obtained the money to pay programmers, 
stated that it is “[v]ery simple. We bill our customers in advance each month 
for service. They pay us. . . . It’s coming from customers.” 
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explained that the payment (what is paid to programmers) and 
accrual (how the expenses are shared across the divisions
71
) 
processes involve a binder with a page for each network, 
detailing what to pay to the programmers. The binder is kept 
confidential, with few copies produced. Those copies are 
produced on purple paper, according to Ms. Gaiski, because “[i]f 
you try to copy something on a deep purple piece of paper, it 
just looks black.” One of the purple-paged binders is 
distributed to each of the divisions’ chief financial officers 
“[s]o each division has their own [profit and loss statement] by 
which they’re judged,” she explained. The divisions do not make 
payments to programmers. The divisions also do not make 
decisions on packaging, branding, and how to market to 
customers. Those decisions are made out of Philadelphia 
headquarters, explained Ms. Gaiski. As far as Ms. Gaiski is 
aware, the divisions do not write checks to Comcast at 
Philadelphia headquarters, though she noted that “[t]he 
accounting department would handle how cost is allocated.”  
Ms. Gaiski does not negotiate on behalf of a particular 
entity or region: “I just think of the field. It’s almost like a 
commodity. They’re all aggregated. They’re all kind of the same 
widget out there. There’s no difference in whether something is 
                                                 
71 Comcast divides its operations into geographical divisions, described 
further infra. 
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coming — a customer is coming out of Massachusetts or 
California. To me, a customer is a customer. . . . MTV is MTV 
whether you’re in Massachusetts or California.” She will 
communicate to divisions as to whether they must carry a 
particular service, for instance. When asked how influential 
cable operations in Massachusetts are in determining programming 
offerings, Ms. Gaiski stated that “[t]hey are not at all.”72  
Ms. Gaiski does not draft the agreements entered into with 
programmers — that work is done by an internal team of lawyers 
at Philadelphia headquarters — but she does help “because, 
ultimately, at the end of the day, I’ve been doing these deals 
for so many years, and . . . that contract remains my 
responsibility to make sure that we can comply with it and that 
we don’t inadvertently or otherwise breach it.” Either she or 
her boss, Greg Rigdon, the Executive Vice President of Content 
Acquisition, signs the programming agreements.
73
  
If the programming deal is one that commits Comcast for 
less than $25 million, the approval process is via a contract 
approval form. If it is more than $25 million, Ms. Gaiski 
                                                 
72 Mr. Donnelly tried to couch Ms. Gaiski’s function as negotiating directly 
on behalf of the Cable Franchise Companies: “Jen Gaiski is not wearing just 
the Comcast Corporation hat, she’s actually wearing many hats, Comcast of 
Boston hat, Comcast of Needham hat, etcetera.” He added that “[s]he is doing 
all these contracts for all these subs. The subs consume the service and 
generate cash. That goes into our cash management facility. And that cash 
then is pooled and used by Comcast to make payments to the network 
providers.” 
73 The actual programming agreements were not entered into the record. The 
parties instead included documents illustrating provisions that would be 
included in such agreements. 
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explained that “we have what we call . . . the approval memo.” 
The approval memo is “usually a two-page document that lays out 
the most important points and commitments in the contract” and 
“[a]t the end of that, Neil Smith, the [P]resident of Comcast, 
signs it, and Brian Roberts, the [C]hairman and CEO, signs it.” 
Ms. Gaiski stated that “Comcast Corporation generally is the 
party” on the programming agreement, but “[s]ometimes [it is] 
Comcast Programming, LLC.” Each contract “covers . . . all of 
our cable systems, which fold up in divisions, all of our 
affiliates. We essentially act on their behalf.” The other side 
to the programming agreement would be the programmer. 
Programming agreement terms are typically about ten years long, 
according to Ms. Gaiski. “And renewals are often an even tougher 
discussion than the initial contract negotiation,” testified 
Ms. Gaiski. 
 If there is a contractual dispute with a programmer, 
Ms. Gaiski gets involved. “No one has copies of those 
contracts,” she noted. Divisions “wouldn’t be able to defend 
their actions because they wouldn’t have anything to reference 
or go back to.” She also explained that because programming 
agreements can have a distribution component, i.e., that a 
certain number of subscribers must be exposed to a particular 
channel, “someone in California or someone in the western 
division can’t possibly begin to even record that or . . . 
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confirm that compliance because what I negotiated is for the 
entire company, not just for the western division.” Disputes, 
compliance, and payments are all handled out of Philadelphia 
headquarters, as are negotiations.  
The programming budget “has fallen under [Ms. Gaiski’s] 
purview” during her time with Comcast and she is held 
accountable for the budget. “They can’t possibly hold a division 
responsible when I’m the one negotiating the contracts,” she 
stated. She described the budget process as taking about two 
months, where she and her team “go through each contract and 
create a budget page for every single programmer” and “put 
together what we call a CPV.” She stated that “[a] CPV takes the 
individual pages and puts them all in one report, aggregates 
them by subscribers, and says this year . . . we expect 
programming fees to be whatever, $6 billion, $11 billion.” 
Subsequently, she meets with the accounting department to go 
through the budget, and then with company executives, all at 
Philadelphia headquarters. Generally no persons outside 
Philadelphia headquarters are involved in the budget process. 
Ms. Gaiski stated that they might go to the divisions, but that 
the “[o]nly thing that they would be able to say is something 
like, oh, we weren’t planning on making a rate increase in 
November, we were maybe going to make a rate increase in 
December.”    
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Ms. Gaiski also explained the concept of grant of rights: 
“So grant of rights is where I’m really involved with someone 
like John Schanz. So if he’s developing a new set-top box, a new 
way to deliver our cable TV programming, I have to make sure 
that in that deal, I have the right to distribute that signal 
because, again, I’m just basically just redistributing their 
signal. And so grant of rights is very important too.” She 
further explained that “[the programmers] want to have a very 
small scope of my grant of rights, a very small scope of my 
technology; whereas, John [Schanz] is moving the company very 
quickly because we need to remain competitive. So I need to have 
expansive grant of rights because the last thing I want to do is 
have to go back and open up a deal when it’s negotiated.”  
4. Procurement 
Comcast engaged in centralized procurement of goods and 
services out of Philadelphia headquarters. “It’s all about 
scale,” testified Mr. Kiriacoulacos, the Executive Vice 
President and Chief Procurement Officer for Comcast Cable and 
NBCUniversal. “It’s all about choosing the right suppliers. It’s 
all about making sure we’re spending the right amounts of money 
with a healthy supply portfolio. It gives us the ability to 
deploy standardized technology. So, in other words, a set-top 
box or a cable modem deployed in Philadelphia is the exact same 
technology that’s deployed in California. And it allows us to 
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consolidate Comcast as a whole, which allows us to . . . 
negotiate standard terms, better . . . technology standards.” He 
pointed out that Comcast could not achieve these kinds of 
benefits if each of the approximately 6,500 cable franchises had 
its own procurement department. According to Mr. Scott, “We 
would do those contracts all nationally kind of looking at the 
whole company. And one of our biggest objectives was to try to 
drive down the cost of those items as much as we could.”  
Mr. Kiriacoulacos explained that the procurement bucket of 
expenditures includes categories such as “all technology, all 
customer premise equipment, all network equipment and software, 
and ad purchases, media purchases, and call centers, for 
example, billing systems.” He identified technology as one of 
the largest procurement expenses, “which includes network and 
customer premise equipment.” He described customer premise 
equipment as “those devices that are . . . in a subscriber’s 
home. It’s set-top boxes, which give you video on your TV. It’s 
cable modems, which give you high-speed internet.” Regarding the 
network, his department is “responsible for the selection, 
negotiation, and contract management of those agreements. . . . 
We call it capacity because it is capacity driven, but network 
is another term we could use.”   
The procurement department has around fifty employees, 
broken down into three groupings: real estate, which manages 
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transactions for about 3,000 properties, both leased
74
 and owned, 
including in Massachusetts; demand supply forecasting, “which 
collates and market[s] purchase demands from every division” 
that are communicated to suppliers; and negotiations. 
Mr. Kiriacoulacos explained that his department procured items 
that are capital expenditures, items that would be depreciated, 
as well as items that are operating expenditures, such as 
billing, call centers, and hardware/software agreements.  
 Procurement contracts are negotiated at Philadelphia 
headquarters, and go through “the CAF, the contract approval 
form process. This process is owned by Art Block, our general 
counsel . . . for Comcast,” according to Mr. Kiriacoulacos. He 
stated that the legal entity usually on the procurement 
contracts was an entity known as Comcast Cable Communications 
Management (“CCCM”) and that “[a]s far as I know, I’ve only 
signed for this entity.” The contracts are “living, breathing 
documents, and we continually amend them,” stated 
Mr. Kiriacoulacos. The procurement is centralized, but the 
contracts are essential to providing services, including in 
Massachusetts.  
Centralization afforded benefits, noted Mr. Kiriacoulacos: 
“[I]t’s scale on the commercial side. So the ability — my team’s 
                                                 
74 Rents on leased properties were paid automatically “through the system in 
Philadelphia,” stated Mr. Kiriacoulacos. 
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ability to forecast and give 12-month projected purchases to the 
vendors is a great benefit. Scale is one. Again, for the vendors 
to be able to produce one version of a product versus . . . ten 
versions of the same product is greatly beneficial. And the 
second one is it allows a standardization of our network and CPE 
devices. So, in other words, they’re interchangeable.”  
5. The Northeast Division 
Comcast divides its cable operations into geographic 
divisions, including a division in the northeast (“Northeast 
Division”) located in Manchester, New Hampshire.75 Each division 
is responsible for management of cable systems — the local 
equipment and facilities through which the cable services are 
provided — and CRANs. Personnel at the Northeast Division’s 
Manchester location, including officers of the Cable Franchise 
Companies, performed functions such as marketing, government 
relations, engineering and technical operations, and finance and 
human resources for the Massachusetts market during the tax 
years 2003 through 2008. The Massachusetts field operations fall 
within the Northeast Division. The Northeast Division was known 
as the Eastern Division from 2002 through 2005, the Northern 
Division from 2005 to 2006, and the North Central Division from 
2007 through 2012.  
                                                 
75 Comcast comprised six divisions in the tax year 2003 time frame. It 
decreased to five divisions and then down to three divisions by the tax year 
2008. 
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Kevin Casey is the current president of the Northeast 
Division. He described the Northeast Division as “one of three 
operating divisions that make up Comcast Cable. And my 
responsibilities are to manage the properties in 14 states from 
Virginia through Maine” as well as “[o]ne little town” in North 
Carolina. “The buck stops with [him] for these 14 states.” He 
stated that about 1,000 people work in the Manchester location, 
which was formerly “a missile assembly plant at one time.” About 
500 people worked at the location during the tax years 2003 
through 2008. Mr. Casey has fourteen direct reports and more 
than 22,000 indirect reports. There are five regions in the 
fourteen states that he oversees. Two of the regions service the 
Massachusetts market — the Boston region and the western New 
England region. He explained that the Northeast Division 
“work[s] in tandem with Philadelphia. They set the broad 
strategy for the company. We develop an operating plan to 
support the company strategy. And it’s my responsibility and my 
team to execute against that strategy.” 
From a technical perspective, the national network 
interacts with the CRANs, “which is a divisional function,” 
explained Mr. Casey. An individual with the Northeast Division 
is responsible for “mak[ing] sure that the CRAN[s] interfaced 
and interconnected with the national backbone as well as the 
local last mile.” He added that “[t]hese are the wires on the 
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poles that serve the customers at the end of the network” and 
that “the regions are responsible for the day-to-day 
maintenance. If a wire gets knocked down, they have to take the 
white truck and get the ladder out and put the wires back up. So 
that’s how the company functions from a technical perspective.” 
The Northeast Division has no content acquisition function, 
but has “allocable costs from headquarters,” testified 
Mr. Casey. He “can’t tell you that [he knows] precisely how 
costs are allocated. But it’s held at corporate. So it isn’t 
anything that [he has] direct responsibility or authority over 
in terms of whether it’s negotiating contracts or saying here’s 
how much [he wants] to pay. It’s a company expense at the 
corporate level.” He stated that the company goes through the 
exercise of allocating costs “[b]ecause we have financial 
statements and we have some direct costs that we control and 
some that are allocated based on what I described. And that’s 
just how our business is, that’s how we organize our business, 
that’s how we run our empire.” But he admitted that he doesn’t 
“make the decision around how costs are allocated.” According to 
Mr. Casey, “I don’t operate the business on a day-to-day basis 
based on legal entities.” 
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Subscribers located in the Northeast Division don’t send 
payments to Manchester but to New Jersey.
76
 “That’s the lock box 
clearing house where payments get processed for the whole 
company,” stated Mr. Casey. Local Massachusetts facilities 
included network facilities, field management offices, customer 
services centers, and call centers. 
Mark Reilly, the Northeast Division’s Senior Vice President 
of Government and Regulatory Relations who is also based in 
Manchester, explained that “[w]e are broken up into regions. So 
we have, this is the greater Boston region. You go everywhere 
from Brunswick, Maine, all the way down to the Cape and 
Islands.” He added that “greater Boston runs that market. 
Western New England has everything from Carmel, New York, the 
seashore of Connecticut up to the Canadian border. So it’s 
western New England.” Defining a region is “not an easy answer,” 
stated Mr. Reilly. “Where is the network fed from? That’s a 
factor in how we create the regions.” He stated to “[t]hink 
about [regions] as the last mile of our operations. So the 
network begins with John Schanz. And from a customer care 
                                                 
76 Regarding billing and payments by subscribers, Mr. Dordelman explained that 
“[t]he traditional way is to get a bill in the mail and turn around and put a 
check in the mail, which will get centralized into a central location, what 
we call a lock box, which is basically where receipts and revenue are 
consolidated and pooled and used for company resources.” Additional ways to 
pay include “online payment[s] and physical payment[s] where people walk into 
our offices and actually pay us cash, check.” After collection “they would be 
further consolidated into the company’s internal bank and then pooled and 
reused by the division for the payment of operating expenses,” including 
content acquisition costs. 
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perspective, you have people all the way up to Philadelphia who 
oversee what we are going to do in terms of delivering the 
customer experience.” He stated that “[a]t the division level, 
this is that sort of middle tier that’s overseeing the 
operations of our footprint. The execution of the white trucks 
that are in the streets and the delivery of the customer 
experience from the technicians going into the home, the regions 
own that last mile delivery of the experience.”   
According to Mr. Reilly, “The best way to think of it is 
look at the different silos of what I oversee. One of the silos 
is franchising.” Franchising comprises “compliance with the 
existing franchise and it’s renewing any franchise that comes up 
for expiration. So at any given point in time, we have hundreds 
of franchises in what we call the renewal window.” “Typically,” 
Mr. Reilly explained, “it’s a ten year franchise. Three years 
before expiration the renewal window begins. And that’s the 
process to work with that local community or jurisdiction over 
the renewal of that franchise.” If the Northeast Division needed 
to get outside counsel involved, Mr. Reilly stated that the 
legal department at Philadelphia headquarters made the call.   
“Legislative issues,” are also handled by Mr. Reilly. “[S]o 
in all of those states any issues that come up in a given 
legislature that would impact the business, I oversee those 
issues.” He added that “[i]f that state legislation impacts our 
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business in any way, shape or form — so as I think about that, 
the cable television business, the high speed internet business, 
the voice business, the Xfinity home security business, or since 
[NBCUniversal], the broadcast industry business, anything that 
comes up in any of those state legislatures, those issues are 
going to come to me. . . . [W]e want to make sure, much like in 
the franchises, that we have a consistent approach when it comes 
to legislative issues.” 
Mr. Reilly also handles “[p]ublic relations, anything from 
social media, print media, broadcast perspective, PR related 
issues. And then community investment,” including philanthropic 
endeavors.  
6. Cable Franchise Licenses and the Cable Franchise Companies 
During the tax years 2003 through 2008, Comcast entities 
held approximately 6,500 cable franchises nationwide, with more 
than 1,000 cable franchises in the Northeast Division.
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Mr. Scott described a cable franchise license as “a local 
license to operate. It gives you the right of ways to hang your 
cable on the telephone poles and do underground construction, 
easements.” Mr. Reilly similarly explained that a “cable 
franchise enables us to offer cable television service. If we 
don’t get a franchise, we can’t lawfully offer cable television 
                                                 
77 As testified to by Mr. Scott, “The whole cable industry evolved from these 
local franchising agreements. . . . It was sort of a hodgepodge of legal 
entities all over the place. Then as the industry consolidated later, you 
ended up with big companies that had many of these legal entities.” 
  ATB 2017-546
service in a community.” He stressed that “[w]e can’t run our 
business without it. We need to have that cable franchise to 
offer our cable services.” Mr. Reilly stated that both federal 
law and state law set a framework for cable franchises.
78
 
Each of the appellants, with the exception of Georgia, held 
one or more cable franchise licenses with cities and/or towns in 
Massachusetts.
79
 Some of the appellants held cable franchise 
licenses with jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts. “[E]ach 
and every city and town under Massachusetts law is its own 
franchise,” noted Mr. Reilly. He contrasted this with 
Connecticut, for instance, where “[w]e don’t have that . . . 
[because] [i]t’s a different state law. So we have things 
organized differently in terms of our franchise areas. They are 
not city and town like they are in Massachusetts.” 
Mr. Reilly stressed that he believes the expectation of the 
cities and towns “is everything that Comcast has to offer . . . 
is part of what they are getting.” For instance, when Comcast 
appeared at public hearings after acquisition of the Cable 
Franchise Companies from AT&T Broadband, he believed that the 
municipalities looked to Comcast as a whole when evaluating 
whether to approve assumption of the franchise by a new owner. 
                                                 
78 In Massachusetts the relevant statutory provision is G.L. c. 166A. 
79 The record contained numerous cable franchise licenses. See footnote 61, 
supra, regarding Georgia. 
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But he admitted that each of the Cable Franchise Companies “is 
the legal entity that is named in the franchise.”  
Mr. Reilly testified that “[w]hen we went through the AT&T 
transaction, we would go to the communities and we would explain 
the legal ability of AT&T to take over the franchise, the 
financial wherewithal of AT&T to run the systems, the technical 
and management expertise to run it.” He stated that “[w]e had to 
go through that whole process again when it was Comcast 
acquiring all of the AT&T franchises across the country.” He 
explained that “under Massachusetts law, you have to go through 
a hearing. And you have to get each community’s approval to 
transfer that franchise.”  
As to why all the franchises are tied to individual legal 
entities, Mr. Scott stated that “I think just because we 
acquired so many companies, and these licenses were long term 
and they were in place with the local government authorities. So 
we left them.” Comcast felt that consolidation of the entities 
would complicate efforts to obtain approval of the AT&T 
Broadband transaction from local franchising authorities. 
Mr. Scott noted the challenge to consolidate as a reason for 
keeping a separate-entity structure: “It could have been 
challenging. You’d have to go back to the city government. And 
every time you would do that, you would end up in a negotiation. 
And there was probably a cost involved.” According to Mr. Scott, 
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“[T]hese were very time consuming conversations and negotiations 
when you would go back for anything.” He testified that he was 
not aware of any other reasons for keeping the separate-entity 
structure — “I’m really not aware of any other ones. We acquired 
the companies and the franchises and the legal entities.” 
Comcast kept the entities in place after the AT&T Broadband 
acquisition and changed their names to indicate their 
affiliation with Comcast, essentially stepping into the shoes of 
the prior entity. Mr. Reilly proffered another reason for 
keeping the separate franchise entities. Certain entities had 
“legacy shareholders who get a percentage of revenues from the 
original franchise going back to the ‘70s or ‘80s,” testified 
Mr. Reilly. “When you think about that, they would be getting 
0.5 percent of that larger entity. So when you’ve got those 
sorts of situations, certainly you want to keep it as is.” 
Regarding the renewal process for cable franchise licenses, 
Mr. Reilly explained that “[t]hree years before they expire, 
under federal law there’s a process you go through. We call it 
the 626 process. You basically send a letter to the community 
saying I want to renew this franchise.”80 He added that 
subsequently “the community as well as the company goes through 
what is called ascertainment. Under federal law, the community 
is supposed to ascertain what are the cable related needs of the 
                                                 
80 See 47 U.S.C. 546. 
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community for that new franchise. So it varies.” Mr. Reilly 
stated that the renewal letters are sent from the Manchester 
office. He stated that “as we go through all of these 
negotiations, we are looking to have consistency in the terms. 
And it’s not just in Massachusetts. We want to have consistency 
from Maine to North Carolina in terms of those conditions or 
requirements in the franchise agreement[s] so you can run your 
business in a way other than a patchwork quilt.”  
Mr. Reilly testified that “corporate sets . . . the model 
franchise. . . . [T]hat’s going to be something that will be 
consistent from community to community.” He and his Manchester 
team “go through line by line every tweak to the model franchise 
that a community is seeking to make sure this isn’t going to 
upset our need to run a consistent business.” During the tax 
years 2003 through 2008, Mr. Casey testified that he signed the 
cable franchise licenses for the Cable Franchise Companies.
81
 
“I’m the authorized officer of these legal entities for purposes 
of signing, but I don’t manage my business that way.” He also 
signed property leases for these entities.   
Regarding payment terms under the cable franchise licenses, 
Mr. Reilly testified that “under Massachusetts law, and this is 
where it’s different in other jurisdictions, the franchise fee 
                                                 
81 Mr. Reilly likewise testified that Mr. Casey signed the cable franchise 
licenses from his office in Manchester. He noted that Mr. Casey was an 
officer of the Cable Franchise Companies, as was he, and that Mr. Casey was 
“authorized to sign on behalf of the company as an officer.” 
  ATB 2017-550
is capped at 50 cents per subscriber. So that’s the payment that 
goes to the community.” He noted “that’s a little bit in 
conflict with federal law that says you can get up to 5 percent 
of gross revenues of video revenues. . . . So what happens in 
Massachusetts is that they have got the cap under state law of 
50 cents per subscriber, so those payments get paid to each and 
every community based upon the subscribers in that individual 
community. . . . But when we go through the renewal 
negotiations, they will get to their 5 percent they are entitled 
to under federal law by having that go to PEG support, public 
access support.” Mr. Reilly stated that during the tax years 
2003 through 2008, the Northeast Division out of Manchester was 
responsible for determining the amount of franchise payments and 
mailing them out. 
The Cable Franchise Companies did not have separate 
management or headquarters within the areas that they held cable 
franchise licenses. As stated in their annual reports filed with 
the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, all thirteen 
Cable Franchise Companies had their principal places of business 
in Philadelphia during the tax years 2003 through 2008, 
initially at 1500 Market Street and subsequently at the Comcast 
Center. 
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7. Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreements and Management 
Agreements 
 
Each of the Cable Franchise Companies entered into a Shared 
Personnel and Facilities Agreement with CCCM, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Comcast,
82
 and a Management Agreement with Comcast. 
These agreements were in force during the tax years 2003 through 
2008.  
Pursuant to the Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement, 
each of the Cable Franchise Companies “desires to acquire from 
CCCM and CCCM is willing to provide, the services of those CCCM 
employees requested by [the Cable Franchise Company] to perform 
the functions identified by the parties from time to time and 
the use of related facilities and vendor contracts and services 
necessary for [the Cable Franchise Company’s] Business” because 
“[the Cable Franchise Company] does not itself have the direct 
resources necessary to operate and manage the Business.” In 
return for the services, the Cable Franchise Company was 
required to “pay CCCM for CCCM’s actual costs incurred 
attributable to the Shared Personnel and Facilities.” 
Mr. Donnelly testified that the agreement covered the 
reimbursements for content, vendor contracts from procurement, 
and payroll costs — all without mark-up. “That agreement 
basically says that cable gets to charge all of its costs down 
                                                 
82 CCCM was a disregarded entity for federal and state taxing purposes. 
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to the operating companies and they will pay for it at cost.” He 
added that “the fourth whereas clause was the guts of why this 
is in place. [Each of the Cable Franchise Companies] doesn’t 
itself have any ability to render any of its services without 
the support that it gets from all of the affiliates on the 
charges. And that’s why it gets charged down all these costs.”  
Pursuant to the Management Agreement,
83
 Comcast agreed to 
provide certain management and operation services, including 
maintenance, construction, purchasing, accounting, tax, internal 
audit, legal, finance, and programming. In return for the 
services, the Cable Franchise Company was required to pay 
Comcast an annual fee of 2.25 percent “of gross revenues, less 
franchise fee revenue, from all sources.” According to 
Mr. Donnelly, “This 2.25 is a proxy for cost at Comcast 
Corporation.”    
8. Allocation of Costs to the Cable Franchise Companies  
Mr. Donnelly testified that accounting ledgers were not 
maintained on a separate-entity basis. For state tax purposes, 
each of the Cable Franchise Companies was allocated a pro rata 
share of expenses based upon subscribers. Similarly, 
                                                 
83 Mr. Donnelly testified that the Management Agreement is the agreement 
referenced in the Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement. The Shared 
Personnel and Facilities Agreement stated as follows: “WHEREAS, Cable has 
contracted separately with Comcast Corporation to provide certain supervisory 
services necessary for Cable to operate and manage Cable’s cable 
communications systems and other related business.” The Board noted that the 
Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement was executed on November 18, 2002 
but the Management Agreement was not executed until January 1, 2003. 
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depreciation costs of the entire network were allocated to each 
of the Cable Franchise Companies based upon the numbers of 
subscribers, even if the particular entity did not own or lease 
any property. The implementation of such an arbitrary 
methodology rendered cost information unreliable and underscored 
why the appellants could not meet their burden of proof. 
Mr. Donnelly acknowledged that Comcast charged each of the 
Cable Franchise Companies a proportionate share of content 
acquisition costs, generally calculated based upon the number of 
subscribers receiving the content. He added, however, that 
charges might be “based upon historic subs as opposed to current 
subs.” Trying to clarify, he stated that “[n]ot everything goes 
down based upon just your current subs. There are programming 
charges for certain networks that are based upon, for example, 
the subs that existed in 2006 even though it’s today. . . . 
[And] [i]t’s not always based upon the subscriber receiving the 
service today. It might be based upon a benchmark in a prior 
year. That’s all I’m saying.” He also testified that the 
payments made by Comcast to programmers generally approximate 
the allocations made to the Cable Franchise Companies for 
content acquisition, i.e., “we don’t mark up anything on the 
programming.”84 
                                                 
84 Mr. Donnelly stated that the Cable Franchise Companies deducted the amounts 
for federal and state tax purposes. Comcast reported the amounts as income 
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9. Centralized Control v. Separate-Entity Structure 
Despite the deliberate decision to maintain separate 
franchise entities, including the Cable Franchise Companies, 
numerous witnesses testified that they disregarded the structure 
in their conduct. “We don’t manage our business in the way that 
those legal entities are framed,” stated Mr. Casey. 
Mr. Scott attested to the multitude of entities in the 
Comcast universe, but that Comcast took a “national approach” to 
business. When asked how important the individual legal entities 
were to his job function, he stated “[n]ot very. A lot of us 
were officers of many companies, but really we looked at the 
whole business nationally.”  
As stated by Mr. Dordelman, “I’m an officer on hundreds of 
sub entities within the company. It’s a large corporation. It 
goes across 40 states.” He stated that “[t]o avoid operational 
chaos, there’s a lot of similarity between the authorized 
officers. . . . We want it neat. It keeps the level of control 
and helps our accounting, our auditing department be more 
comfortable that they know who the authorized signers are for 
entities as opposed to having them geographically disbursed.” 
Mr. Dordelman also testified that “[a]s an officer of [Mass I, 
for example,] I had authority to sign documents and rely on our 
                                                                                                                                                             
and deducted the amounts that it paid to the programmers for federal and 
state tax purposes. 
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legal and tax and accounting folks to make certain those 
documents were appropriate for me to be signing.” He “didn’t 
have overall day-to-day line responsibility to be doing an undue 
amount on a day-to-day basis for those entities. But . . . 
indirectly it would be beneficial to those entities[,]. . . 
doing my day-to-day job as it accrues down to the benefit of all 
entities underneath.” 
 “Comcast is running a business to over 21 million homes in 
America,” noted Mr. Reilly. “And while we have operational 
layers to run every aspect of business, we run this as Comcast 
offering products and services in all the communities in which 
we have a franchise.” He added that “[i]f we had it delivered 
differently by franchise area, you wouldn’t be able to invest 
millions of dollars at a master [headend] and have it deliver an 
experience that is the same to all the communities around it.”  
10. Costs of Performance Study 
Mr. Donnelly testified that case law developments in 
Massachusetts prompted his decision to file the amended returns 
that became the basis for the Costs of Performance Issue, 
particularly the case of AT&T Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-524, aff’d, 82 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1106 (2012) (decision under Rule 1:28), further 
appellate review denied, 463 Mass. 1112 (2012).  
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In or around 2008, the decision was made to hire the 
accounting firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), which worked 
in conjunction with Mr. Donnelly and his team to prepare an 
analysis of the costs of performance for each of the Cable 
Franchise Companies’ income-producing activity (“COP Study”). 
The COP Study purported to determine the direct and indirect 
costs of each income-producing activity and the states in which 
the direct costs occurred. Based upon the COP Study, the 
appellants determined that sales attributable to Video and 
Internet services, as the allegedly relevant income-producing 
activities
85
 of the Cable Franchise Companies, should be sourced 
to Pennsylvania. A written description of the COP Study was 
entered into evidence and the full results of the COP Study were 
also entered into evidence.
86
 
The COP Study comprised five steps: obtaining general 
ledger information, identifying income-producing activities, 
identifying direct costs, mapping costs to income-producing 
activities, and identifying where costs were incurred.  
The COP Study identified the principal direct costs of the 
Internet service as the costs associated with operation of 
                                                 
85 The COP Study also identified additional suggested income-producing 
activities not pertinent to these appeals: telephony (including phone service 
subscriptions), rentals of customer premise equipment (such as cable modems 
and set-top boxes), and other revenue (primarily activation fees and service 
fees). 
86 The document included as part of the stipulation was labeled “a description 
of [PwC’s] cost of performance analysis.” The record was unclear as to 
whether any document actually drafted by PwC existed. No PwC employee 
testified in these matters. 
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Comcast’s national network and that those costs were highest in 
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and New Jersey because key network 
operations were concentrated in those states.
87
 Mr. Donnelly 
stated that in identifying income-producing activities “[w]e 
took a step back and looked at a number of ways in which the 
income producing activities are reported by Comcast. We just 
didn’t want to be doing it for tax purposes.” 
The COP Study identified the principal direct costs of the 
Video service as the costs associated with content acquisition 
and that those costs were highest in Pennsylvania because all 
relevant acquisition activity occurred in Pennsylvania. These 
results were based upon an aggregate of all the Cable Franchise 
Companies.  
The COP Study also included a costs of performance analysis 
on a separate-entity basis in the same manner that Comcast 
prepared each entity’s Massachusetts tax return. On a separate-
entity basis, the COP Study found the following: (1) for 2006, 
the preponderance of CA/MA/MI/UT’s costs related to Internet 
service was in Massachusetts due to a high level of investment, 
which increased depreciation;
88
 (2) for 2006, the preponderance 
                                                 
87 Mr. Donnelly stated that Internet costs were expressed as percentages 
rather than dollars because “[t]he amount of dollars that are spent for those 
particular services we’ve been told are very sensitive. And therefore, it was 
requested that we not communicate raw dollars but we communicated 
percentages.” 
88 Mr. Donnelly testified that depreciation was included as a direct cost 
“because you have a very plant intensive, national network intensive business 
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of Boston’s costs related to Internet service was in 
Massachusetts due to a high level of investment, which increased 
depreciation; (3) for all other years and Cable Franchise 
Companies, Internet service costs were highest in Pennsylvania; 
(4) for 2004, the preponderance of costs for Boston, Needham, 
and CA/MA/MI/UT related to Video service was in Massachusetts, 
due to a high level of investment, which increased depreciation; 
and (5) for all other years and Cable Franchise Companies, Video 
service costs were highest in Pennsylvania. 
In putting together the COP Study, Mr. Donnelly stated that 
pertinent general ledgers were gathered, but acknowledged that 
general ledgers “are not kept at an individual legal entity 
level. They are kept on what I refer to as a ledger or a system. 
It’s a compilation of several towns, local franchise 
authorities, that are bundled together and accounted for as one 
unit.” He added that “because over time we accumulated so many 
franchises through acquisitions, etcetera, they have been 
grouped into systems. And typically a system has more than one 
tax legal owner associated with it.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
here. We can’t deliver our service without the plant.” He further stated that 
“[t]he entire network is necessary to render the service. And depreciation is 
just like any other charge that’s getting charged down to the operating 
companies to fulfill, to get a proper reflection of the income and expenses 
that they need to incur to render service in Massachusetts.” He contended 
that “if you take the depreciation out, then that actually swings the cost 
even more heavily outside of Massachusetts. Because the local plant is 
obviously in there as a big depreciation item.” 
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Mr. Donnelly testified that PwC did not determine which 
costs went with which entity: “[O]nce you went through these 
five steps, you’re using all of the accounting data that’s 
sitting on the accounting ledgers of these companies. So once 
you determine what’s the income producing activity, what’s the 
indirect and direct costs by account numbers, etcetera, the 
results flow to each taxpayer based on how we construct our tax 
returns.” He stressed that “to be clear, it wasn’t part of the 
cost of performance study. It was simply how we construct our 
tax returns. You’re simply layering on a geographic tag.”  
Mr. Donnelly stated that “[w]e constructed the cost of 
performance analysis on a legal entity basis in the same 
mechanical way that we would have constructed the tax return.” 
To report tax results on a legal entity basis, Mr. Donnelly 
explained that they engaged in the following process: 
We take the results that are in the general ledger, 
system 304 for example, and then we compute the amount 
of subscribers owned by each legal entity. Each legal 
entity owns a set, individual franchises. 
 
There’s one for one between a franchise and a tax 
entity. So you go through and say within the system, 
he owns a number of franchises and those franchises 
make up half of the subscribers accounted for in that 
system. 
 
And maybe another legal entity owns a few franchises 
that make up 25 percent, and maybe another legal 
entity makes up a number of franchises that make up 
the other 25 percent. 
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So in total you have 100 percent. So the results of 
that system are 25 percent would go out to the one 
entity, 25 percent to the other and 50 percent to the 
other entity. Sometimes that’s confusing for people to 
understand.  
 
The Board’s Conclusions 
Based upon the totality of the evidence, the Board found 
that while the appellants established their right to apportion 
income,
89
 they failed to establish that their sales factors as 
originally filed were in error. Consequently, they were not 
entitled to abatements based upon the Costs of Performance 
Issue.
90
 
Regarding the appellants’ right to apportion, the Board 
found that the majority of the eight particular Cable Franchise 
Companies referenced as the Mass CableCos by the Commissioner 
were foreign corporations. Each of the Mass CableCos listed a 
principal place of business in Philadelphia for the tax years 
2003 through 2008, not Massachusetts. Also, relevant cable 
franchise licenses for the entities were signed in New 
Hampshire. Further, as the Board noted, supra, in its discussion 
of the Payroll Companies Sales Factor Issue, the Commissioner 
conceded that Mass I had employees in other states and that it 
                                                 
89 Specifically the Mass CableCos, the only entities that the Commissioner 
challenged under his allocation argument. 
90 The Board’s determination here concerning the Cable Franchise Companies’ 
sales factors solely relates to the Costs of Performance Issue. See, e.g., 
footnote 18, supra, and the Board’s discussion regarding the Payroll 
Companies Sales Factor Issue, supra.     
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had the right to apportion its income.
91
 The Board found these 
facts sufficient to establish that the entities referenced by 
the Commissioner as the Mass CableCos were taxable in another 
state and, therefore, entitled to apportion their income.  
While the Board found that the Mass CableCos were entitled 
to apportion their income, it found that the appellants failed 
to meet their burden of proving that their sales factors as 
originally filed were incorrect in terms of the Costs of 
Performance Issue. 
The Board found that neither the Commissioner nor the 
appellants were correct in their assertion of the relevant 
income-producing activity for the Cable Franchise Companies and 
whether the activity constituted “a transaction, procedure, or 
operation directly engaged in by a taxpayer which results in a 
separately identifiable item of income.” 830 CMR 63.38.1. The 
Board found that under applicable statutory and regulatory 
provisions, the only activity directly engaged in by the Cable 
Franchise Companies that resulted in the income at issue (sales 
derived from Video and Internet services to subscribers located 
in Massachusetts)
92
 — and hence the income-producing activity in 
                                                 
91 See footnotes 17 and 18, supra. 
92 As stated in the appellants’ post-trial brief: “On their original returns, 
the [Cable Franchise Companies] erroneously computed their sales factors by 
sourcing all receipts from subscribers located in Massachusetts to 
Massachusetts, without regard to where the income-producing activities giving 
rise to those receipts took place and the costs of performing those 
activities.” Certain of the Cable Franchise Companies also held cable 
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these matters — was to function as cable franchise licensees 
with Massachusetts cities or towns, with each cable franchise 
license between one of the Cable Franchise Companies and a 
Massachusetts city or town constituting an individual 
transaction that gave rise to rights and obligations to deliver 
the Video and Internet services underlying the Costs of 
Performance Issue.
93
 As the Cable Franchise Companies engaged in 
no demonstrable procedures and contracted out their operations
94
 
instead of performing them directly, a procedural or operational 
approach to costs of performance was erroneous based upon the 
facts in these appeals.   
The evidence established that the fundamental reason for 
maintaining the separate Cable Franchise Companies was for cable 
franchise license purposes, and that Massachusetts law mandated 
the holding of such a license in order to provide the Video and 
Internet services
95
 to subscribers in Massachusetts.
96
 The Board 
                                                                                                                                                             
franchise licenses with jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts and therefore 
had sales from non-Massachusetts subscribers. Based upon the appellants’ 
argument, those sales are not at issue here. 
93 Certain of the Cable Franchise Companies (CA/MA/MI/UT, GA/MA, MA/NH/OH, 
Georgia, and MA/VA) held cable franchise licenses with jurisdictions outside 
Massachusetts, but the income at issue in these matters is limited to sales 
from Video and Internet services to subscribers located in Massachusetts. 
Additionally, the Cable Franchise Companies held leases.   
94 For instance, pursuant to the Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement and 
the Management Agreement, either CCCM or Comcast provided operational, 
management, and other necessary functions and facilities to the Cable 
Franchise Companies in order to meet the terms required under the cable 
franchise licenses. 
95 As Mr. Schanz testified, both services utilized the same network. 
96 Pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 3, “No person shall construct, commence, or 
operate a CATV system in any city or town by means of wires and cables of its 
own or of any other person, without first obtaining as herein provided a 
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found these facts sufficient to conclude that the income-
producing activity of the Cable Franchise Companies — to 
function as cable franchise licensees with Massachusetts cities 
or towns — was performed wholly in Massachusetts.  
Even if the facts were capable of supporting a finding that 
the income-producing activity was performed in Massachusetts and 
outside Massachusetts, the Board found that “the costs of 
performing the income-producing activity are greater in 
Massachusetts than in any other one state,” pursuant to 830 CMR 
63.38.1(9)(d)(1). Both income-producing activity and costs of 
performance are analyzed on a direct basis pursuant to 830 CMR 
63.38.1(9)(d), and the greater direct activity and costs 
occurred in Massachusetts. The Board found that the numbers 
assigned to each Cable Franchise Company for costs purposes by 
the appellants were generally based upon an arbitrary formula, 
not on whether a particular entity incurred such costs, and so 
the numbers were highly suspect and incapable of quantification 
as either overstating or understating costs. Apart from its 
identification of incorrect income-producing activities, the 
Board disregarded the COP Study and related spreadsheets on the 
basis of numerical unreliability and erroneous reflection of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
written license from each city or town in which such wires or cables are 
installed or are to be installed, a copy of which shall be forwarded to the 
division. Such license must be non-exclusive.” 
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actual direct costs of the Cable Franchise Companies.
97
 The Cable 
Franchise Companies did not directly engage in the activities 
contained in the COP Study.  
The Board found the most reliable methodology of direct 
costs for the Cable Franchise Companies to function as cable 
franchise licensees with Massachusetts cities or towns was the 
methodology for costs set out pursuant to Massachusetts law and 
actually incorporated into the cable franchise licenses. 
Pursuant to G.L. c. 166A, § 9:  
A licensee, serving more than two hundred and fifty 
subscribers, shall on or before March fifteenth of 
each year, pay to the commonwealth a license fee equal 
to eighty cents per subscriber served and to the 
issuing authority a license fee equal to fifty cents 
per subscriber served. In determining a license fee, 
the number of subscribers served shall be measured as 
of December thirty-first of the preceding calendar 
year. 
       
G.L. c. 166A, § 9. Similarly, using the cable franchise license 
between Mass II and the Town of Southwick as an example: 
(a) During the term of the Renewal License the annual 
License Fee payable to the Issuing Authority shall be 
the maximum allowable by law, per Subscriber served as 
of the last day of the preceding calendar year, 
payable on or before March 15
th
 of the said year. 
Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 166A, § 9, this fee is currently 
fifty cents ($.50) per Subscriber, but not less than 
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) annually. 
 
(b) In accordance with Section 622(b) of the Cable 
Act, the Licensee shall not be liable for a total 
financial commitment pursuant to this Renewal License 
and applicable law in excess of five percent (5%) of 
                                                 
97 See footnote 86, supra. 
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its Gross Annual Revenues and said five percent (5%) 
shall include: (i) the support for PEG Access pursuant 
to Section 6.3 and (ii) any License Fees payable to 
the Town and State pursuant to MGL chapter 166A. 
 
(c) All payments by the Licensee to the Town pursuant 
to this Section shall be made payable to the Town and 
deposited with the Town Treasurer unless otherwise 
agreed to in writing by the parties. 
 
Based upon the above, the Board found that these costs were 
incurred in Massachusetts, not in any other location outside the 
Commonwealth, even if payments to Massachusetts cities and towns 
were issued from another state. The costs were a direct result 
of functioning as cable franchise licensees with Massachusetts 
cities or towns.
98
   
From the inception of their argument throughout their 
testimony and briefs,
99
 the appellants aligned their costs of 
performance analysis from the national perspective of Comcast 
rather than the individual Cable Franchise Companies. Comcast 
was not an underlying taxpayer on the Costs of Performance 
Issue.
100
 The Board found that Comcast made a deliberate choice 
to maintain separate entities for purposes of functioning as 
cable franchise licensees and the sales factor analysis 
                                                 
98 The record also contained leases between the Cable Franchise Companies and 
Massachusetts cities and towns. 
99 The appellants’ post-trial brief stated that “[t]he taxpayers in these ten 
consolidated cases are Comcast Corporation and a number of its affiliates” 
and that “[t]he first issue relates to the application of Massachusetts’ 
costs of performance rules to receipts from Comcast’s provision of . . . 
[Video] and . . . [Internet] services during the 2003-2008 Years at Issue.”  
100 The only issue directly involving Comcast as a taxpayer in these matters 
was the Comcast Sales Factor Issue for the tax years 2007 and 2008, discussed 
infra. 
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consequently focused on the separate entities at issue here, the 
Cable Franchise Companies, not Comcast. The appellants stressed 
the impracticality and inefficiency of actually operating the 
Comcast business on the basis of individual entities, despite 
the business decision to retain such a structure for stated 
beneficial purposes. The Board found that while Comcast may have 
ignored the separate entities — including the Cable Franchise 
Companies — in day-to-day operations, the appellants could not 
unilaterally ignore the legal entity structure for tax purposes. 
Accordingly, because the only income-producing activity of the 
Cable Franchise Companies relevant in these matters was to 
function as cable franchise licensees with Massachusetts cities 
and towns, and the costs of performing this activity were 
greater in Massachusetts than in any other one state, the income 
at issue was properly included in the sales factors as 
originally self-reported. 
B. Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue 
The Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue concerned the 
question of whether certain entities (“Add-Back Entities”)101 
                                                 
101 The appellants identified the Add-Back Entities as Mass I, Mass II, Mass 
III, Boston, Southern NE, GA/MA, MA/NH/OH, Georgia, Comcast MO of Delaware, 
Inc. (“Comcast MO DE”), CCCH, Needham, CA/MA/MI/UT, Willow Grove, and Comcast 
of Maine/New Hampshire, Inc. (“ME/NH”). The Commissioner excluded Needham, 
CA/MA/MI/UT, Willow Grove, and ME/NH from his identification, but did not 
indicate the concession of any entities involved in the Intercompany Interest 
Expenses Issue. As neither party tendered any notable factual contentions or 
legal arguments germane to the level of individual entities (apart from a 
series of promissory notes concerning the Allocable Expenses Issue, discussed 
infra), the Board’s findings and rulings on the Intercompany Interest 
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included in the Mass I Forms 355C for the tax years 2003 through 
2008 qualified for an exception to the add-back provision under 
G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a).  
The Add-Back Entities did not claim exceptions on the 
originally filed Forms 355C, but Mass I — as the principal 
reporting corporation — later filed for abatements based on the 
unreasonableness exception of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a), which 
provides that “otherwise deductible interest” expenses do not 
have to be added back to income if “the taxpayer establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence, as determined by the 
commissioner, that the disallowance of the deduction is 
unreasonable.” G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a).  
The evidence on this issue consisted largely of promissory 
and credit notes (“Notes”) and the testimony of both factual and 
expert witnesses.  
The Evolution of Comcast’s Financing 
Mr. Dordelman, the current Senior Vice President and 
Treasurer for Comcast who served as Vice President of Finance 
and Treasurer during relevant time periods, testified that the 
cable business is one of the most capital-intensive industries 
in the country due to the need for significant and continuous 
investment in infrastructure, including infrastructure in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Expenses Issue encompassed all fourteen entities identified by the appellants 
and defined herein as the “Add-Back Entities.” 
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Massachusetts. To meet these capital needs, Comcast borrows huge 
sums from third-party lenders, such as Citibank, J.P. Morgan, 
and Wells Fargo, and today it is one of the largest corporate 
borrowers in the country.   
Mr. Dordelman explained that from its inception through the 
1990s, Comcast financed projects on a geographic “project by 
project” basis, “where each project was obliged to stand on its 
own and finance itself.” Under this approach, debt was “secured 
by assets[,] . . . cash flows and financial wherewithal of each 
individual” project and the loans were made directly from the 
third-party lenders to the operating entity affiliated with the 
capital improvement.   
Mr. Dordelman testified that Comcast grew and expanded 
dramatically as a company during the 1990s, and it began to move 
away from this project-based approach to a more centralized 
financing model, where third-party borrowing was consolidated at 
Comcast’s top-level corporate members. Also, he noted that 
Comcast achieved investment-grade rating in 1997, which 
“open[ed] up a much larger pool of investors.” The appellants 
claimed that the uses for the borrowed funds did not change with 
the move to centralized financing. As stated in the appellants’ 
post-trial brief: “[T]he move to centralized borrowing did not 
change Comcast’s capital needs or the uses it made of borrowed 
funds. It continued to invest billions of dollars in borrowed 
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funds in the cable infrastructure needed by its operating 
entities to deliver their services.”   
“At a certain point in time,” stated Mr. Dordelman, “[] we 
began to move in a different direction. The company became 
larger, stronger. And it had a lot bigger financial footprint to 
it, bigger financial wherewithal.” According to Mr. Dordelman, 
“[W]e found the input we were receiving both from the investment 
community and from the folks who rate the company’s securities 
consistently up and down is that if we began to consolidate the 
company’s wherewithal, financial capabilities, and break down 
these walls between these individual projects, that the combined 
streams would be greater recognized and greater appreciated.” He 
explained that the centralized approach offered a number of 
advantages, including lower borrowing costs and less cumbersome 
audit and compliance requirements. “One of the real beauties of 
this is by consolidating financing there,” he stated, “we didn’t 
have as many individual entities to administer to, account for, 
have audits for.”102 According to Mr. Dordelman, when Comcast 
transitioned from the project-based approach to the centralized 
financing approach, it refinanced the project-based debt and put 
in place intercompany loans with the relevant subsidiaries to 
reflect the debt.  
                                                 
102 The Board noted the divergence with Comcast’s decision to avoid 
consolidation pertaining to cable franchise licenses, as discussed in the 
Costs of Performance Issue, supra. 
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Centralized financing between third-party lenders and 
Comcast’s top-tier subsidiaries continued during the tax years 
2003 through 2008. Comcast then purported to allocate a share of 
the third-party debt on an intercompany basis to individual 
entities, included the Add-Back Entities, by executing the 
various Notes.         
Intercompany Notes 
The parties stipulated to more than fifty Notes, with 
principal sums ranging from the $3,000 range to upwards of the 
$2,000,000,000 range.
103
 Certain of the Notes were payable on 
demand while others had fixed maturity dates. Mr. Donnelly, the 
Vice President for State and Local Tax for Comcast during 
relevant time periods, testified that no demand for payment had 
been made for the Notes payable on demand as of the time of the 
hearing of these appeals. With respect to the Notes reciting 
fixed maturity dates, the evidence showed that some Notes had 
been “replace[d] and extinguishe[d]”104 by other Notes reflecting 
a later date for payment. Mr. Donnelly testified that at least 
in one instance, with respect to one of the Mass I Notes, “the 
                                                 
103 The Commissioner referenced eight of the Notes as relevant to the Allocable 
Expenses Issue, discussed infra, rather than the Intercompany Interest 
Expenses Issue. 
104 Certain Notes purported to “replace[] and extinguish[]” prior notes between 
various pre-acquisition AT&T Broadband entities. The appellants did not 
allege that the refund sought on the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue 
pertained to acquired AT&T Broadband debt but rather to an allocated portion 
of Comcast’s centralized, third-party debt. Regardless, none of the claimed 
interest expenses directly tied to any of the Notes or any objectively 
quantifiable indicia of debt. 
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parent transferred cash down and paid off the note to [its 
holder] Comcast MO Investments,” an entity that paid no state 
tax. When asked what Comcast MO Investments did with the cash, 
Mr. Donnelly stated that “[i]t went back into the centralized 
cash management pool.”105   
Mr. Donnelly likewise testified that no third-party lenders 
received payment as a result of the Notes. Payments to third-
party lenders were made directly by Comcast, which took 
deductions for the interest expenses on its own tax returns. 
Expert Testimony 
The appellants offered the testimony and expert report of 
Dr. Michael I. Cragg and the testimony of Professor Richard D. 
Pomp. The Commissioner offered the testimony of Professor Peter 
D. Enrich. 
 The Board qualified Dr. Cragg, a principal at economic 
consulting firm the Brattle Group, as an expert in financial 
economics and finance. His testimony and expert report focused 
primarily on the general economics of the cable industry and the 
need for debt financing within that industry. As stated in his 
expert report, he was “retained by counsel for Comcast to 
evaluate, from an economic perspective, the level of debt and 
related interest expense that the entities filing Massachusetts 
                                                 
105 Mr. Donnelly testified that Comcast has “a centralized cash management 
facility” that “collects and sweeps all the cash from all the operating 
companies.” 
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tax returns could have supported as standalone entities from 
2003 to 2008.” Dr. Cragg analyzed the level of debt allocated to 
each of the Add-Back Entities and concluded that the level of 
debt would be supportable and reasonable for each of the Add-
Back Entities on a standalone basis and that the level of debt 
was well within industry norms. He admitted that he had not 
taken into account any terms or principal amounts contained in 
the Notes when preparing his expert report.      
  Professor Pomp, a professor of law at the University of 
Connecticut Law School, testified as an expert witness in the 
field of state taxation and focused his testimony primarily on 
the purpose of add-back statutes such as G.L. c. 63, § 31J. 
Professor Pomp described add-back statutes as a “sort of poor 
man’s combined reporting” and explained that such statutes 
“became fashionable” during the 1980s and 1990s to combat 
abusive tax minimization strategies. In his opinion, add-back 
statutes are overly broad and do not offer an “efficient 
response to the problem” presented by abusive intercompany 
transactions. Add-back statutes are, in Professor Pomp’s words, 
the equivalent of “shooting a mosquito with a shotgun.”   
 Professor Pomp also testified on the unreasonableness 
exceptions common to add-back statutes such as G.L. c. 63, 
§ 31J. In his opinion such exceptions were designed to “provide 
a safety valve” in the event that transactions that were not 
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abusive or of the kind meant to be redressed by add-back 
statutes are caught up in their “dragnet.” He testified that an 
objective way to determine if a required add back of income is 
unreasonable is by a comparison to the outcome of the same 
transactions under unitary-combined reporting,
106
 which he 
referred to as the “gold standard” because it “blow[s] through” 
all of the transactions within a corporate group and 
“neutralize[s]” the effects of the transactions. Professor Pomp 
testified that a comparison to the tax liability under unitary-
combined reporting would reveal if the add back caused 
significant distortion, which would be an indication that the 
add back was unreasonable.
107
  
 The Commissioner’s expert witness, Professor Enrich, a 
professor of law at Northeastern University School of Law, also 
testified about the history and purpose of add-back statutes. 
Unlike Professor Pomp, he opined that add-back statutes were 
                                                 
106 See footnote 23, supra, for an explanation of the differences between 
unitary-combined reporting and separate-entity reporting.  
107 Counsel for the appellants attempted to elicit testimony and an estimate 
from Professor Pomp regarding the amount of distortion caused by the add back 
of the alleged interest expenses in the present appeals by comparing an 
analysis based upon a unitary-combined reporting regime. Counsel for the 
Commissioner objected to this testimony and the Board sustained his 
objection, as the proffered testimony was based both on an Illinois statutory 
regime not in effect in Massachusetts during the tax years 2003 through 2008 
and on unsubstantiated hearsay of a type that an expert may not rely upon. 
See Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 670 (2016) (“An expert is 
permitted to rely on hearsay studies to form his or her opinion, but the 
expert may not testify to the content of those studies.”) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, this portion of Professor Pomp’s testimony was stricken from the 
record. In their post-trial brief, the appellants labeled the Board’s clear 
ruling to strike the testimony as an expression of “skepticism” that they 
hoped the Board would revisit. The Board declined. 
  ATB 2017-574
generally a “good match” for the problem that they were intended 
to solve — abusive tax planning structures.   
 Regarding unreasonableness exceptions, Professor Enrich 
testified that they generally cover two scenarios: “It should be 
applied certainly in the case of unconstitutional distortion to 
prevent the statute from being unconstitutional. But it should 
also be applied in a narrow range of exceptional circumstances 
where application would otherwise be unreasonable.” In his 
opinion, there is a necessary amount of “inexactitude” in 
allocating the income from a multi-state business to a 
particular jurisdiction. Thus, he noted, the bar for 
demonstrating unconstitutional distortion of income is rather 
high, with very few cases in nearly a century of jurisprudence 
resulting in a finding of unconstitutionality.  He stated that 
he did not consider the ratio testified to by Mr. Donnelly 
regarding tax paid to Massachusetts compared to number of 
subscribers located in Massachusetts to be on the order of 
magnitude required to show unconstitutional distortion.   
Professor Enrich testified that the second scenario in 
which the unreasonableness exception to the add-back statutes 
should apply is where it can be shown, through facts and 
circumstances, that the add back of income is demonstrably 
inappropriate. He stated that he did not consider the facts of 
the present appeals to be such a circumstance.   
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The Board’s Conclusions  
Based on the record in its entirety, the Board found that 
the appellants failed to prove that the claimed interest 
expenses qualified as true indebtedness. Consequently, it was 
unnecessary for the Board to reach the applicability of the 
unreasonableness exception of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a). Even if, for 
the sake of argument, the alleged interest expenses constituted 
true indebtedness, the appellants did not establish “by clear 
and convincing evidence, as determined by the commissioner, that 
the disallowance of the deduction [was] unreasonable.” 
G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a). 
1. True Indebtedness 
The Board found that the purported debt of the Add-Back 
Entities was in actuality just an allocable portion of third-
party borrowings entered into by certain Comcast top-level 
corporate members for which the Add-Back Entities bore no actual 
liability. The appellants papered this purported debt with the 
various Notes that reflected neither a genuine indebtedness of 
the Add-Back Entities nor a correlation to the amounts claimed 
as interest expense deductions.  
The record lacked vital indicia of bona fide debt. Among 
the considerations relevant to such an inquiry are whether the 
debt was memorialized in writing, whether there was actual 
payment of principal and interest, and whether there was 
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evidence of a circular flow of funds. Despite the existence of 
the Notes, no cash was transferred upon their origination and no 
payment of either principal or interest was made by the Add-Back 
Entities to any third party as a result of the contended loans. 
With respect to the Notes that purported to be payable on 
demand, no demand for payment was ever made. With respect to the 
Notes that recited a date for payment, the evidence showed that 
these Notes were extinguished and replaced with other Notes or, 
in one stated instance, satisfied by a transfer of cash from 
Comcast to the holder — a Delaware entity that paid no tax — 
after which the cash simply circulated back into the centralized 
cash management pool.   
Additional important considerations in ascertaining bona 
fide debt are whether the debtor and lender are related parties, 
whether they acted in an arm’s-length manner in their course of 
dealings, and whether an unrelated entity would have advanced 
funds on a comparable basis. The Add-Back Entities as borrowers 
and the entities listed as lenders on the Notes were related 
parties, and the record was devoid of any evidence that arm’s-
length negotiations preceded execution of the Notes. The record 
also lacked evidence that the Add-Back Entities could have 
entered into loans with outside entities on the same terms. As 
Dr. Cragg testified when asked about interest rates for the Add-
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Back Entities in a standalone scenario, “They would pay a higher 
interest rate. They are on an individual basis riskier.”  
Of particular significance, the claimed interest expenses 
were admittedly the product of a conjured formula as opposed to 
numerical reality. As Mr. Dordelman testified, Comcast had moved 
to a more centralized model of financing under which all third-
party borrowing was done by top-level members of the Comcast 
group. Mr. Donnelly testified that the refund amounts claimed as 
part of the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue were derived by 
multiplying Comcast’s overall third-party interest expenses by 
each of the Add-Back Entities’ percentage108 of Comcast’s overall 
subscribers.
109
 Mr. Donnelly testified that the amounts claimed 
were meant to reflect each of the Add-Back Entities’ 
proportionate share of Comcast’s overall third-party debt, and 
that the formula was intended to “limit” or “cap” the amount of 
deduction claimed. The Board found these assertions to be more 
indicative of creative bookkeeping entries and not bona fide 
debt. Comcast made a deliberate choice to transition to a 
centralized model of financing for advantageous business 
reasons, yet concurrently sought to take interest expense 
deductions for the Add-Back Entities based upon a fictional 
                                                 
108 As the Commissioner remarked in his post-trial brief, each of the Add-Back 
Entities was an entity that held a franchise or franchises with cities and/or 
towns. 
109 The Commissioner’s post-trial brief stated that “[i]nformation in the 
record is insufficient to verify Mr. Donnelly’s allocation calculations.” The 
Board agreed, but its ultimate findings made this point moot. 
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allocation of the third-party debt. As the deductions were 
grounded in artifice, the Board rejected the appellants’ claims.  
In reaching its conclusion on whether true indebtedness 
existed, the Board placed no weight on the testimony of the 
expert witnesses or Dr. Cragg’s expert report as the focus was 
on the issue of unreasonableness rather than the issue of bona 
fide debt. 
2. Unreasonableness Exception 
Even if the Board were to find that true indebtedness 
existed, the record contained no evidence — let alone the clear 
and convincing evidence required under G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a) — 
that the Commissioner’s disallowance of the deductions was 
unreasonable. The appellants alleged that disallowance was 
unreasonable because the failure to recognize any appreciable 
debt service attributable to the Add-Back Entities resulted in a 
distorted reflection of income “so severe that it transgresses 
constitutional bounds.” The Board found that any professed 
distortion was self-inflicted and the result of the appellants’ 
own business choices. 
The appellants attempted to demonstrate cataclysmic 
distortion by, in the words of Mr. Donnelly, “showing the amount 
of tax that Comcast
110
 would have paid if Massachusetts had a 
                                                 
110 Professor Enrich noted that a troublesome aspect of this exercise “is the 
comparisons that Mr. Donnelly was drawing were comparisons about the entire 
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unitary regime [as] it has today in the years 2003 to 2008.”111 
This “showing” involved testimony by Mr. Donnelly on figures 
derived from Illinois unitary-combined returns
112
 that used the 
worldwide property denominator for California (because Illinois 
did not have a property factor during the tax years 2003 through 
2008, according to Mr. Donnelly). The Board found that this 
contrived exercise was wholly useless for purposes of proving 
unreasonableness under G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a), a Massachusetts 
statute, and the separate-entity reporting in effect in 
Massachusetts during the tax years 2003 through 2008.     
The Board also found the comparisons offered by the 
appellants’ witnesses in terms of tax paid to Massachusetts 
versus tax paid throughout the United States to be fruitless. 
Mr. Donnelly testified that “the amount of income tax that we 
paid to Massachusetts is disproportionately high to the amount 
of income tax that we paid overall.” Numerous factors affect the 
ultimate tax paid to any jurisdiction, including, but not 
limited to, apportionment formulas, tax rates, credits, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
combined unitary Comcast business. They weren’t comparisons about the 
particular entities that were taxed here.”  
111 See footnote 23, supra, for an explanation of the differences between 
unitary-combined reporting and separate-entity reporting. 
112 The Illinois returns were not produced as part of the record. The 
appellants introduced two schedules summarizing conclusions from the returns 
that the Board admitted de bene subject to a motion to strike. The Board 
struck Professor Pomp’s testimony concerning the Illinois returns. See 
footnote 107, supra. 
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other incentives,
113
 and the Board did not find this to be a 
useful benchmark in proving distortion. Rather, the Board agreed 
with Professor Enrich that the pertinent inquiry is whether the 
income allocated to a taxing jurisdiction is out of all 
appropriate proportion to the activities conducted therein. As 
stated by Professor Enrich, “It’s not at all surprising if some 
parts of that business are going to be far more profitable than 
others and that a fair accounting system would obviously 
attribute more of the income to one jurisdiction than another.” 
In the present appeals, the Board found that the record did not 
contain clear and convincing evidence that the income allocated 
to the Add-Back Entities was out of all proportion to the 
activities conducted in Massachusetts, and to the extent the 
appellants raised a constitutional challenge, the Board found 
that they failed to establish by clear and cogent evidence (the 
requisite heightened standard in such challenges) that 
extraterritorial values were taxed or that the amount of tax 
that resulted was out of all proportion to the amount of 
business transacted in the Commonwealth. 
In reaching its conclusion on the issue of 
unreasonableness, the Board placed no weight on the testimony of 
                                                 
113 As Mr. Donnelly testified, for instance, “We have a presence and we do 
things for these [appellants] in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania’s rules, 
they don’t have any factors though. They don’t have any sales factor. They 
don’t have any property factor. And they don’t have any payroll factor. . . . 
They had no taxable liability in Pennsylvania.” 
  ATB 2017-581
Dr. Cragg and Professor Pomp. While Dr. Cragg’s analysis may (or 
may not) be valid from an economics perspective, the Board found 
it unhelpful in establishing actual distortion in these matters. 
The Board likewise discounted the testimony of Professor Pomp, 
who chiefly provided an inconsequential discourse on his 
preference for unitary-combined reporting over separate-entity 
reporting.
114
 Unitary-combined reporting took effect in 
Massachusetts starting with tax years beginning on or after 
January 1, 2009. See St. 2008, c. 173, §§ 48 and 101. The tax 
years 2003 through 2008 operated under separate-entity 
reporting, which the appellants, the Commissioner, and the Board 
were bound to follow in these matters.
115
 
C. Federal Changes Issue 
The Federal Changes Issue presented the question of whether 
the Commissioner’s disallowance of certain federal changes for 
the tax years 2003 through 2008 was in error. The appellants 
contended that the Commissioner’s refusal to accept the changes 
based upon Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) revenue agent 
reports (“RAR”) had “no legitimate explanation or basis” and 
deprived them of a reduction in Massachusetts corporate excise. 
The Commissioner, in turn, alleged jurisdictional defects in 
                                                 
114 See footnote 23, supra. 
115 See discussion, supra, under the Costs of Performance Issue, regarding 
Comcast’s decision to maintain separate corporate entities for purposes of 
holding cable franchise licenses with cities and towns. Comcast decided 
against consolidating franchises for purported business reasons, just as it 
conversely decided to consolidate financing for purported business reasons. 
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bringing forth the federal changes, “cherry-pick[ing]” favorable 
federal changes, and a general failure to substantiate. While 
the Board disagreed with the Commissioner’s jurisdictional 
allegations, it found that the appellants themselves lacked 
“legitimate explanation or basis” in proving their claimed 
entitlement to reductions based upon federal changes.  
Internal Revenue Service Final Determinations and Department of 
Revenue Determination 
 
The appellants maintained that three distinct phases of RAR 
adjustments were provided to the Commissioner. They designated 
these adjustments as follows in their request for findings of 
fact: “(1) RAR reports received prior to 2010 (Ex. 637); (2) RAR 
adjustments received after 2010 (Ex. 638); and (3) RAR 
adjustments related to AT&T Broadband received after 2010 (Exs. 
633-636).” The appellants also included various schedules 
identified as Exhibit 640, which purported to numerically 
reconcile all phases of RAR adjustments.  
1. “RAR reports received prior to 2010” 
Exhibit 637, offered in support of the alleged first phase 
of adjustments, contained three sets of IRS final determinations 
— a set for the tax years 2002 through 2004, a set for the tax 
years 2005 and 2006, and a set for the tax years 2007 and 2008. 
The named taxpayer on the final determinations was “Comcast 
Corporation & Subsidiaries.” 
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An IRS Form 4549-A: Income Tax Examination Changes (“Form 
4549-A”) for the tax years 2002 through 2004 was executed by the 
IRS on February 29, 2008. A Form 870: Waiver of Restrictions on 
Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance of 
Overassessment (“Form 870”)116 for the tax years 2002 through 
2004 was signed by Comcast on March 25, 2008. Additionally, a 
Form 870-AD: Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and 
Collection of Tax Deficiency and to Accept Overassessment (“Form 
870-AD”) was executed by Comcast on June 25, 2010, and by the 
IRS on July 14, 2010, which appeared to settle certain 
adjustments pertaining to the tax years 2002 through 2004.
117
 
A Form 4549-A for the tax years 2005 and 2006 was executed 
by the IRS on June 9, 2009. Handwritten notations on this Form 
4549-A stated “All Adjustments – Agreed & Unagreed.” An 
additional Form 4549-A for the tax years 2005 and 2006 was 
signed by the IRS on June 9, 2009. Handwritten notations on this 
Form 4549-A stated “Agreed Adjustments Only.” A Form 870 for the 
tax years 2005 and 2006 was signed by Comcast on June 16, 2009. 
A handwritten notation on this Form 870 stated “Agreed.” The 
                                                 
116 The Form 870 contained a clause that read “I consent to the immediate 
assessment and collection of any deficiencies (increase in tax and penalties) 
and accept any overassessment (decrease in tax and penalties) shown above, 
plus any interest provided by law. I understand that by signing this waiver, 
I will not be able to contest these years in the United States Tax Court, 
unless additional deficiencies are determined for these years.” 
117 The Form 870-AD stated that “[t]his is a partial agreement” and 
“[c]ompliance agreed non-protested issues and Appeals agreed issues listed on 
Schedule 1A, page 3 of Appeals Audit Statement — see attachment.” 
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numerals on this Form 870 appeared to tie to the Form 4549-A 
stating “Agreed Adjustments Only.”118  
A Form 4549-A for the tax years 2007 and 2008 was executed 
by the IRS on January 25, 2011.
119
 A Form 870 for the tax years 
2007 and 2008 was executed by Comcast on February 24, 2011.  
Exhibit 637 also contained myriad schedules with 
unexplained notations and cross-references,
120
 as well as a 
document entitled “2003-2008 RAR Summary,” which ostensibly 
intended to reconcile this first phase of federal changes to the 
level of the appellants.
121
    
2. “RAR adjustments received after 2010” 
The appellants contended that the documents entered as 
Exhibit 638 comprised a second phase of adjustments that 
resulted in no net Massachusetts changes because they related to 
                                                 
118 The Commissioner’s “cherry-pick[ing]” argument alleged that the appellants 
only included the “Agreed” adjustments and discarded the “Unagreed” 
adjustments. As discussed further below, the Board found that the “Unagreed” 
items appeared to be resolved by the second phase of adjustments.   
119 The Board noted the anomaly of including the Form 4549-A for the tax years 
2007 and 2008 in the “RAR reports received prior to 2010” category when the 
IRS did not execute the form until January 25, 2011.       
120 For instance, a “Reconciliation Schedule” stated that “[t]he 2003 and 2004 
taxable income/(loss) per IRS Form 4549 started with Form 1139 versus the 
originally filed 1120. However, [t]he appeals schedule date[d] 6/25/10 used 
the as filed taxable income for 2004, so, [we] used the as filed TI.” The 
“Reconciliation Schedule” also cross referenced various workpapers, including 
a phantom “wp10.4.” Another schedule referenced a phantom “w/p-1.2” and “w/p-
1.3.” A handwritten note on yet another schedule stated “2002 stub 2 & 2004 
include adjustments from Exam as well; however, 2003 only reported 
adjustments from Exam.” The Board was at a loss to understand the meaning of 
these statements and references, as well as many others dispersed throughout 
the exhibits.    
121 Neither the appellants nor the Commissioner specifically defined which 
entities in the Forms 355C filed by Mass I as the principal reporting 
corporation were pertinent to the Federal Changes Issue. The summary 
schedules at Exhibit 640 included more than forty entities. 
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non-business income.
122
 These adjustments appeared to settle the 
“Unagreed” items from the first phase of adjustments for the tax 
years 2005 and 2006, and their inclusion in the record appeared 
to serve the purpose of accounting for the “Unagreed” items from 
the first phase.
123
 As with Exhibit 637, the appellants included 
schedules with various unexplained notes inscribed throughout.          
3. “RAR adjustments related to AT&T Broadband received after 
2010” 
 
 The appellants offered a third phase of adjustments, 
documented with Exhibits 633 through 636 and Exhibit 639. These 
entries concerned net operating losses stemming from pre-2003 
federal changes reported by AT&T Solutions, Inc. (“AT&T 
Solutions”) to the Commissioner. Per letter dated June 10, 2011, 
the Commissioner’s Office of Appeals determined that AT&T 
Solutions should be allowed abatements due to federal changes 
and also “determine[d] that the [net operating losses] should be 
adjusted in accordance with the allowances by the Internal 
Revenue Service.” The appellants provided spreadsheets that 
allegedly rolled pre-2003 AT&T Solutions net operating losses 
over to entities acquired by Comcast in November 2002 as part of 
the AT&T Broadband acquisition. According to Mr. Donnelly, the 
Vice President for State and Local Tax for Comcast during 
                                                 
122 The Board made no findings as to whether these adjustments truly related to 
non-business income.    
123 The “Unagreed” items were adjusted after a 2013 Tax Court settlement and 
primarily derived from variable prepaid forward contracts involving shares of 
Sprint and Cablevision. 
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relevant time periods, “[T]his is the kind of interaction[] we 
were having with [AT&T]. They would pass along adjustments 
pertaining to the entities we purchased through the Broadband 
acquisition” and “then obviously [these adjustments] affected 
net operating losses rolling into the Comcast ownership 
periods.” 
Jurisdiction 
The Commissioner noted that the appellants were required to 
report federal changes within three months of the final 
determination pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, § 30. With one exception, 
the record did not evidence any report filed within three months 
of any final determination.
124
 As explained further in the 
opinion, the Board found that this was not fatal to jurisdiction 
in filing for abatements based upon federal changes.  
The Commissioner also noted that the appellants were 
required to file for abatements within one year of a final 
determination under G.L. c. 62C, § 30. The Board found that the 
appellants timely filed for abatements under G.L. c. 62C, § 37, 
                                                 
124 A Form 4549-A for the tax years 2007 and 2008 was executed by the IRS on 
January 25, 2011, subsequent to the Forms CA-6 filed on November 29, 2010 
under Mass I as the principal reporting corporation. The appellants arguably 
complied with the reporting requirement prematurely regarding this final 
determination. But as the Commissioner pointed out, the Forms CA-6 initially 
did not include any of the final determinations and were not supplemented 
with the final determinations until February 2012, after the Commissioner 
requested documentation for the requested federal changes. 
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with the time extended by the parties’ execution of valid Forms 
A-37 and a Form B-37.
125
    
The Board’s Conclusions 
While the Board found that the record contained final 
determinations and that the appellants’ federal changes claim 
was jurisdictionally intact, substantively it found that the 
appellants failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing 
their rights to abatements based upon the federal changes.      
The appellants primarily relied upon the eight sets of 
documents included as Exhibits 633 through 640 as purported 
substantiation. The appellants’ trial testimony was limited to 
Mr. Donnelly confirming that three phases of federal changes 
occurred and attesting to his involvement in preparing the 
exhibits. Counsel for the appellants did not pose specific 
questions to Mr. Donnelly regarding the exhibits, but instead 
stated that “[t]hose documents are in the record and they speak 
for themselves, and they are lengthy and contain a lot of 
numbers that we are not going to go through and we can establish 
on briefing.” Though the Board agreed that the documents were 
“lengthy and contain[ed] a lot of numbers,” it found that —
contrary to the appellants’ assertions — the documents did not 
“speak for themselves.” Further, the appellants’ briefs provided 
no guidance or clarification. Instead, the appellants’ briefs 
                                                 
125 See footnote 31, supra. 
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merely attempted to shift blame to the Commissioner, the party 
without the burden of proof, for not resolving his concerns 
about the lack of clarity in the appellants’ proposed 
adjustments earlier and more adequately.  
After dissecting the evidence, the Board found that — in 
the absence of explanatory testimony from Mr. Donnelly, the 
person involved in compiling the documentation, or some other 
person with direct knowledge — the documents alone were 
inadequate to support the appellants’ claims in the Federal 
Changes Issue. The myriad documents and their assorted notations 
and cross-references provided no discernible basis for the 
relief that the appellants sought. Additionally, the appellants 
neglected to explain how and why the federal changes were 
relevant under Massachusetts law, and how adjustments were 
allocated to the level of the particular entities in the 
Massachusetts combined group for which the federal changes were 
claimed,
126
 including the net operating losses allegedly derived 
from the AT&T Solutions abatement approval. Accordingly, on the 
basis of the record in its entirety, the Board found that the 
appellants failed to meet their burden of proof on this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
126 The appellants provided a spreadsheet allocating amounts to specific 
entities, but no explanation as to how these amounts were derived. 
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D. Allocable Expenses Issue 
The Allocable Expenses Issue concerned the question of 
whether certain intercompany interest expenses should be 
disallowed on the basis that the interest expenses were paid 
with non-unitary income that was allocable to Pennsylvania.  
For the tax years 2003 through 2008, the Commissioner’s 
auditor disallowed a deduction against Georgia’s income for 
dividends received from [shares in] AirTouch Communications, 
Inc. (“AirTouch”) on the basis that ownership was less than 15 
percent per G.L. c. 63, § 38(a)(1). The dividends deductions 
were taken against Georgia’s income as reported on the original 
Mass I combined returns. The appellants, in turn, argued that 
Georgia should not have reported the dividends received from the 
AirTouch shares on the original returns because the AirTouch 
shares were held by Georgia as a long-term investment rather 
than a strategic asset (“AirTouch Dividends Income Issue”). 
Consequently, they claimed that the dividends income should have 
been treated as non-unitary income and should have been reported 
to Pennsylvania, Georgia’s commercial domicile.127 Georgia 
                                                 
127 As the Supreme Judicial Court has stated, “[T]he commerce clause and the 
due process clause of the United States Constitution prohibit a State from 
imposing a tax on value earned outside its borders. However, a State may tax 
a nondomiciliary corporation on an apportionable share of its interstate 
business provided there is a ‘“minimal connection” or “nexus” between the 
interstate activities and the taxing State, and “a rational relationship 
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the 
enterprise.”’ This is known as the unitary business principle.” General 
Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 440 Mass. 154, 161 (2003) (citations 
omitted). 
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ultimately filed Pennsylvania returns for the tax years 2003 
through 2008, reporting 100 percent of the AirTouch dividends 
income to Pennsylvania and taking related interest expense 
deductions on the Pennsylvania returns as well.
128
  
The Commissioner subsequently conceded the AirTouch 
Dividends Income Issue.
129
 During the course of the trial of 
these matters, however, the Commissioner raised a correlative 
issue — the Allocable Expenses Issue — that interest expenses on 
certain Notes involving a related entity, Centaur Funding 
Corporation (“Centaur”), should be disallowed on the basis that 
the dividends income from the AirTouch shares was used to pay 
the interest expenses on these Notes (“Centaur Notes”).130 The 
Commissioner conceded that the Centaur Notes constituted true 
debt but that the interest expenses should be disallowed 
nonetheless as they were fully allocable to Pennsylvania, as 
with the AirTouch dividends income. The Commissioner asserted at 
the opening of the trial that the appellants are taking “the 
surprising position that the interest deductions that are 
associated with that dividend . . . [are] apportionable, 
                                                 
128 The Pennsylvania tax returns for the tax years 2003 through 2006 were filed 
on a “Report of Change in Corporate Net Income Tax,” while the tax returns 
for the tax years 2007 and 2008 were filed on a “PA Corporate Tax Report.” 
129 The Commissioner’s post-trial brief stated that “[t]he Commissioner agrees 
with the [appellants’] alternative position, that Georgia should not have 
reported the dividend income to Massachusetts on the grounds that it is non-
business income properly allocable to Pennsylvania.”  
130 The Commissioner identified the Centaur Notes as Exhibits 721 and 722 and 
Exhibits 724 through 729 in his post-trial brief. The remainder of the Notes 
comprised the basis for the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue, discussed 
infra and supra. 
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including to Massachusetts. They are trying to have their cake 
and eat it too.”  
In response, the appellants argued that “equity and good 
conscience” did not require the Board to consider the Allocable 
Expenses Issue since it had not been set out in the pleadings. 
Even if the Board allowed this new issue to proceed, the 
appellants contended that the provisions of G.L. c. 63, § 30(4) 
only disallow deductions allocable to classes of income not 
included in taxable net income pursuant to G.L. c. 63, § 38(a).  
In their Motion to Alter, Amend, or Clarify Decision, the 
appellants also raised potential tax implications associated 
with both the AirTouch Dividends Income Issue and the Allocable 
Expenses Issue. Specifically, the appellants claimed that they 
were entitled to tax reductions regardless of the Board’s 
determination for the Commissioner on the Allocable Expenses 
Issue. While Georgia took an intercompany interest expense 
deduction on the original Mass I combined return for the tax 
year 2003
131
 (which was disallowed by the Commissioner upon 
audit), it conversely reported intercompany interest expenses 
                                                 
131 The Commissioner’s post-trial brief stated that “[i]n Massachusetts, 
Georgia reported and added back to its taxable income the Centaur interest in 
the 2005-2008 tax years.” The Commissioner incorrectly claimed that Georgia 
had taken an interest expense deduction for the tax year 2004. The 
Commissioner’s audit narrative clearly stated that “[f]or the period ending 
12/31/03, related member interest expense has been added back to taxable net 
income and no add back exception has been allowed since the taxpayer did not 
provide clear and convincing evidence that the add back would be 
unreasonable. It should be noted that the taxpayer did add back the related 
member interest expense in 12/31/04 and did not claim an add back exception 
in that year.” 
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but did not claim exceptions to the add back on the original 
combined returns for the tax years 2004 through 2008.
132
 The 
Commissioner’s concession of the AirTouch Dividends Income 
Issue, the appellants reasoned, should have resulted in a 
reduction of the deficiency assessments for the tax years 2004 
through 2008 because Georgia had already added back intercompany 
interest expenses, i.e., the Allocable Expenses Issue cannot be 
used to mathematically offset the AirTouch Dividends Income 
Issue for the tax years 2004 through 2008.
133
         
The Origins of the AirTouch Shares and the Centaur Notes 
When Comcast acquired AT&T Broadband in November 2002, it 
acquired a minority interest in AirTouch as part of the 
transaction. According to Mr. Dordelman, the current Senior Vice 
President and Treasurer for Comcast who served as Vice President 
of Finance and Treasurer during relevant time periods, “We 
wanted the cable television business of AT&T Broadband, but what 
came along with it were some unusual assets and liabilities that 
had nothing to do with the cable television business, whether 
you’re speaking about a block of stock that was a piece of 
                                                 
132 The appellants sought abatements and refunds upon the contention that the 
Add-Back Entities, including Georgia, erroneously failed to claim an 
exception to the add back on the original combined returns for intercompany 
interest expenses. The Commissioner denied the requested relief and the Board 
also denied the requested relief by its decisions in favor of the 
Commissioner on both the Allocable Expenses Issue and the Intercompany 
Interest Expenses Issue.        
133 The appellants’ motion indicated that the Commissioner had not made any 
adjustment pertaining to his concession of the AirTouch Dividends Income 
Issue before billing the appellants for the deficiency assessments. 
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history from when the former predecessor to AT&T Broadband sold 
their cellular business to another operator and took back some 
stock, that being the company AirTouch, all sorts of other 
assets and liabilities.”134 
The origins of the AirTouch shares date back to April 1998 
and U S WEST’s sale of its fourteen-state domestic wireless 
business to AirTouch, an unrelated, publicly traded wireless 
company. As a result of the sale, U S WEST received a 10 percent 
minority interest in AirTouch that included common stock, 
825,000 shares of Class D preferred stock, and 825,000 shares of 
Class E preferred stock. U S WEST entered into an Amended and 
Restated Investment Agreement that limited its rights as a 
shareholder.  
U S WEST separated into two public companies in June 1998, 
changing its name to MediaOne Group, Inc. (“MediaOne Group”) in 
the process: it spun off its fourteen-state landline telephone 
and directory publishing businesses but retained its domestic 
cable television business, non-controlling interests in assorted 
international cable and wireless investments, and the AirTouch 
shares.  
                                                 
134 The oddest unintended inheritance of the AT&T Broadband acquisition was “a 
portfolio of jumbo airliner leases,” stated Mr. Dordelman. “It had nothing to 
do with the business. We inherited a lease structure I think called Synthetic 
Lease on a hydroelectric dam [with no water flowing to it] in the state of 
California.” He testified that “[i]t was years of untangling years of strange 
business dealings that were part of a prior generation.” 
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In June 1999, AirTouch merged with Vodafone Group, Plc 
(“Vodafone”), a public limited company headquartered in the 
United Kingdom, and subsequently became a subsidiary of 
Vodafone. As a consequence of the merger, MediaOne Group’s 
AirTouch common stock shares were cancelled and MediaOne Group 
received Vodafone American Depository Shares equivalent to an 
approximately 5 percent interest in Vodafone. MediaOne Group 
continued to hold the AirTouch preferred shares, the shares at 
issue in these matters. MediaOne Group was acquired by AT&T in 
June 2000 and became part of AT&T Broadband, which Comcast 
subsequently acquired in November 2002.  
The AirTouch shares periodically paid dividends, which 
Georgia received indirectly through two entities disregarded for 
federal and Massachusetts tax purposes — Georgia wholly and 
directly held Comcast MO SPC I, LLC, which wholly and directly 
held Comcast MO SPC II, LLC, which held the AirTouch shares. 
Georgia reported the dividends income as the ultimate corporate 
member of these two entities. The Centaur Notes were issued by 
MediaOne SPC II, LLC, which appears to be the predecessor of 
Comcast MO SPC II, LLC. Georgia used 100 percent of the AirTouch 
dividends to make interest payments on the Centaur Notes. 
Mr. Donnelly explained that “the interest on the [Centaur Notes] 
pays the dividends that go out to the Centaur [] shareholders.”  
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According to Mr. Donnelly, Centaur “was an entity created 
by [MediaOne Group] to monetize the stock, the preferred stock 
we are talking about.”135 He stated that Centaur was “a foreign 
entity, a Cayman Islands entity that . . . had third-party 
public investors” and “that there’s some provision that ties 
their interest into the AirTouch stock.” He added that Centaur 
received “cash in exchange for interest in Centaur. . . . And 
then it took that cash and loaned it back up to [Georgia]. And 
what the shareholders got was an interest in the AirTouch stock 
which has to be sold at some future date.”136   
Georgia filed Pennsylvania returns dated January 9, 2015, 
for the tax years 2003 through 2008. Mr. Donnelly testified that 
“[w]e prepared those returns and reported the dividend income 
and the interest expense as allocable to Pennsylvania.” 
 The Board’s Conclusions 
The Board found that “equity and good conscience” allowed 
it to consider the Allocable Expenses Issue. Based upon the 
evidence and as discussed further in the opinion, the Board 
found that the interest expenses on the Centaur Notes were 
sufficiently related to the dividends income from the AirTouch 
shares such that the interest expenses also should have been 
                                                 
135 Mr. Donnelly noted that “[w]hat Comcast got was basically an embedded tax 
liability. Because at some point in time, that stock has to be sold to 
recognize the proceeds used to pay off Centaur shareholders.” 
136 When asked whether Centaur was taxed on the interest income that it 
received from Georgia, Mr. Donnelly replied, “I don’t know. I suspect not.” 
  ATB 2017-596
fully allocated to Pennsylvania, as the appellants had reported 
on their Pennsylvania returns. As the ultimate corporate member 
of two disregarded entities, Georgia received dividends from the 
AirTouch shares. The dividends from the AirTouch shares were 
used to pay interest on the Centaur Notes. Centaur then used the 
interest to pay dividends to its own shareholders. Each step was 
part of an integrated transaction formulated to monetize the 
AirTouch shares.       
The Commissioner’s concession of the AirTouch Dividends 
Income Issue obviated any findings and rulings on this issue by 
the Board, including tax implications. Based upon the record, 
the Board had insufficient evidence to compute the tax 
implications of the Allocable Expenses Issue, the Commissioner’s 
newly advanced issue. It is incumbent upon the Commissioner and 
the appellants to calculate and resolve any numerical 
consequences in accordance with the Board’s decisions and these 
findings of fact and report, adjusting for any conceded issues 
and alternative arguments for any applicable tax year.
137
 
E. Comcast Sales Factor Issue 
The basis for the Commissioner’s deficiency assessments 
against Comcast for the tax years 2007 and 2008 initially 
concerned the question of whether Comcast had the requisite 
                                                 
137 The Commissioner cannot presume, for instance, that his concession of the 
AirTouch Dividends Income Issue is offset numerically by the Allocable 
Expenses Issue. See footnote 22, supra. 
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nexus for purposes of being subject to the Commonwealth’s tax 
jurisdiction (“Comcast Nexus Issue”). The appellants included 
Comcast in the Mass I combined returns for the tax years 2007 
and 2008. The Commissioner removed Comcast from these returns 
upon audit, alleging lack of nexus. In his post-trial brief the 
Commissioner abandoned the nexus argument
138
 and instead advanced 
the Comcast Sales Factor Issue — that reimbursements for 
expenses paid to programmers
139
 should be removed from the 
numerator of Comcast’s sales factors. 
                                                 
138 Though the Board made no findings and rulings on the Comcast Nexus Issue as 
a result of the Commissioner’s change in theory, the Board noted that the 
record contained uncontested testimony that Comcast had one employee in 
Massachusetts in 2008. See 830 CMR 63.39.1 (stating that “a foreign 
corporation must file a return in Massachusetts and pay the associated excise 
if any one or more of the following apply,” including “the employment of 
labor”). Additionally, during the tax years 2007 and 2008, Comcast was the 
sole owner of CCCM, a disregarded entity for federal and state tax purposes, 
which entered into a Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement with each of 
the Cable Franchise Companies. Pursuant to the agreement, CCCM agreed to 
provide employees, the use of facilities, and vendor contracts and services 
to each of the Cable Franchise Companies. See 830 CMR 63.39.1 (Activities 
that place a corporation within the scope of G.L. c. 63, § 39 include “the 
employment of labor” and the “own[ing] or us[ing] any part or all of its 
capital, plant, or other property in the Commonwealth in a corporate 
capacity.”). See also Cambridge Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2003-358, 402 (“‘Evidence of a party 
having the burden of proof may not be disbelieved without an explicit and 
objectively adequate reason. . . . If the proponent has presented the best 
available evidence, which is logically adequate, and is neither contradicted 
nor improbable, it must be credited.’”), aff’d, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2005) 
(decision under Rule 1:28). Comcast itself entered into a Management 
Agreement with each of the Cable Franchise Companies. See Amray, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1986-98 (“The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that servicing activities do give a state 
jurisdiction to assert an income tax under both the commerce clause and the 
due process clause.”). 
139 The Board discussed payments to programmers in its coverage of the Costs of 
Performance Issue, supra. 
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In his post-trial brief, the Commissioner claimed that 
“[s]imilarly to the paymaster arrangements,140 Comcast Corp. 
included in the numerator of its sales factor the reimbursement 
of the Programming Royalties from the [Cable Franchise 
Companies].” The Commissioner reasoned that “[a]n affiliate’s 
reimbursement at cost for goods or services provided by another 
affiliate is not a sale for sales factor purposes” and that 
“[t]he reimbursement at cost of the Programming Royalties are 
not ‘sales’ and should be excluded from the numerator of Comcast 
Corp.’s sales factor.” 
As with the Allocable Expenses Issue, the appellants urged 
the Board to find that “equity and good conscience” did not 
require consideration of the Comcast Sales Factor Issue due to 
the Commissioner raising it late into the eleventh-hour. 
Notwithstanding this protest, the appellants stated that the 
Commissioner cited no support in the record for the proposition 
that Comcast’s sales factors even included reimbursements for 
programming expenses. They claimed that the sales factors 
included reimbursements for other expenses that they would agree 
to remove from Comcast’s numerator and denominator should the 
Board find that the Comcast Sales Factor Issue was not 
procedurally barred. In their reply brief, the appellants stated 
                                                 
140 The Commissioner’s reference is to the Payroll Companies Sales Factor 
Issue, discussed supra. 
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that “as Mr. Donnelly testified, Comcast Corporation’s sales 
factor included reimbursements for other expenses” and “[t]o the 
extent the Board finds that the Commissioner’s argument is not 
procedurally barred, Comcast agrees that such reimbursements are 
not properly treated as sales, and they should be removed from 
both the numerator and the denominator.” 
The appellants also raised, in their Motion to Alter, 
Amend, or Clarify Decision, the Commissioner’s failure to 
consider the tax implications of the Comcast Sales Factor Issue 
versus the original basis for the deficiency assessments against 
Comcast, the Comcast Nexus Issue, and that they should be 
entitled to a reduction of the deficiency assessments regardless 
of a decision for the Commissioner.  
Mr. Donnelly’s Testimony 
Mr. Donnelly testified in relevant part as follows 
regarding the Comcast sales factors: 
Q. And if you look down, it’s got a sales factor in 
Massachusetts of I guess the numerator — first of all, 
all the sales are attributable to services, right? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And the services — 
 
A. So that basically is the management — remember, 
CCCM is a disregarded entity underneath Comcast 
Corporation at this point. And CCCM underneath the 
shared facilities and management agreement, basically 
it provides everything, virtually everything for the 
cable operations. 
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 So you have a lot of reimbursed expenses. All 
these shared charges that I’ve been talking about that 
ended up on the books and records of the taxpayer, NE-
TO, the stuff this Peter K does, all these shared 
charges show up, are running to CCCM. 
 
Q. That means they are running to Comcast Corporation 
for tax purposes? 
 
A. On the numerator. That’s likely the bulk of what’s 
going on, if not everything that’s going on, for this 
numerator. It’s huge in terms of the whole company. 
It’s a very large amount. 
 
 And I know that what we put in those 
reimbursements so the management expense under the 
shared personnel facilities expense basically ran as 
receipts. It’s a reimbursement. 
 
 Like I said, every charge that we’ve talked about 
here is a dollar for dollar reimbursement. There’s no 
markup on it. 
 
Q. So the reimbursements for programming fees are 
included in the 699 million that’s reported in the 
numerator? 
 
A. No. It’s not — the 699? 
 
Q. Yes. 
 
A. It’s in the denominator. But I think most, if not 
all, of the 699 is the non-programming stuff. So 
that’s not part of it. 
 
Q. I didn’t think so. 
 
A. Management expense. The programming stuff didn’t 
come under — we didn’t allocate programming to the 
states. 
 
Q. I thought you did allocate programming to the 
states? 
 
A. We allocated to Pennsylvania. We reported it as 
revenue on Comcast Corporation and Pennsylvania. 
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Q. And the amounts of reimbursements that Comcast 
received? 
 
A. Is in the denominator. 
 
Q. And the amounts it received from the Massachusetts 
entities? 
 
A. I don’t believe — I’m not sure, I’m almost positive 
we allocated all that to Pennsylvania, the programming 
reimbursement. You have the expenses, and programming 
is different than the stuff — I seem to be confusing 
you.  
 
The ambiguity of Mr. Donnelly’s testimony made it 
impossible for the Board to determine conclusively the construct 
of Comcast’s sales factors. 
The Board’s Conclusions 
The Board found that “equity and good conscience” permitted 
its consideration of the Comcast Sales Factor Issue. Though the 
record, specifically Mr. Donnelly’s testimony, was factually 
nebulous as to whether reimbursements for expenses paid to 
programmers had originally been included in Comcast’s sales 
factors for the tax years 2007 and 2008, the appellants actually 
agreed with the Commissioner’s ultimate theory — that 
reimbursements at cost are not sales and should be excluded from 
the sales factors for purposes of calculating apportionment. As 
a matter of law, the Board found that such expenses should be 
excluded from the sales factors as they did not constitute 
sales. Similarly, any other reimbursements at cost, as testified 
to by Mr. Donnelly, should be excluded.       
  ATB 2017-602
Regarding the appellants’ claim in their Motion to Alter, 
Amend, or Clarify Decision that they should be entitled to an 
adjustment on the Comcast Sales Factor Issue regardless of a 
decision in favor of the Commissioner, the Board found, as with 
the Allocable Expenses Issue, that the record was inadequate for 
the Board to arrive at a monetary conclusion and it is incumbent 
upon the Commissioner and the appellants to calculate and 
resolve any numerical consequences in accordance with the 
Board’s decisions and these findings of fact and report, 
adjusting for any conceded issues and alternative arguments for 
any applicable tax year.
141
  
F. Processing Error Issue 
The Processing Error Issue involved the question of whether 
an admitted processing error on the Commissioner’s part in his 
application of a payment for the tax year 2004 should have 
resulted in an abatement. Mass I reported and paid a non-income 
measure of $764,786 on its Form 355C filed for the tax year 
2004. The Commissioner’s MASSTAX system142 failed to capture this 
non-income measure, triggering an overpayment of $764,786 that 
was applied to a future tax year. During his audit of the 
appellants for the tax years 2002 through 2008, the Commissioner 
                                                 
141 See footnotes 22 and 137, supra.  
142 The MASSTAX system has been described as “a computerized ledger system that 
records a taxpayer's return filing, assessment and tax payment history.” 
Nature’s Way, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2009-223, 227. 
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adjusted Mass I’s non-income measure by $764,786 for the tax 
year 2004. As stated in a July 18, 2012 letter from Michael R. 
Johnson, Audit Manager, to Sarah Wellings, Comcast: 
For the period ending 12/31/04, the non-income measure 
of tax as determined by the taxpayer on its return was 
not assessed in the [MASSTAX] system when the return 
was filed. When the taxpayer filed its 2004 return, 
although it calculated a non-income measure tax of 
$764,786 on its MA tangible property and an income tax 
for 2004 of $18,635,363, only the income tax of 
$18,635,363 was shown on page one of the return. As 
such, the non-income measure was not assessed. The 
taxpayer understands the adjustment but raises a 
concern involving the payment of the tax. The taxpayer 
believes it paid the non-income measure of tax. 
Although the taxpayer paid the tax, since the non-
income measure was not assessed, the payment relating 
to the non-income measure became part of the 
taxpayer’s overpayment. A portion of the overpayment 
for the 2004 tax year was refunded (a check in the 
amount of $73,003 was issued to the taxpayer on 
11/1/06) while the remaining overpayment has been 
applied to subsequent periods. My review of the 
[MASSTAX] system indicates the remaining overpayment 
relating to the 2004 non-income measure was ultimately 
applied to the 12/31/07 tax year and was used by the 
taxpayer and its affiliates. The [MASSTAX] system does 
not have any credit balances pending. The absence of a 
credit balance indicates all monies paid by the 
taxpayer have been applied to satisfy a tax liability. 
Thus, no payment relating to the 2004 non-income 
measure is available to be refunded to the taxpayer. 
 
In their request for findings of fact, the appellants 
requested a finding that the Commissioner “allegedly” credited 
the overpayment. The statement of agreed facts — willingly 
signed by the Commissioner and the appellants — acknowledged 
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that the overpayment was credited to subsequent tax years.
143
 The 
Board found no basis for the appellants to renege on this 
stipulated fact.  
The Board’s Conclusions 
Based upon these facts, the Board found that regardless of 
the Commissioner’s admitted processing error and application of 
payment to a subsequent tax year (which reduced the amount of 
tax due for that subsequent tax year), the audit adjustment 
simply calculated the non-income measure as originally reported 
by Mass I. Consequently, the $764,786 amount represents a tax 
lawfully due and cannot be abated by the Board. 
OPINION 
I. Costs of Performance Issue 
The Costs of Performance Issue concerned the question of 
whether the sales factors as originally filed for the Cable 
Franchise Companies incorrectly apportioned income to 
Massachusetts. 
A. To Allocate or to Apportion 
The parties initially disagreed over whether the income 
from business activity of certain entities should be allocated 
or apportioned to Massachusetts. The provisions of G.L. c. 63, 
                                                 
143 Section 4.2(j) of the statement of agreed facts stated as follow: “[T]he 
Commissioner treated Mass I’s payment for its nonincome measure of $764,786 
as an overpayment and credited the payment to a subsequent tax period.” The 
July 18, 2012 letter quoted above is cited as an exhibit supporting this 
stipulated fact. 
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§ 38 set out the parameters for determining whether income from 
business activity should be either allocated or apportioned to 
Massachusetts: 
(b) If the corporation does not have income from 
business activity which is taxable in another state, 
the whole of its taxable net income, determined under 
the provisions of subsection (a), shall be allocated 
to this commonwealth. . . .  
 
(c) If a corporation . . . has income from business 
activity which is taxable both within and without this 
commonwealth, its taxable net income . . . shall be 
apportioned to this commonwealth by multiplying said 
taxable net income by a fraction, the numerator of 
which is the property factor plus the payroll factor 
plus twice times the sales factor, and the denominator 
of which is four. 
 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(b) & (c). The corresponding regulation at 
830 CMR 63.38.1 states as follows: 
All of a taxpayer’s taxable net income is allocated to 
Massachusetts if the taxpayer does not have income 
from business activity which is taxable in another 
state. If a taxpayer has income from business activity 
which is taxable both in Massachusetts and in another 
state, then the part of its net income derived from 
business carried on in Massachusetts is determined by 
multiplying all of its taxable net income by the three 
factor apportionment percentage as provided in 
M.G.L. c. 63, § 38(c)-(g) and 830 CMR 63.38.1. 
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(1)(b).  
The Commissioner contended that the Cable Franchise 
Companies defined by him as the Mass CableCos (Mass I, Mass II, 
Mass III, Boston, Brockton, Milton, Needham, and Southern NE) 
did not establish that they were even entitled to apportion 
their income under G.L. c. 63, § 38(c) and consequently that the 
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Board should not even reach the ultimate question concerning the 
sales factors for these entities.   
B. The Record Contained Sufficient Evidence to Establish the 
Mass CableCos’ Right to Apportion Their Income 
 
The appellants established that the Mass CableCos were 
entitled to apportion their income. Pursuant to G.L. c. 63, 
§ 38: 
[A] corporation is taxable in another state if (1) in 
that state such corporation is subject to a net income 
tax, a franchise tax measured by net income, a 
franchise tax for the privilege of doing business, or 
a corporate stock tax, or (2) that state has 
jurisdiction to subject such corporation to a net 
income tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state 
does or does not. 
 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(b). The regulation at 830 CMR 63.38.1 sets out 
further guidance as to what constitutes “subject to tax” and 
“jurisdiction to tax.” 830 CMR 63.38.1(5)(a) & (b). Both tests 
analyze a corporation “only on the basis of the separate 
activities of that individual corporation.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1(5)(c).  
A taxpayer claiming that it is subject to one of the listed 
categories of taxation “must furnish to the Commissioner upon 
request documentary evidence to support the claim. The 
documentary evidence should include proof that the taxpayer has 
filed the requisite tax return and has paid the tax due.” 
830 CMR 63.38.1(5)(a). The regulation notes that  
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[i]f a taxpayer’s activities in another state are 
protected from state taxation by the United States 
Constitution or by other federal law, including P.L. 
86-272, or if the taxpayer is not required to file 
returns under the law of the other state, the taxpayer 
is not subject to tax in the other state, even if it 
voluntarily files returns with or pays tax to that 
state. 
 
Id. (from the version of the regulation in effect prior to 
October 20, 2006) (also stating that “[a] taxpayer . . . is 
presumed not to be subject to tax in that state if the taxpayer 
has filed an abatement application or similar claim in that 
state alleging that it is not subject to tax in such state”).  
A taxpayer is considered within another state’s tax 
jurisdiction “with respect to a business activity if, under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, the taxpayer’s 
business activity could be taxed in Massachusetts under the same 
facts and circumstances that exist in the other state.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1(5)(b). See also Tech-Etch, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2005-279, 288 
(“‘Taxability in the state of the purchaser does not depend on 
the tax laws of the purchaser’s state, but on whether the 
taxpayer has sufficient contact with that state to give it 
jurisdiction to impose a tax.’”), aff’d, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 
(2006) (decision under Rule 1:28), further appellate review 
denied, 448 Mass. 1102 (2006). Pursuant to the regulation: “The 
Commissioner will presume that any activities of a corporation 
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in another state are protected from the other state’s tax 
jurisdiction by federal law, including P.L. 86-272, if the 
corporation does not file returns in that jurisdiction.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1(5)(b). Additionally, the taxpayer “must furnish evidence 
to the Commissioner upon request to substantiate the claim.” Id. 
The Board has not interpreted the regulation to require the 
filing of a return in another state. The Board has held that 
“[t]he voluntary filing of a tax return in a state is not, by 
itself, sufficient to establish that a taxpayer is taxable in 
that state. However, it is also ‘immaterial that the taxpayer 
may not have filed a tax return in a given state so long as the 
taxpayer’s connections with the state provide a basis upon which 
the state might assert its jurisdiction to assess an income 
tax.’” IDC Research, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-399, 524-25 (quoting Amray, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 1986-98, 103), aff’d, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 352 (2010), 
further appellate review denied, 459 Mass. 1103 (2011). The 
Board has also found that “an appropriate inquiry under 
[G.L. c. 63, § 38(b)] is whether the jurisdiction of those 
states to tax . . . might be limited in any way either by the 
United States Constitution or by Congress’ exercise of its power 
under the Commerce Clause.” Amray, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact 
and Reports at 1986-104. See also Tenneco, Inc. v. Commissioner 
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of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-639, 658 
(“A state may not tax income arising out of interstate 
activities, even on a proportional basis, unless there is a 
‘minimal connection’ or ‘nexus’ between the interstate 
activities and the taxing state and a ‘rational relationship 
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate 
values of the enterprise.’”) (citations omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[a]lthough our modern 
due process jurisprudence rejects a rigid, formalistic 
definition of minimum connection, we have not abandoned the 
requirement that, in the case of a tax on an activity, there 
must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a 
connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax.” Allied-
Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation. 504 U.S. 768, 
778 (1992) (citation omitted). The Court further stated that 
“[t]he present inquiry . . . focuses on the guidelines necessary 
to circumscribe the reach of the State’s legitimate power to 
tax. We are guided by the basic principle that the State’s power 
to tax an individual’s or corporation’s activities is justified 
by the ‘protection, opportunities and benefits’ the State 
confers on those activities.” Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 778 
(quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 
(1940)).  
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In Fleet Funding, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-117, the Board determined 
that the taxpayer had insufficient activities with other states 
for purposes of entitlement to apportionment. The taxpayers were 
“Massachusetts-domiciled entities receiving passive interest 
income from loans originated and serviced by others. They had no 
employees and their only significant assets were the notes 
transferred to it by Fleet and the interest income they received 
from those assets.” Id. at 2008-155. The Board found that 
“[t]here is simply no showing on this record that these 
activities are sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of any 
other state to impose an income-based tax.” Id. at 2008-155 & 
2008-185 (“[J]urisdiction to tax requires a constitutional, not 
statutory, analysis.”) (footnote and citation omitted).   
 In Bayer Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-543, 564, remanded on 
unrelated grounds, 436 Mass. 302 (2002), the Board found that 
the taxpayer       
was incorporated in Massachusetts and its only place 
of business was in Massachusetts. Its business 
activities were all performed in Massachusetts. It had 
no employees of its own. It did not own any property 
in other jurisdictions. Without nexus to any other 
state, Agfa Financial was not entitled to apportion 
its income under G.L. c. 63, § 38(b). Accordingly, the 
Commissioner properly allocated all of Agfa 
Financial’s income to Massachusetts for the tax years 
at issue.  
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See also Bayer Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2005-491, 531-32 (“Agfa Financial 
incorporated as a Massachusetts corporation and was located in 
Wilmington, Massachusetts. During the tax years at issue, Agfa 
Financial filed business registrations seeking permission to 
conduct business in other states. Despite this fact, Agfa 
Financial did not maintain a place of business anywhere other 
than Wilmington, Massachusetts and did not engage in any 
business activity or own property in any other state.”), aff’d, 
68 Mass. App. Ct. 1101 (2007) (decision under Rule 1:28). 
In another matter, the Board found that “[f]oreign 
corporations are taxable in Massachusetts if they engage in any 
one of a broad variety of activities, including the buying, 
selling, or procuring of services or property, the employment of 
labor, or the exercise of any other ‘act, power, right, 
privilege or immunity’ in the Commonwealth.” IDC Research, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2009-525 (quoting 
G.L. c. 63, § 39) (“Applying that standard to the facts of the 
present appeals, the Board found and ruled that CW Publishing 
was taxable in the many states to which its advertising sales 
representatives travelled to solicit sales of advertising.”). 
In the present matters, though the parties stipulated that 
Mass I, one of the entities included in the Commissioner’s group 
of Mass CableCos, was included as a nexus taxpayer in CCCH’s New 
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Hampshire unitary returns for the tax year 2003 and as a nexus 
taxpayer in Comcast’s New Hampshire unitary returns for the tax 
years 2004 through 2008, the Board was unpersuaded that it met 
the “subject to tax” test on this basis. The documentation 
included merely comprised a New Hampshire “Combined Business 
Profits Tax Affiliation Schedule” for each of the tax years 2003 
through 2008. This documentation was insufficient for the Board 
to make a finding that Mass I was “subject to a net income tax, 
a franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the 
privilege of doing business, or a corporate stock tax” in New 
Hampshire. G.L. c. 63, § 38(b). See also 830 CMR 63.38.1(5)(a).  
The Board found sufficient evidence in the record to 
conclude that each of the Mass CableCos met the second test for 
taxability, that another state would have jurisdiction to tax 
the entities. The Commissioner conceded that Mass I had 
employees in other states
144
 during the tax years 2003 through 
2008, which, as the Board found in another matter, constituted 
an activity that would subject a corporation to taxability in 
Massachusetts. IDC Research, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2009-525.         
The appellants in the present matters contended that they 
had a presence in Pennsylvania. Mr. Donnelly testified that “we 
do things for these taxpayers in Pennsylvania. Under 
                                                 
144 See footnote 17, supra.  
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Pennsylvania’s rules, they don’t have any factors though.”145 The 
Board disagreed with the degree of presence that the appellants 
tried to attribute to Pennsylvania for purposes of determining 
the sales factors of the Cable Franchise Companies, as discussed 
further below concerning apportionment, but acknowledged that 
Pennsylvania was the location listed as the principal place of 
business for each of the Cable Franchise Companies, including 
the Mass CableCos. The Board also found it noteworthy that the 
majority of the Mass CableCos were foreign corporations. The 
Board has held that “[a] domestic corporation is subject to the 
corporate excise by reason of corporate existence at any time 
during its taxable year.” Urban Computer Systems, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
1988-286, 290. Applying this reasoning here, the majority of the 
Mass CableCos would be subject to corporate excise in the 
jurisdiction where they are considered domestic corporations. 
Testimony also established that the cable franchise 
licenses were signed in New Hampshire. The regulation defines 
business activities broadly as “all of a taxpayer’s transactions 
and activities, regardless of classification or labels, 
                                                 
145 Mr. Donnelly also testified that he did not know whether, under 
Pennsylvania law, the Cable Franchise Companies had an obligation to file 
Pennsylvania tax returns despite their alleged “presence” in Pennsylvania. 
“They had a lot of activities,” he stated. “The nerve center for all our 
subsidiaries is Pennsylvania.” He admitted that the appellants are treating 
the Cable Franchise Companies as having Massachusetts sales under 
Pennsylvania sourcing rules and as Pennsylvania sales for Massachusetts 
purposes. 
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occurring in the course of a taxpayer’s trade or business.” 
830 CMR 63.38.1(2). See also 830 CMR 63.39.1 (“execution of 
contracts” listed as an example of “‘doing business’” in the 
Commonwealth); Wisconsin, 311 U.S. at 444-45 (“[T]hat a tax is 
contingent upon events brought to pass without a state does not 
destroy the nexus between such a tax and transactions within a 
state for which the tax is an exaction.”) (citations omitted). 
The Commissioner appears to have conflated taxability and 
apportionment factors in his argument, essentially contending 
that Mass I’s payroll percentage was “insignificant in producing 
income” pursuant to 830 CMR 63.38.1(11)(4)(b) and therefore its 
income was properly allocated to Massachusetts. Similarly, the 
Commissioner contended that the Mass CableCos would have “zero 
apportionment”146 in other states if the Massachusetts regulatory 
scheme were applied in other states. Taxability and 
apportionment are distinct concepts. See G.L. c. 63, § 38(b) & 
(c). A taxpayer does not even reach apportionment in the absence 
of taxability — that is the crux of the allocation argument. An 
analysis of apportionment factors does not conversely determine 
allocation. See 830 CMR 63.38.1(11)(a)(3) (even if no factors 
are deemed applicable, “the taxable net income of the taxpayer 
                                                 
146 “A factor shall not be deemed to be inapplicable merely because the 
numerator of the factor is zero.” G.L. c. 63, § 38(g). 
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is presumed to be 100 percent apportioned to Massachusetts,” not 
allocated to Massachusetts).
147
 
Accordingly, because the appellants established that 
another state would have jurisdiction to tax the Mass CableCos, 
the Board ruled that the income of the Mass CableCos was 
apportionable to Massachusetts.   
C. The Appellants Failed to Prove that Their Sales Factors as 
Originally Filed Were Incorrect 
 
The appellants contended that they erroneously calculated 
their self-reported sales factors and that this consequently 
resulted in a higher amount of income apportioned to 
Massachusetts for which they sought abatements in the Costs of 
Performance Issue.   
A taxpayer that has “income from business activity which is 
taxable both within and outside of Massachusetts must apportion 
its taxable net income to Massachusetts by multiplying its 
taxable net income” by a percentage derived from three factors148 
— a property factor, a payroll factor, and a sales factor. 830 
 CMR 63.38.1. See also Boston Professional Hockey 
Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 276, 280 
(2005) (“The purpose of applying this three-factor apportionment 
                                                 
147 The quoted material is located at 830 CMR 63.38.1(12)(a)(3) in the version 
of the regulation in place prior to October 20, 2006. 
148 Certain types of corporations apportion their taxable net income based 
upon a single factor rather than three factors. For instance, under 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(l), manufacturing corporations apportion using 100 percent 
of the sales factor only. 
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formula is to obtain a fair approximation of the corporate 
income that is ‘reasonably related to the activities conducted 
within [Massachusetts].’”) (quoting Gillete Co. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, 425 Mass. 670, 681 (1997)). The Costs of Performance 
Issue concerns only the sales factor.  
Pursuant to G.L. c. 63, § 38, “The sales factor is a 
fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the 
corporation in this commonwealth during the taxable year, and 
the denominator of which is the total sales of the corporation 
everywhere during the taxable year.” G.L. c. 63, § 38(f). The 
statute further provides that “[a]s used in this subsection, 
‘sales’ means all gross receipts of the corporation except 
interest, dividends, and gross receipts from the maturity, 
redemption, sale, exchange or other disposition of securities.” 
Id.149 These appeals concern sales of Video and Internet services 
to subscribers located in Massachusetts, and therefore concern 
“[s]ales, other than sales of tangible personal property.” Id. 
                                                 
149 By St. 2005, c. 163, § 26, G.L. c. 63, § 38(f) was amended effective 
December 8, 2005. Subsequently, this portion of the statute read as follows:  
 
As used in this subsection, unless specifically stated otherwise, 
‘sales’ means all gross receipts of the corporation, including 
deemed receipts from transactions treated as sales or exchanges 
under the Code, except interest, dividends, and gross receipts 
from the maturity, redemption, sale, exchange or other 
disposition of securities, provided, however, that ‘sales’ shall 
not include gross receipts from transactions or activities to the 
extent that a non-domiciliary state would be prohibited from 
taxing the income from such transactions or activities under the 
Constitution of the United States.  
 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(f) (as amended by St. 2005, c. 163, § 26). 
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Such sales “are in this commonwealth if” either of two scenarios 
exists: “1. the income-producing activity is performed in this 
commonwealth; or 2. the income-producing activity is performed 
both in and outside this commonwealth and a greater proportion 
of this income-producing activity is performed in this 
commonwealth than in any other state, based on costs of 
performance.” Id. The regulation at 830 CMR 63.38.1 similarly 
states that   
[g]ross receipts from sales, other than sales of 
tangible personal property, are attributed to 
Massachusetts if the income-producing activity that 
gave rise to the receipts was performed wholly within 
Massachusetts. If income-producing activity is 
performed both within and without Massachusetts and if 
the costs of performing the income-producing activity 
are greater in Massachusetts than in any other one 
state, then gross receipts are attributed to 
Massachusetts. 
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d).
150
 The regulation defines an income-
producing activity as     
a transaction, procedure, or operation directly 
engaged in by a taxpayer which results in a separately 
identifiable item of income. In general, any activity 
whose performance creates an obligation of a 
particular customer to pay a specific consideration to 
                                                 
150 The regulation at 830 CMR 63.38.1 was amended in 2006 and this portion 
subsequently read as follows:  
 
Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are 
attributed to Massachusetts if the income-producing activity that 
gave rise to the sales was performed wholly within Massachusetts. 
If income-producing activity is performed both within and without 
Massachusetts and if the costs of performing the income-producing 
activity are greater in Massachusetts than in any other one 
state, then the sales are attributed to Massachusetts.  
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d) (new regulation promulgated October 20, 2006). 
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the taxpayer is an income-producing activity. However, 
except insofar as required by 830 CMR 
63.38.1(9)(d)3.c., below, (relating to the licensing 
or sale of intangibles), income-producing activity 
includes only the activities of the taxpayer whose 
income is being apportioned. Except as provided in 830 
CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)3.c., below, income-producing 
activity does not include activities performed on 
behalf of a taxpayer by another person, such as 
services performed on its behalf by an independent 
contractor or by any other party whose activities are 
not attributable to the taxpayer for purposes of 
determining tax jurisdiction under 830 CMR 63.39.1. 
For example, in the case of a taxpayer who brokers the 
sale of services that are performed by third parties, 
the income-producing activity includes only the 
brokerage activity and not the ultimate services 
performed, provided that the performance of the 
ultimate service by the third party is not considered 
an activity of the taxpayer under 830 CMR 63.39.1 for 
purposes of determining whether the taxpayer is 
taxable in the state where the service is performed. 
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2) (emphasized language not included in 
the version of the regulation promulgated October 20, 2006). The 
regulation further provides that “[f]or purposes of 830 CMR 
63.38.1(9)(d), unless otherwise provided in this regulation, 
830 CMR 63.38.1, the taxpayer’s costs of performance are its 
direct costs determined in a manner consistent with generally 
accepted accounting principles. Unless otherwise provided in 
this regulation, 830 CMR 63.38.1, costs of performance do not 
include costs of independent contractors or services by 
subcontractors.” 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(4). The regulation also 
specifically delineates that “[i]n the case of affiliated 
corporations, the income of each corporation is separately 
  ATB 2017-619
determined and apportioned unless, under the particular facts, 
one affiliate acts as the alter ego of another.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1(3)(b).  
The Board and Massachusetts courts have considered numerous 
matters involving calculation of the sales factor under 
G.L. c. 63, § 38(f). The taxpayer was the owner and operator of 
the Boston Bruins Professional Hockey Club in the matter of 
Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2003-273, aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, 443 Mass. 276 (2005). The taxpayer 
challenged the Commissioner’s calculation of its sales factor, 
as well as its property factor. Id. See also Boston Professional 
Hockey Association, 443 Mass. at 280 (“In its sales factor 
claim, BPHA seeks to lower the amount of the numerator by 
reducing the total sales of the corporation deemed to be ‘in 
this commonwealth.’”). In finding for the Commissioner, the 
Board determined   
that BPHA's income-producing activity was not merely 
an individual Bruins game but instead the overall 
ownership and operation of an NHL franchise. 
Therefore, BPHA's income-producing activity included 
many subsidiary activities like scheduling, contract 
negotiation, and the approval of logos and trademarks. 
The Board found and ruled that these subsidiary 
activities, most of them performed by the 
administrative and office staff on Causeway Street, 
were necessary in creating a viable NHL franchise. 
Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that many of 
the costs excluded by [the taxpayer’s expert witness], 
like salaries to BPHA's executive and administrative 
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staff working at the Causeway Street office and the 
correlating payroll and pension tax expenditures on 
these salaries, should have been included in the 
analysis of the costs associated with BPHA's business, 
because the totality of activities by Bruins players, 
coaches, scouts, and executive and administrative 
staff “were necessary steps in creating the ultimate 
[NHL franchise] product, and thus constituted 
activities whose performance created an obligation in 
the ultimate customers to pay consideration.” 
 
Boston Professional Hockey Association, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports at 2003-301-02 (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Board’s 
conclusions: 
The board rejected BPHA's argument on alternative 
grounds. First, it found that with respect to gate 
receipts received by BPHA, the “income-producing 
activity” was the “operation of an NHL franchise,” not 
just the playing of individual games. That activity 
included many subsidiary activities (including the 
playing of games) necessary to create a viable NHL 
franchise, and the greatest proportion of the costs 
incurred in that income-producing activity were 
incurred in Massachusetts where the franchise was 
physically located, administered and managed, and 
where the team played almost one-half of its games. 
Alternatively, it found that even if each game were 
treated as a separate income-producing activity, BPHA 
only received gate receipts when the Bruins played 
home games, and those receipts were received entirely 
in Massachusetts where the costs of playing the games 
were also incurred. In so finding, the board rejected 
BPHA's argument that BPHA earned consideration (and 
therefore revenue) in their performance of regular 
season away games in the form of the obligation of the 
away team to play a corresponding game in BPHA's home 
territory. 
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Boston Professional Hockey Association, 443 Mass. at 284-85 
(footnote omitted). The Court found that “both grounds on which 
the board upheld the commissioner’s allocation of gate receipts 
were based on reasonable interpretations of the tax laws and the 
department’s regulations, were supported by substantial 
evidence, and do not lead to a ‘grossly distorted result.’” Id. 
at 286 (citations omitted).  
The matter of Interface Group v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-1343, remanded, 
72 Mass. App. Ct. 32 (2008), aff’d, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 
(2009) (decision under Rule 1:28), further appellate review 
denied, 456 Mass. 1105 (2010), concerned whether receipts from 
the sale of travel packages were Massachusetts sales for 
purposes of calculating the sales factor under G.L. c. 63, 
§ 38(f). The appeal required the Board to determine the 
taxpayer’s income-producing activity. Interface Group, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2008-1343. “The Commissioner 
contended that Interface's income-producing activity was its 
overall operation as a public charter tour operator 
(‘operational approach’), while the appellants contended that 
Interface's income-producing activity was each individual sale 
of a travel package to an individual customer (‘transactional 
approach’). Adoption of the transactional approach would require 
analyzing GWV's costs on a per-trip basis, while adoption of the 
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operational approach would require analyzing GWV's costs on an 
annual basis.” Id. at 2008-1345-46. The Appeals Court had 
remanded the matter to the Board for further proceedings on the 
basis that the Board had not provided guidance on interpretation 
of the first two sentences of 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2)
151
 and had 
not provided adequate support for its decision.
152
 Id. at 2008-
1349. The Board found that   
[a]s a public charter tour operator, GWV was in the 
business of assembling various components of travel 
packages and marketing those packages to the travel 
agents who sold them to the ultimate customers. The 
“transaction, procedure or operation directly engaged 
in” by GWV was the bulk purchase of rooms and 
transportation and the package and sale of the tours 
through travel agents, not the sale of individual 
tours to individual customers. Therefore, the Board 
found that the Commissioner properly characterized 
                                                 
151 The first two sentences state as follows: “For purposes of this subsection, 
an income-producing activity is a transaction, procedure, or operation 
directly engaged in by a taxpayer which results in a separately identifiable 
item of income. In general, any activity whose performance creates an 
obligation of a particular customer to pay a specific consideration to the 
taxpayer is an income-producing activity.” 63.38.1(9)(d)(2). 
152 The Appeals Court held that “the board has not provided an explanation for 
its conclusory determination that it ‘found no basis for fracturing GWV's 
business into thousands of mini-transactions on a customer-by-customer 
basis’” and that “although it may be that GWV's income-producing activity can 
be conceptualized appropriately as the bulk assembly of travel packages, it 
is also the case that the taxpayer has put forth an interpretation that may 
be consistent with a transactional approach. These are all issues that 
require further explanation by the board.” Interface Group v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 41 (2008). The Appeals Court stated that 
“[t]he board’s opinion here does not address how the two sentences of the 
regulation [830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2)] are to be construed or why the 
taxpayers’ construction runs counter to the regulation, nor does it reconcile 
the arguable conflict in the board’s findings” and that “[a] reading of that 
regulation yields several plausible interpretations.” Id. at 38-39. The Court 
noted, for instance, that “[i]t is . . . consistent with the interpretation 
that because the second sentence of the regulation begins with the words ‘in 
general,’ that sentence is an exemplar rather than a limitation on the reach 
of the first sentence. On this view, it is not necessary or appropriate to go 
beyond the first sentence — that here, GWV’s income-producing activity was 
the assemblage of the packages, thus, the costs of this activity were borne 
largely by the operation of the business in Massachusetts.” Id. at 39. 
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GWV's income-producing activity as its overall 
operation of a business that assembled, marketed and 
sold tours in bulk. Accordingly, as explained in the 
Opinion, the Board reinstated its decisions for the 
appellee. 
 
Id. at 2008-1354-55. The Board reasoned that   
[t]he general, non-specific language of the 
regulation, particularly the disjunctive phrase 
“transaction, procedure, or operation” from the first 
sentence, and the phrase “[i]n general” from the 
second sentence, require a close analysis of the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case to 
determine the activity that produces all the income 
which is subject to apportionment. The regulation does 
not permit a taxpayer to cherry-pick from among its 
subsidiary activities
153
 so as to characterize its 
income-producing activity in the manner which results 
in the most favorable tax treatment.  
 
Id. at 2008-1360 (citation omitted). The two sentences, noted 
the Board, emphasize a taxpayer’s activity — the activity “must 
be directly engaged in by the taxpayer and it must result in a 
payment obligation of a customer, i.e., it must result in a 
sale.” Id. at 2008-1361.154 Upon its analysis of the particular 
facts and circumstances of the matter, the Board held that    
GWV is not “directly engaged” in the sale of 
individual vacation tours to individual customers.  
Rather, [GWV] purchases the components of its tour 
packages in bulk and sells the packages indirectly 
through travel agents.  Accordingly, [GWV]’s income-
producing activity that gives rise to its sales income 
                                                 
153 The Cable Franchise Companies did not have subsidiary activities from which 
to cherry-pick. Their direct activity here was limited to transactions with 
Massachusetts cities and towns for purposes of functioning as cable franchise 
licensees.   
154 “Reading these two sentences together, income-producing activity under the 
regulation is activity in which the taxpayer directly engages which generates 
sales income to the taxpayer.” Interface Group, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact 
and Reports at 2008-1361. 
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is its overall operation of a business which 
negotiates, purchases, assembles, packages and markets 
tours in bulk. It is GWV’s performance of this overall 
operation that creates its income which is subject to 
apportionment. 
 
Id. at 2008-1361-62. Further, the Board stated that “[t]o view 
GWV’s business activity as thousands of separate mini-
transactions, which each create a separately identifiable item 
of income, ignores GWV’s fundamental business function as a 
travel tour operator, which is to deal in bulk so as to secure 
discounted, competitive prices.” Id. at 2008-1365.  
The case of AT&T Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-524, 526, aff’d, 82 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1106 (2012) (decision under Rule 1:28), further 
appellate review denied, 463 Mass. 1112 (2012), presented the 
Board with the question of “whether certain receipts from 
interstate and international telecommunications services 
provided by the appellant should be included in the numerator of 
the appellant’s sales factor for purposes of determining its 
Massachusetts taxable income for the tax years at issue.” “AT&T 
was in the business of providing interstate and international 
network telecommunications services. The receipts at issue in 
this appeal were from its interstate and international voice and 
data telecommunications services.” Id. at 2011-525 (footnote 
omitted). The Commissioner advocated for a transactional 
approach upon which the income-producing activity “was [AT&T’s] 
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provision of each individual telephone call and data 
transmission . . . for each of its customers located in 
Massachusetts, the performance of which created an obligation of 
the individual customer to pay specific consideration to AT&T.” 
Id. at 2011-527. The taxpayer advocated for an operational 
approach and “contended that its income-producing activity was 
its business of providing a national, integrated 
telecommunications network, which it operated and managed from 
its Global Network Operations Center located in Bedminster, New 
Jersey.” Id. at 2011-528 and 2011-545 (“[T]he characterization 
of AT&T's ‘income-producing activity’ determined how its costs 
of performance were to be analyzed, which ultimately determined 
which of its sales were Massachusetts sales to be included in 
the numerator of its sales factor.”). The Board indicated that 
“[t]he regulation might appear to offer a choice between a 
transaction or a procedure or an operation. However, it does not 
offer a choice. Instead, the statute requires a determination of 
the correct income-producing activity, based on a close analysis 
of the particular facts presented.” Id. at 2011-546 (citation 
omitted).  
Based upon its examination of the facts in that matter, the 
Board determined that     
AT&T’s income-producing activity was not the 
connection of an individual transmission over a 
specifically designated wire. Through detailed and 
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convincing evidence, the appellant instead established 
that AT&T’s income-producing activity was providing a 
long-distance transmission service by means of 
operating a complex and comprehensive network that 
routed and completed those transmissions, very often 
over unpredictable paths that were not necessarily the 
shortest geographic distance. Simply put, AT&T could 
not provide its long-distance service without 
operating its entire long-distance network. The Board 
found that the Commissioner’s expert’s proposed 
“calling patterns” and “traffic factors adjustment” 
theories, which lacked specific evidentiary 
foundation, were not sufficient to support the 
Commissioner’s transactional approach. Moreover, these 
theories could not be supported, particularly in the 
event of heavy network traffic or unforeseen network 
outages, both of which, the appellant proved, were 
common occurrences. The Board thus found and ruled 
that, in accordance with the statute and the 
regulations, AT&T’s income-producing activity was its 
operation of its global network. 
 
AT&T Corp., Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-549-
50. The Board also noted that     
[w]hile not central to its decision, the Board also 
recognized the problems associated with adoption of 
the transactional approach for analyzing AT&T's costs 
of performance under the facts of this appeal. In 
particular, the costs of maintaining particular 
switches could not be allocated to individual 
transmissions unless it were known which particular 
switches that those transmissions had used. 
Determining this information would be a monumentally 
challenging task, both given the volume of AT&T's 
transmissions and the fact that a transmission would 
frequently be re-routed during its transmittal.  
 
Id. at 2011-553.  
Turning to the matters at hand, the Board cannot apply the 
same operational approach used in Boston Professional Hockey 
Association, Interface, and AT&T for the simple reason that the 
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Cable Franchise Companies did not directly engage in any 
operations, as did the taxpayers in the referenced cases. See 
Interface, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2008-1362 
(“Rather, what is required is an examination of a taxpayer’s 
overall business to determine the taxpayer’s income-producing 
activity.”). The Cable Franchise Companies relied upon the 
Comcast national network, Comcast resources, and resources of 
affiliates to fulfill the terms of the cable franchise licenses, 
but the Cable Franchise Companies were not the entities directly 
engaging in any operations. The Shared Personnel and Facilities 
Agreement specifically stated that each of the Cable Franchise 
Companies “does not itself have the direct resources necessary 
to operate and manage the Business.” They functioned as cable 
franchise licensees with Massachusetts cities and towns, a 
significant activity as the provisions of G.L. c. 166A, § 3 
required holding such a license from a Massachusetts city or 
town. The Board found that this income-producing activity was 
performed wholly within Massachusetts and resulted in the 
separately identifiable items of income at issue here, receipts 
from subscribers located in Massachusetts for Video and Internet 
services.
155
  
                                                 
155 The taxpayer in Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-324, 356, “contended that its 
Travel Unit performed no income-producing activity in Massachusetts, because 
the activities of its employees did not directly produce any obligation of 
customers to pay a consideration to Interface.” The taxpayer reasoned that 
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Even if the income-producing activity could arguably be 
construed as having been performed both within and without 
Massachusetts, the Board found that the costs of performing the 
income-producing activity were greater in Massachusetts than in 
any other one state. The Cable Franchise Companies’ quantifiable 
direct costs of functioning as cable franchise licensees with 
Massachusetts cities and towns were those costs enumerated in 
the cable franchise licenses, and the Board found those costs — 
paid to Massachusetts cities and towns — were greater in 
Massachusetts, regardless of whether the payments were made from 
Comcast’s Northeast Division office in New Hampshire. See also 
G.L. c. 166A, § 9.  
                                                                                                                                                             
“the activity of selling travel packages to the ultimate vacationing customer 
was the sole activity that produced an obligation in the customer to pay a 
consideration” and that “because such activity was performed by travel agents 
who were independent contractors,” the activity could not be imputed to the 
taxpayer pursuant to 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2). Id. at 2000-356-57. The Board 
found that “‘direct’ does not refer to the customer’s obligation to pay 
consideration to the taxpayer. Rather, ‘direct’ refers to the taxpayer’s 
participation in some activity, indeed, ‘any activity whose performance 
creates an obligation’ in a customer to pay consideration to the taxpayer.” 
Id. at 2000-357. The Board further found that “[w]hile Travel Unit employees 
did not correspond directly with the traveling customer, their activities in 
the Needham office of booking and marketing the accommodations were necessary 
steps in creating the ultimate vacation tour product, and thus constituted 
activities whose performance created an obligation in the ultimate customers 
to pay consideration.” Id. at 2000-358-59. Similarly here, even though 
payments made by Massachusetts customers were not made directly to the Cable 
Franchise Companies, the activity of functioning as cable franchise licensees 
with Massachusetts cities and towns directly resulted in the income at issue, 
sales derived from Video and Internet services to subscribers located in 
Massachusetts. Notably, the provisions of G.L. c. 166A, § 9, as incorporated 
into the cable franchise licenses, require payment of a fee by the Cable 
Franchise Companies calculated per subscriber. The Board contrasts this fee 
method with the arbitrary allocation of costs to the Cable Franchise 
Companies based upon subscribers regardless of whether the Cable Franchise 
Companies incurred such costs. 
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The appellants’ analysis erroneously considered the 
activities of Comcast’s national operations rather than those of 
the individual Cable Franchise Companies in ascertaining direct 
costs. The Cable Franchise Companies were merely allocated a 
formulaic portion of the national costs in a push-down exercise.  
See Interface, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2008-
1360 (“[A] corporation’s internal accounting practices are not 
dispositive for purposes of computing its taxable income.”) 
(citations omitted); Bayer, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2005-517 (“Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed 
that ‘the characterization of a transaction for financial 
accounting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on 
the other, need not necessarily be the same. Accounting methods 
or descriptions, without more, do not lend substance to that 
which has no substance.’”) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 
U.S. 561, 577 (1978)). 
The appellants essentially sought to disregard their 
separate-entity structure for purposes of apportionment. 
Relevant case law is not in their favor. Bayer, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2000-559 (“A taxpayer seeking to 
challenge the form in which it has cast its own transactions has 
a heavy burden of proof imposed upon him.”) (citations omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that “[t]he doctrine of 
corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life. 
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Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the 
state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands 
of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed 
convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of 
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business 
by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable 
entity.” Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 
438-39 (1943) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). But 
while “‘[a] taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his 
affairs as he may choose and having elected to do some business 
as a corporation, he must accept the tax disadvantages.’” 
Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. 
denied, 345 U.S. 924 (1953) (“‘The Government may look at 
actualities and upon determination that the form employed for 
doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is 
unreal or sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the 
fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute.’”) 
(citation omitted).  
“The practical reason for such a rule is that otherwise the 
taxpayer could commence doing business as a corporation or 
partnership and, if everything goes well, realize the income tax 
advantages therefrom; but if things do not turn out so well, may 
turn around and disclaim the business form he created in order 
to realize the loss as his individual loss.” Id. See also Bayer, 
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Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2000-560 (“The burden 
is on the taxpayer to see to it that the form of business he has 
created for tax purposes, and has asserted in his returns to be 
valid, is in fact not a sham or unreal. If in fact it is unreal, 
then it is not he but the Commissioner who should have the sole 
power to sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction since 
otherwise the opportunities for manipulation of taxes are 
practically unchecked.”) (citation omitted); Bayer, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2005-514 (“One of the purposes 
for this higher burden is to prevent a taxpayer from re-
characterizing a transaction based on subsequent information in 
order to secure the best tax treatment for itself.”). Stated 
differently, the appellants were not entitled to recast their 
treatment of the Cable Franchise Companies for purposes of 
recomputing their sales factors and lowering their Massachusetts 
taxes. See Tenneco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2000-673 (“Tenneco can be bound by how it has cast its own 
transactions. ‘Just as the Commissioner in determining income 
tax liabilities may look through the form of a transaction to 
its substance, so, as a general rule, may he bind a taxpayer to 
the form in which the taxpayer has cast a transaction.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 The appellants offered several distinct business reasons 
for maintaining the separate Cable Franchise Companies, chiefly 
  ATB 2017-632
that consolidation of the entities would have complicated 
gaining approval of the AT&T Broadband transaction from local 
franchising authorities and could have resulted in additional 
costs in the negotiation process.
156
 Additionally, certain legacy 
shareholders still existed and consolidation would result in the 
shareholders getting a percentage of the larger Comcast entity. 
The appellants also offered distinct business reasons as to why 
Comcast’s operations largely ignore the separate entities, 
including economies of scale, consistency, more favorable 
negotiated terms, and standardization of technology. The 
appellants quoted AT&T, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
at 2011-551, in their post-trial brief for the proposition that 
“[t]he Commissioner cannot have it both ways.” Neither can the 
appellants. See Walker-Butler v. Berryhill, 857 F.3d 1 (1
st
 Cir. 
2017) (“It appears that Plaintiff wants to have her cake and eat 
it, too.”). The taxpayer in AT&T, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2011-525, actually operated a global enterprise. The 
Cable Franchise Companies did not engage in any operations. 
While Comcast arguably engaged in operations on the level of the 
taxpayers in AT&T, Boston Professional Hockey Association, and 
                                                 
156 While the provisions of G.L. c. 166A, § 7 state that “[n]o license or 
control thereof shall be transferred or assigned without the prior written 
consent of the issuing authority, which consent shall not be arbitrarily or 
unreasonably withheld,” the regulation at 207 CMR 4.01 states that “[a] 
transfer or assignment of a cable license or control thereof between commonly 
controlled entities, between affiliated companies, or between parent and 
subsidiary corporations, shall not constitute a transfer or assignment of a 
license or control thereof under M.G.L. c. 166A, § 7.” 
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Interface, Comcast was not one of the Cable Franchise 
Companies.
157
 The appellants argued that “[t]he Board has 
cautioned a number of times against interpretations that would 
‘trivialize[] the actual income-producing activities performed 
at a taxpayer’s headquarters.’” (citing AT&T, Mass. ATB Findings 
of Fact and Reports at 2011-551). Here, adoption of the 
appellants’ reasoning would overinflate, rather than trivialize, 
the activities of the Cable Franchise Companies. The Board 
declined to reach such an absurd result.         
The Board was likewise unpersuaded by the appellants’ 
contentions that activities such as procurement, content 
acquisition, and operation of the national network should be 
considered activities directly engaged in by the Cable Franchise 
Companies either because the activities were performed by 
individuals who were also officers of the Cable Franchise 
Companies or because the activities should be attributed to the 
Cable Franchise Companies pursuant to the same attribution rules 
applicable to tax nexus determinations. See 830 CMR 
63.38.1(9)(d)(2).  
Though individuals such as Mr. Scott, Mr. Schanz, 
Mr. Dordelman, and Mr. Reilly were officers of the Cable 
Franchise Companies, they clearly were not holding themselves 
out to the public as officers of these entities for purposes of 
                                                 
157 See footnote 23, supra. 
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how they conducted business — they were wearing their Comcast 
hats. As stated by Mr. Dordelman, he “didn’t have overall day-
to-day line responsibility to be doing an undue amount on a day-
to-day basis for those entities.” Mr. Scott admitted that he 
didn’t really think about the individual subsidiaries — the 
company was run on a division level, with operating regions 
within particular divisions. These individuals transacted 
business on a national level and the Cable Franchise Companies 
were merely allocated costs pursuant to the Shared Personnel and 
Facilities Agreement and the Management Agreement.
158
 As the 
Commissioner stated in his reply brief: “Except for signing 
necessary legal papers . . . there is no evidence that any of 
those individuals ever acted in their capacity as officers of 
the [Cable Franchise Companies].”159 
Comcast and any other affiliates providing services to the 
Cable Franchise Companies were more akin to independent 
                                                 
158 The Shared Personnel and Facilities Agreement covered reimbursements for 
content acquisition, vendor contracts from procurement, and payroll costs. 
Mr. Donnelly testified that costs were generally allocated by a formula based 
upon subscribers. The Management Agreement covered management and operation 
services, including maintenance, construction, purchasing, accounting, tax, 
internal audit, legal, finance, and programming, and stipulated a fee based 
upon 2.25 percent “of gross revenues, less franchise fee revenue, from all 
sources.” 
 
159 The Commissioner quoted testimony from Ms. Gaiski as follows: 
 
Q. And you see this over here? It says Comcast of Massachusetts 
I, Inc., is the first one, and the second one is Comcast of 
Massachusetts II, Inc. Do you see that? 
Q. (by Gaiski). Yes. 
Q. Do you know what they are? 
A. No. 
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contractors than agents for purposes of attribution rules for 
nexus purposes. An “agent” is defined as        
any person whose actions would be imputed to a 
taxpayer under the standards of 830 CMR 63.39.1 for 
purposes of determining whether the taxpayer is doing 
business in Massachusetts (or another state). In 
general, any taxpayer employee or other representative 
acting under the direction and control of the taxpayer 
is an agent, provided that bona fide independent 
contractors retained by a taxpayer are not agents of 
the taxpayer. However, for purposes of 830 CMR 
63.38.1, one corporation will generally not be treated 
as an agent of an affiliated corporation.  
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(2) (emphasis added). The regulation defines an 
“independent contractor” as   
any person who performs services for a taxpayer but 
who is not an employee of the taxpayer, and who is not 
otherwise subject to the supervision or control of the 
taxpayer in the performance of the services. In 
general, a person is treated as an independent 
contractor with respect to a taxpayer if that person's 
actions would not be imputed to the taxpayer under the 
standards of 830 CMR 63.39.1 for purposes of 
determining whether the taxpayer is doing business in 
Massachusetts (or another state). A corporation may 160 
be treated as an independent contractor with respect 
to an affiliated corporation unless, under the 
particular facts, the affiliate is merely the 
corporation’s alter ego. 
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(2) (emphasis added).
161
 The regulation further 
states in relevant part that   
                                                 
160 Prior to the new regulation promulgated on October 20, 2006, the regulation 
used the word “will” rather than “may.”   
161 The Commissioner contended that programming costs were costs of independent 
contractors and consequently should be excluded on that basis. Arguably, the 
language of 830 CMR 63.38.1(2) would not apply since the programmers were not 
providing a service but more so a license to distribute the programming. 
Regardless, the Board found that these costs were not direct costs of the 
Cable Franchise Companies. They were merely allocated costs by Comcast. 
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income-producing activity does not include activities 
performed on behalf of a taxpayer by another person, 
such as services performed on its behalf by an 
independent contractor or by any other party whose 
activities are not attributable to the taxpayer for 
purposes of determining tax jurisdiction under 830 CMR 
63.39.1. 
 
830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2). The Board reads all three of the above 
provisions as requiring “a close analysis of the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case to determine the activity 
that produces all the income which is subject to apportionment.” 
Interface, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2008-1361. 
In these matters, no other affiliate was “under the direction 
and control” of the Cable Franchise Companies. 830 CMR 
63.38.1(2). No other affiliate was the “alter ego” of any of the 
Cable Franchise Companies; the separate-entity structure was 
deliberately maintained for business reasons. Id. Even if 
activities were “performed on behalf”162 of the Cable Franchise 
Companies, such activities are not included for purposes of 
income-producing activities unless performed by a party whose 
activities are attributable to the taxpayer under 830 CMR 
63.39.1. See 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2).  
The Board was not convinced by the appellants’ attempt to 
align with Cambridge Brands, Inc. v. Commissioner, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2003-358, aff’d, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 
                                                 
162 For instance, Ms. Gaiski stressed in her testimony that she didn’t think of 
a particular entity when negotiating agreements with programmers and the 
Cable Franchise Companies had no input into the terms of these agreements. 
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1118 (2005) (decision under Rule 1:28). The appellants cited to 
Cambridge Brands, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2003-403, for the proposition that activities performed on 
behalf of a taxpayer by an affiliate must be imputed to the 
taxpayer for nexus purposes. Since certain sections of 830 CMR 
63.38.1 reference 830 CMR 63.39.1, the appellants argued that 
“the same activities that are imputed to the taxpayer for nexus 
purposes are imputed to the taxpayer for income-producing 
activity purposes.”  
One of the issues in Cambridge Brands, Mass. ATB Findings 
of Fact and Reports at 2003-398, concerned “whether the 
Commissioner properly treated the sales of candy by CBI to TRI 
Sales as ‘throwback’ sales includible in the numerator of CBI’s 
sales factor as calculated under G.L. c. 63, § 38(f).” The 
Commissioner contended “that CBI had completed its deliveries in 
the Commonwealth and that, in any event, CBI was not taxable in 
the states of Illinois and Tennessee, because the warehouse 
arrangements were fictitious and that CBI had no selling agents 
outside of Massachusetts.” Id. at 2003-399. Further, “[t]he 
Commissioner claimed that TRI was the one performing warehousing 
activities on behalf of CBI, and that the warehouse arrangement 
was merely a ploy by CBI to achieve nexus.” Id. at 2003-401. The 
Board determined as follows:  
  ATB 2017-638
A finding that TRI was performing activities on behalf 
of CBI would actually further the taxpayer’s position, 
because the Commissioner’s regulations require that 
TRI’s activities be imputed to CBI for nexus purposes.  
830 CMR 63.39.1(7) provides that “[f]or the purposes 
of determining whether a foreign corporation is 
subject to the excise under M.G.L. c. 63, § 39, the 
activities of employees, agents, or representatives, 
however designated, of the foreign corporation will be 
imputed to the corporation.” The regulation 
specifically provides that “[a]n agent or 
representative may be an individual, corporation, 
partnership, or other entity.” Id. The only exception 
to this rule is for activities of independent 
contractors. See id. According to the requirements for 
an independent contractor listed in that regulation, 
the Board found and ruled that TRI could not be 
considered an independent contractor of its 
subsidiary, CBI, most particularly because TRI did not 
“hold[] [it]self out to the public as an independent 
contractor in the regular course of its business.”  
830 CMR 63.39.1(7)(c). Accordingly, the Board found 
and ruled that the Commissioner’s arguments regarding 
TRI’s involvement in the Illinois and Tennessee 
warehouses did not successfully discredit CBI’s 
evidence that the candies were sold by agents 
connected with those warehouses. 
 
Id. at 2003-403-04. While certain provisions of 830 CMR 63.38.1 
indeed make reference to 830 CMR 63.39.1, and application of the 
independent contractor requirements under 830 CMR 63.39.1(7)(c) 
as applied in Cambridge Brands would arguably be advantageous to 
the appellants (i.e., the record is unclear as to whether any 
affiliates held themselves out to the public as independent 
contractors), closer scrutiny is required. As the Board quoted 
above, 830 CMR 63.38.1 contains a separate definition of the 
term independent contractor as it pertains to persons providing 
services. The Board reads the reference to 830 CMR 63.39.1 in 
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the second sentence of the definition – “[i]n general, a person 
is treated as an independent contractor with respect to a 
taxpayer if that person's actions would not be imputed to the 
taxpayer under the standards of 830 CMR 63.39.1 for purposes of 
determining whether the taxpayer is doing business in 
Massachusetts (or another state)” — as exemplar rather than 
absolute. 830 CMR 63.38.1(2). The third sentence of the 
definition — “[a] corporation may be treated as an independent 
contractor with respect to an affiliated corporation unless, 
under the particular facts, the affiliate is merely the 
corporation’s alter ego” — otherwise would be rendered 
superfluous. Id.163 As noted above, the Board concluded that no 
other affiliate was an alter ego of the Cable Franchise 
Companies. Similarly, the reference to 830 CMR 63.39.1 in the 
clause reading that “income-producing activity does not include 
activities performed on behalf of a taxpayer by another person, 
such as services performed on its behalf by an independent 
contractor or by any other party whose activities are not 
attributable to the taxpayer for purposes of determining tax 
jurisdiction under 830 CMR 63.39.1” does not reach the 
appellants’ desired outcome. 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)(2) (emphasis 
                                                 
163 Additionally, 830 CMR 63.39.1 was promulgated in 1993, while 830 CMR 
63.38.1 was initially promulgated in 1995, with a new regulation promulgated 
in 1999, amendments in 2000 and 2001, and a new regulation promulgated in 
2006. The Commissioner could have simply incorporated the requirements of 
independent contractor as articulated in 830 CMR 63.39.1 rather than draft a 
definition of the term in 830 CMR 63.38.1. 
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added). The appellants failed to establish that the activities 
performed by Comcast or any other affiliate would be 
attributable to the Cable Franchise Companies pursuant to 
830 CMR 63.39.1. The Board concluded that an arbitrary 
allocation of costs could not suffice as evidentiary support for 
purposes of attributing activities to the Cable Franchise 
Companies. The appellants’ argument merely attempted to once 
again bypass the separate-entity structure in favor of a global 
company analysis. 
Pursuant to relevant Massachusetts law and regulations, the 
Board was required to analyze computation of the sales factor 
from the perspective of the separate companies at issue — the 
Cable Franchise Companies — not Comcast. The record established 
that while concerted decisions were made to consolidate certain 
activities such as content acquisition, procurement, and 
operation of the national network, similar concerted decisions 
were made to maintain a separate-entity structure for purposes 
of cable franchise licenses, and the appellants were legally 
bound by this separate-entity structure for tax purposes 
regardless of how Comcast chose to conduct its business. The 
Board determined that the relevant income-producing activity 
engaged in by the Cable Franchise Companies for the sales at 
issue — receipts from Video and Internet services provided to 
subscribers located in Massachusetts — was to function as cable 
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franchise licensees with Massachusetts cities and towns, and 
that this activity took place wholly in Massachusetts. Assuming 
arguendo that the facts could support that the activity took 
place within and without Massachusetts, the Board found that the 
costs of performance — the costs itemized pursuant to 
G.L. c. 166A and in the cable franchise licenses — were greater 
in Massachusetts than in any other one state. 
Accordingly, though the Board determined that the 
appellants established the right to apportion, it ruled that 
they had not established that the apportionment percentages as 
filed were incorrect. 
II. Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue 
The appellants contended that the disallowance of alleged 
interest expense deductions by the Commissioner was unreasonable 
under G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a), which states in relevant part that  
[f]or purposes of computing its net income under this 
chapter, a taxpayer shall add back otherwise 
deductible interest paid, accrued or incurred to a 
related member, as defined in section 31I,
164
 during 
the taxable year, except that a deduction shall be 
permitted when either: (1) the taxpayer establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence, as determined by the 
commissioner, that the disallowance of the deduction 
is unreasonable, or (2) the taxpayer and the 
                                                 
164 A “related member” under G.L. c. 63, § 31I is “a person that, with respect 
to the taxpayer during all or any portion of the taxable year, is: (1) a 
related entity[;] (2) a component member as defined in subsection (b) of 
section 1563 of the Code; (3) a person to or from whom there is attribution 
of stock ownership in accordance with subsection (e) of section 1563 of the 
Code; or (4) a person that, notwithstanding its form of organization, bears 
the same relationship to the taxpayer as a person described in (1) to (3), 
inclusive.” G.L. c. 63, § 31I. The parties did not dispute that the claimed 
interest expense deductions pertained to related members. 
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commissioner agree in writing to the application of an 
alternative method of apportionment under section 42. 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit 
or negate the commissioner’s authority to otherwise 
enter into agreements and compromises otherwise 
allowed by law.
165
 
 
G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a). Prior to reaching the question of whether 
or not the disallowance was unreasonable, the Board first 
considered the fundamental question of whether “otherwise 
deductible interest” even existed.166 
A. The Appellants Failed To Establish the Existence of Bona Fide 
Debt 
  
For Massachusetts corporate excise purposes, net income is 
generally
167
 calculated by taking “gross income less the 
deductions, but not credits, allowable under the provisions of 
the Federal Internal Revenue Code, as amended and in effect for 
the taxable year.” G.L. c. 63, § 30(4). Internal Revenue Code 
                                                 
165 The appellants did not cite to G.L. c. 63, § 31J(b) in arguing their 
entitlement to interest expense deductions: “The adjustments required in 
subsection (a) shall not apply if the taxpayer establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence, as determined by the commissioner, that: (i) a principal 
purpose of the transaction giving rise to the payment of interest was not to 
avoid payment of taxes due under this chapter; (ii) the interest is paid 
pursuant to a contract that reflects an arm’s length rate of interest and 
terms; and (iii) (A) the related member was subject to tax on its net income 
in this state or another state or possession of the United States or a 
foreign nation; (B) a measure of said tax included the interest received from 
the taxpayer; and (C) the rate of tax applied to the interest received by the 
related member is no less than the statutory rate of tax applied to the 
taxpayer under this chapter minus 3 percentage points.” 
166 In his post-trial brief, the Commissioner correctly noted that 
“[q]ualification as bona fide debt is, in fact, a prerequisite to the 
application of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a), because it applies only to ‘otherwise 
deductible interest paid, accrued, or incurred to a related member.’ If debt 
is not bona fide, it cannot give rise to deductible interest to begin with.”  
167 Certain deductions are not allowed, such as deductions for “dividends 
received” and deductions for “taxes on or measured by income, franchise taxes 
measured by net income, franchise taxes for the privilege of doing business 
and capital stock taxes imposed by any state.” G.L. c. 63, § 30(4). 
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§ 163(a) states that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction 
all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on 
indebtedness.” I.R.C. § 163(a).168 
Courts and this Board have held that “[f]or a transaction 
to give rise to a valid interest deduction, the transaction must 
constitute true indebtedness.” Sysco Corporation v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-918, 940 
(citing Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1960)), 
aff’d, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2013) (decision under Rule 1:28), 
                                                 
168 Section 385(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of 
Treasury “to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to 
determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated for purposes 
of this title as stock or indebtedness.” I.R.C. § 385(a). Section 385(b) of 
the Internal Revenue Code lists factors that the “regulations may include 
among other factors”:  
 
1. whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on 
demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in 
return for an adequate consideration in money or money's 
worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest, 
2. whether there is subordination to or preference over any 
indebtedness of the corporation,  
3. the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation, 
4. whether there is convertibility into the stock of the 
corporation, and 
5. the relationship between holdings of stock in the 
corporation and holdings of the interest in question.  
 
I.R.C. § 385(b). See also Segel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 816, 827 (1987) 
(“Unfortunately, there is no singular defined set of standards that has been 
uniformly applied in the debt-equity area.  . . . Congress enacted section 
385 as an attempt to pass to respondent the task of establishing uniform 
rules to define debt and equity.”) (internal citations and footnotes 
omitted); National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2014-630, 645 n.7 (“The only operative 
Code section addressing the determination of whether an instrument 
constitutes bona fide indebtedness is § 385(a) of the Code, which states that 
the IRS may make regulations regarding the determination of an instrument as 
debt or equity.”), aff’d, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 522 (2016), further appellate 
review denied, 475 Mass. 1104 (2016). As noted by the Commissioner in his 
reply brief, “After the initial briefs in this case were filed, the U.S. 
Treasury Department and [the IRS] published proposed regulations under 
[I.R.C. § 385].” The IRS subsequently issued final and temporary regulations 
under I.R.C. § 385. See T.D. 9790, 2016-45 I.R.B. 
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further appellate review denied, 465 Mass. 1109 (2013).
169
 See 
also Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2015-270, 307 
(“The hallmarks of whether an advance is bone fide indebtedness 
for tax purposes are: (1) whether the advance satisfies the core 
definition of debt; and (2) whether the conduct of the parties 
was consistent with that of a debtor and creditor, based on 
various factors.”) (citation omitted). True indebtedness 
represents “both ‘“an unconditional obligation on the part of 
the transferee to repay the money, and an unconditional 
intention on the part of the transferor to secure repayment.”’” 
Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-940 
(quoting Schering-Plough Corporation v. United States, 651 
F.Supp. 2d 219, 244 (D.N.J. 2009)). See also Overnite 
Transportation Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 1999-353, 369 (“As the Appeals 
Court framed the core issue, ‘it is well-settled that a 
distribution by a subsidiary corporation to its parent is a loan 
and not a dividend if, at the time of its payment, the parties 
intended it to be repaid.’”) (quoting New York Times Sales, Inc. 
                                                 
169 In Sysco, Professor Pomp recognized that “‘[o]ne overriding rule is that 
for interest to be deductible there must be “indebtedness,” that is, an 
unconditional and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of money.’” 
Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-935-36 (finding that 
“Professor Pomp characterized this obligation as fundamental to whether 
interest is deductible” even though he “failed to demonstrate the existence 
of ‘an unconditional and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of 
money’ [in finding that the parties intended to create debt] in the context 
of [a] cash-management system”). 
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v. Commissioner of Revenue, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 752 (1996)), 
aff’d, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 180 (2002). 
“Related but separate corporations can freely enter into 
contracts including debt transactions, like any corporations or 
individuals.” Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
at 1999-370 (citing Bordo Products Co. v. United States, 476 
F.2d 1312, 1323 (Ct. Cl. 1973)). Such transactions, however, 
entail “closer scrutiny because arrangements do not result from 
arm’s-length bargaining.” Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact 
and Reports at 1999-369-70 (citing Kraft Foods Co. v. 
Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 123-24 (2nd Cir. 1956)).  
The Board has recognized that “[t]he task of distinguishing 
debt and equity in transactions involving related parties has 
occasioned much litigation. Despite a resulting wide body of 
case law, no bright-line rules have evolved to assist the 
determination. Case-by-case consideration of all relevant 
circumstances is necessary, and the question is one of fact.” 
Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-368-69 
(citations omitted). 
To determine the “‘intrinsic economic nature of the 
transaction,’” courts and this Board have applied numerous 
objective criteria when “analyzing the debt/equity170 
                                                 
170 Characterizing an advance as debt or equity is significant for tax 
purposes. See, e.g., Matthew T. Schippers, Comment, The Debt Versus Equity 
Debacle: A Proposal for Federal Tax Treatment of Corporate Cash Advances, 
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distinction” in cases involving related parties. The New York 
Times Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings 
of Fact and Reports 1995-137, 146-47 (quoting Alterman Foods, 
Inc. v. U.S., 505 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1974)), aff’d, 40 Mass. 
App. Ct. 749 (1996), further appellate review denied, 423 Mass. 
1108 (1996). In New York Times Sales, the Board reviewed eleven 
factors when considering the question of whether transfers 
involving a cash management system constituted debt or equity:     
1. the extent to which the shareholder controls the 
corporation; 
2. the earnings and dividend history of the 
corporation; 
3. the magnitude of the advances; 
4. whether a ceiling or limit on the amounts that 
may be transferred existed; 
5. the presence of security or collateral for the 
loan; 
6. the existence of a fixed maturity date or 
schedule for repayment; 
7. whether the transferor of the funds has a right 
to, or has attempted to, demand repayment; 
8. whether the transferee has the ability to make or 
has made any effort to repay the transfer; 
9. the presence of a promissory note or other 
evidence of indebtedness; 
10. the existence of a stated rate of interest and 
the payment of interest; 
11. the parties’ treatment of the transfers on their 
corporate books. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
64 KAN. L. REV. 527, 531 (2015) (“Whether a cash advance is characterized as 
debt or equity has critical tax implications. The Code imposes federal income 
tax on most U.S. corporations with few exceptions. The Code provides 
different tax treatment of debt and equity in several contexts. However, the 
deductibility of interest from bona fide indebtedness is the main reason 
corporate taxpayers and the [IRS] focus on debt versus equity questions. The 
Code allows a corporation to take a tax deduction for ‘all interest paid or 
accrued . . . on indebtedness.’ Yet, the Code does not contain a similar 
deduction for dividends that corporations pay to shareholders for their 
equity investments.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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New York Times Sales, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
1995-147 (citing Alterman Foods, Inc. v. U.S., 505 F.2d at 877 
n.7). The Board noted that “[n]o single factor is determinative; 
rather, all of the factors must be considered to determine 
whether repayment or indefinite retention of the funds 
transferred was intended.” New York Times Sales, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 1995-147 (citing Alterman Foods, 
Inc. v. United States, 611 F.2d 866, 869 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). See 
also The Talbots, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-786, 829 (“In determining 
whether a true obligation exists, the Board may consider a 
variety of factors.”) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 79 Mass. App. 
Ct. 159 (2011), further appellate review denied, 460 Mass. 1104 
(2011). In concluding that the transactions did not constitute 
debt, the Board found that    
[t]he Times Company had no intent to repay the amounts 
transferred to it by Sales. Sales did not expect to, 
and could not demand, repayment from the parent 
company which owned all of Sales’ stock. The intrinsic 
economic nature of the transaction between the Times 
Company and Sales suggests that the parties did not 
contemplate a repayment but rather a retention of the 
funds transferred to the Times Company for it to use 
for its own business purposes. 
  
New York Times Sales, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
1995-141-43 (“Sales’ participation in the cash management system 
does not reflect arm’s length dealings between Sales and the 
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Times Company and Sales’ transfers of cash to the Times Company 
under the cash management system were not for fair value.”).  
 The Board considered whether a promissory note declared by 
the taxpayer as a dividend to its parent was true debt in 
Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-368 
(“The controlling question is whether the $600,000,000 Note 
Overnite dividended to its parent reflects true debt . . . . The 
Commissioner reclassified the Note as an equity interest and 
disallowed interest deductions and liability treatment.”). In 
making its determination, the Board also relied upon a multi-
factor analysis, in this case sixteen criteria, “to focus the 
debt-equity inquiry”: 
1. ‘The intent of the parties; 
2. The identity between creditors and 
shareholders[;] 
3. The extent of participation in management by the 
holder of the instrument; 
4. The ability of the corporation to obtain funds 
from outside sources; 
5. The “thinness” of the capital structure in 
relation to debt; 
6. The risk involved; 
7. The formal indicia of the arrangement; 
8. The relative position of the obligees as to other 
creditors regarding the payment of interest and 
principal; 
9. The voting power of the holder of the instrument; 
10. The provision of a fixed rate of interest; 
11. A contingency on the obligation to repay; 
12. The source of the interest payments; 
13. The presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; 
14. A provision for redemption by the corporation; 
15. A provision for redemption at the option of the 
holder; 
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16. The timing of the advance with reference to the 
organization of the corporation.’ 
 
Id. at 1999-372 (quoting Sharcar, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-198, 221-22 
n.5). The Board stressed the evaluative rather than cumulative 
functionality of the criteria. See Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings 
of Fact and Reports at 1999-373 (“[C]ourts have uniformly 
emphasized that ‘no one factor is decisive . . . . The court 
must examine the particular circumstances of each case. “The 
object of the inquiry is not to count factors, but to evaluate 
them.”’”) (quoting Hardman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1409, 1412 
(9
th
 Cir. 1987)). See also National Grid Holdings, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
2014-357, 410 (stating that “applicable factors must be 
evaluated, not counted”) (citation omitted), aff’d, 89 Mass. 
App. Ct. 506 (2016), further appellate review denied, 475 Mass. 
1104 (2016). Applying the criteria to the facts of the case, 
“the Board found that the Note was, though in form a debt, not a 
true debt for purposes of the tax laws. Union Pacific and 
Overnite Holdings, as 100% owners of Overnite, created the Note 
without arm’s-length negotiations or third-party participation 
in crafting its terms.” Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 1999-373 (“[T]he Board notes that many [factors] skew 
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against the appellant’s claim in the parent-subsidiary 
context.”).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Multi-factor analyses have continued to guide the Board in 
cases involving true indebtedness inquiries. In Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2011-1, 44 (citing New York Times Sales, 
40 Mass. App. Ct. at 752), aff’d, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 65 (2013), 
further appellate review denied, 464 Mass. 1107 (2013), the 
Board cited to the Appeals Court ruling in New York Times Sales 
during its review of claimed interest expenses surrounding a 
cash-management system, noting that “the court sanctioned the 
Board’s reasoning involving” a review of multiple factors. The 
Board reached its decision for the Commissioner “with primary 
focus on the factors which indicated the permanent nature of the 
excess cash advances made within the appellants’ cash-management 
system, including the absence of requests for, effort toward, or 
expectation of repayment or actual repayment.” Kimberly-Clark, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-49 (“This 
conclusion was reinforced by other factors such as the absence 
of security, default or collateral provisions attendant to the 
purported debt, as well as the appellants’ failure to establish 
that the promissory notes represented arm’s-length 
transactions.”).    
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The Board relied upon the sixteen Overnite factors to 
conclude that the loans at issue in Massachusetts Mutual 
“constituted debt for Massachusetts tax purposes.” Massachusetts 
Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2015-310. 
Distinguishing Overnite, the Board found that     
MMH was a credit-worthy borrower with sufficient 
revenue and assets to service its debt to MMLIC. MMH 
made every payment required under the MMH Notes in a 
timely manner. It made payments of principal ahead of 
schedule on debt related to its holding in Antares 
when it sold that asset. MMH was a holding company 
with consolidated assets worth billions of dollars 
during the periods at issue and consistently reported 
EBITDA of five to six times the interest burden on the 
MMH Notes. 
 
Compare Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2015-315-16, with Overnite, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 367 
(“It remains to say that Overnite never undertook to repay any 
part of the principal of the note. When the note came due in 
1998, Holding forgave the remaining unpaid interest along with 
$400 million of the principal and Overnite issued to Holding a 
new note of $200 million.”). The Board also found that “[u]nlike 
the lender in Overnite who let payment date after payment date 
pass without receiving full payment and appears to have done 
limited diligence regarding Overnite’s ability to pay, MMLIC 
[personnel] closely monitored the debt obligations of MMH and 
from the inception of the loans engaged impartial third-party 
experts in rating debt securities, the SVO and Fitch, to help 
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evaluate the risk and quality of the loans.” Compare 
Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2015-318, with Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
at 1999-379 (“Overnite Holding took no steps to enforce its full 
and timely interest entitlement at any point over the life of 
the Note, as far as the evidence shows.”). 
Turning to the present appeals, the facts in totality did 
not support a conclusion that true indebtedness existed when 
evaluated under a multi-factor analysis. The facts evidenced 
both a lack of principal and interest payments on the part of 
the Add-Back Entities and a lack of enforcement by the entities 
listed as lenders. See Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2011-946 (“[T]he Board found that repayment of 
purported loans was not intended and did not occur.”). The Board 
found no indicia of arm’s-length dealings between the parties 
and no intent to engage in a true debtor/creditor relationship. 
See Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-382 
(“In sum, the circumstances of the Note and the parties’ course 
of conduct were inconsistent with a debtor/creditor 
relationship, and reflect the posture of an equity holder vis-a-
vis an investment in which capital is to be committed 
indefinitely.”). Further, though the Notes arguably reflected an 
attempt to substantiate debt, they lacked vital provisions such 
as collateral or sinking funds. See id. at 1999-358 (“The Note 
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was unsecured, and there was no provision for escrow or sinking 
fund payments toward the balloon principal repayment obligation 
of $600,000,000 due in 1998.”).  
No testimony validated the interest rates included in the 
Notes as consistent with third-party creditors and the lack of 
payments on the Notes undercut the inclusion of any default 
terms in the Notes. Of particular significance was the sheer 
disconnect between the Notes and the amounts claimed as 
deductions underlying the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue, 
which were based upon an allocation formula applied by 
Mr. Donnelly rather than tied to actual accruals under the 
Notes.       
Peculiarly, the appellants failed to address bona fide debt 
in their post-trial brief and reproached the Commissioner for 
raising bona fide debt in their reply brief, stating that “[t]he 
Commissioner did not make this argument prior to trial.” The 
Board was unmoved by any implication that the appellants were 
blindsided by a true indebtedness argument.
171
 See Staples, Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2015-424, 452 (“Without debt, there is no interest that 
                                                 
171 The appellants protested certain attachments to the Commissioner’s post-
trial brief as “a backdoor attempt to introduce an economic and financial 
analysis after the close of evidence without the safeguards of cross-
examination and rebuttal.” The Board’s decision did not rely upon these 
attachments. As the Board stated above, the evidence established no direct 
correlation between accruals under the Notes and Mr. Donnelly’s formula that 
capped the claimed amounts for each of the Add-Back Entities to an allocated 
portion of Comcast’s third-party debt based upon subscribers. 
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would qualify for a deduction, and therefore, the add-back 
statute does not come into play.”).  
The existence of true indebtedness is a fundamental 
predicate to the deductibility of interest expenses, and 
therefore to the establishment of an exception under G.L. c. 63, 
§ 31J. As stated by the Board, “Especially in the situation of a 
debt transaction between controlled entities, the Board cannot 
presume that the transaction is valid. Special attention must be 
paid to such transactions, because they can often be a means 
whereby controlled entities distribute their profits while at 
the same time obtaining a tax deduction.” The Sherwin-Williams 
Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2000-468 (citation omitted), rev’d on unrelated 
rationale, 438 Mass. 71 (2002). See also The TJX Companies, Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 2007-790, 882 (“The Board must review the facts and 
circumstances surrounding a purported inter-company loan to 
determine whether a true debt obligation exists; when making 
this determination the Board may consider a variety of 
factors.”), aff’d in part, remanded in part on unrelated 
grounds, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2009) (decision under Rule 
1:28), aff’d, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (2010) (decision under Rule 
1:28); Talbots, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2009-
828 (“Massachusetts courts and the Board have found that loans 
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between a subsidiary and its parent are to be scrutinized to 
determine whether an independent third party would have entered 
into the transaction on similar terms.”); Staples, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2015-438 (“[C]ourts examine debt 
transactions between related entities with greater scrutiny.”). 
In a subsequent analysis of the Overnite factors in their 
reply brief, the appellants accused the Commissioner of 
misapplication of relevant law while largely and superficially 
aligning themselves with Massachusetts Mutual.172 Restating 
Comcast’s historical change from direct borrowing to centralized 
borrowing, the appellants maintained that the intent — the first 
of the Overnite factors — stayed the same. The intent apparent 
from the record was Comcast’s desire to centralize borrowing 
with third-party lenders for advantageous business reasons,
173
 
                                                 
172 The appellants attempted to distinguish both Overnite and the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court case of In Re: St. Johnsbury Trucking Company, Inc., 
claiming that unlike those cases, the present matters did not involve 
acquisition debt. Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-
353; In Re: St. Johnsbury Trucking Company, Inc., 206 B.R. 318 (1997). The 
dissimilarities are not so remarkable. Though the alleged interest expenses 
in Overnite and In Re: St. Johnsbury derived from acquisition debt, both 
cases encapsulated the tenet that an entity should not bear responsibility 
for (and reap interest expense benefits from) another entity’s debt. In Re: 
St. Johnsbury, 206 B.R. at 324-25 (finding that “[i]nterest expenses are only 
deductible on one’s own ‘indebtedness.’ A ‘debt’ is that which is due from 
one person to another. . . . The focus, with questions of deductibility, is 
on the actual borrower, the primary obligor, even if the borrower never 
benefits from a loan.”) (internal citations omitted); Overnite, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-381 (“Dr. Kimball overreaches with the 
theory that there should be debt on the books of Overnite to reflect its 
acquisition on borrowed funds.”).
 
173 The Board generally has not found a stated business purpose to be central 
to a true indebtedness analysis. See Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2011-950-51 (“The Board does not agree that business purpose and 
absence of tax avoidance substantially support an assertion that intercompany 
transfers constitute debt.”); Sysco, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 1127 (“Nonetheless, 
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not an intent
174
 for the Add-Back Entities and related entities 
to enter into arm’s-length borrowings. See Overnite, 54 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 188 (stating that “[s]o far as that intention is at 
all ascertainable, it seems not to help the taxpayer”); 
Kimberly-Clark, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-7 
(the Board disallowed interest expenses where “the appellants’ 
witness [testified that] by eliminating individual company bank 
loans and consolidating banking arrangements, Kimberly-Clark was 
able to enhance efficiency and increase profitability”); Sysco, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sysco insists that the board erred in failing to consider, as crucial to its 
analysis, the valid business purpose of Sysco’s cash management system, 
pursuant to which the transfers were made, or the absence of a tax avoidance 
motive. While those factors are central to an analysis under the sham 
transaction doctrine . . . Sysco cites no cases to support its position that 
they are critical in determining whether Sysco intended to repay the amounts 
transferred or that those factors affect the weight or credibility of Sysco’s 
evidence on that issue.”) (internal citations omitted); Staples, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2015-452 (“Business purpose does not affect 
whether payments constitute legitimate debt.”) (citation omitted). But see 
Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2015-310 
(finding that business purpose “has relevance in providing insight into the 
intent of the parties” in a case where the appellants were using the debt to 
improve their risk-based capital score). The Board did not find Comcast’s 
move to centralized borrowing as a relevant link in determining bona fide 
debt. Unlike Massachusetts Mutual, there is no evidence that the Add-Back 
Entities had any compelling intent — apart from interest expense deductions — 
for a debt characterization.                
174 The Commissioner suggested in his post-trial brief that certain Notes “had 
no business purpose except to refinance [pre-merger AT&T Notes], which 
themselves were apparently issued for the sole purpose of avoiding AT&T’s 
federal tax (and state tax based on federal gross income).” The Commissioner 
quoted Mr. Donnelly: “Remember, November 15, 2002 was three days prior to our 
close and acquisition of AT&T Broadband. And these notes that, the question 
is where did these amounts come from, and my understanding is they came from 
a study that AT&T did on negative basis. And the purpose of these notes was 
to cure phantom income that otherwise might have occurred with the spin of 
Broadband to Comcast.” The Commissioner further stated that “Mr. Donnelly is 
referring here to ‘excess loss accounts’ or ‘ELAs’” and that “[w]hen the 
parent sells or otherwise disposes of [a] subsidiary’s stock, the parent is 
required to include in income the balance of any outstanding ELA.” The 
Commissioner concluded that “AT&T apparently sought to expunge ELAs in 
subsidiaries being sold to Comcast in 2002 by causing an intermediate holding 
company to contribute the [pre-merger AT&T Notes] to them, thereby increasing 
basis in the subsidiaries’ stock and eliminating their ELAs.” 
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83 Mass. App. Ct. at 1127 (“[T]he board was not required to 
credit evidence of the subjective intent of Sysco and its 
subsidiaries.”); National Grid Holdings, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 
514-15 (“And particularly in this instance, where related 
entities were on both sides of the transactions, the board was 
not required to credit evidence of the taxpayers’ subjective 
intent.”).      
The appellants cited to Massachusetts Mutual for the 
proposition that Overnite factors two and three — focusing on 
the relationship between the parties and the extent of the 
creditor’s involvement in management of the debtor — were 
neutral. While the Board found neutrality in the context of the 
record in Massachusetts Mutual, the appellants’ characterization 
effectively nullifies factors two and three in all instances. 
Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2015-312 (“[T]he Board found that the second and third factors 
of the identity of interest between MMLIC and MMH and its 
management were neutral.”). The Board has stated that “[i]n 
applying the factors . . . ‘[o]ur objective is not to count the 
factors, but rather to evaluate them.’” Staples, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2015-440 (citation omitted). 
Based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 
certain factors will better lend themselves to “discern[ing] a 
transaction’s ‘essential nature.’” Staples, Mass. ATB Findings 
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of Fact and Reports at 2015-441 (quoting Overnite, 54 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 186). In the matters at hand, the Board found factors two 
and three useful in making its determination and agreed with the 
Commissioner’s contention that the Notes “were issued and held 
by entities under Comcast’s common control, many of which had no 
employees or operations of their own.” The evidence did not 
establish independence amongst the entities in making financial 
decisions regarding debt, but rather that such decisions were 
managed by Comcast.
175
            
In response to Overnite factors four, five, and six — which 
evaluate risk and the debtor’s creditworthiness — the appellants 
set forth the following:  
The Commissioner acknowledges that Dr. Cragg’s 
analysis is relevant to this factor but claims that it 
fails to support [the appellants’] position, because 
it is based on the amount of interest expense [the 
appellants] are actually claiming as an exception to 
the add back statute, rather than the full amount of 
interest that was payable under the notes. There is no 
reason, however, why the [appellants’] claim for an 
add back exception must be equal to the full face 
amount of the debt. The add back regime explicitly 
recognizes that a taxpayer may claim and be entitled 
to a partial exception for unreasonableness. 830 CMR 
63.31.1(4)(b).
176
 Moreover, even apart from the 
                                                 
175 The appellants advocated the same position for Overnite factor nine — 
voting power of the instrument’s holder. The Board restates its analysis 
under factors two and three. 
176 The provisions of 830 CMR 63.31.1(4)(b) address instances where a partial 
exception might be warranted: “A portion of the add back will be considered 
unreasonable to the extent that the taxpayer establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the interest or intangible expense was paid, accrued 
or incurred to a related member that is taxed on the corresponding income by 
a state, U.S. possession or foreign jurisdiction.” The record does not 
contain such clear and convincing evidence. Conversely, the one stated 
instance where one of the Notes was paid down revealed that money was 
  ATB 2017-659
statutory exception, courts have treated advances made 
by a shareholder as part debt and part equity, 
depending on the particular characteristic of each.
177
 
There is no reason why the notes at issue here cannot 
also be treated as part debt and part equity.  
 
The essential query here is not whether the appellants should be 
entitled to part debt/part equity treatment
178
 but whether they 
should be entitled to any debt treatment. See, e.g., Kimberly-
Clark, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-10-11 (“No 
testimony was offered indicating that the various subsidiaries 
were equally creditworthy or that in a third-party lending 
transaction each would have been able to negotiate a loan at 
130% of the monthly Applicable Federal Short Term Rate.”). 
Because the appellants did not establish true indebtedness, the 
Notes “cannot [] be treated as part debt and part equity.” 
Indeed, their arbitrary attempt to separate the query merely 
highlights the lack of substance. 
     Regarding formal indicia of debt — the seventh Overnite 
factor — the appellants asserted that “[t]he Commissioner does 
not dispute that the notes issued to Taxpayers bear all of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
contributed down by Comcast to pay the holder, a Delaware entity that paid no 
tax, and then circulated back into the centralized cash management pool.   
177 A corresponding footnote cites a U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama case and two U.S. Tax Court cases for support. That other 
jurisdictions have found particular facts and circumstances to justify part 
debt and part equity treatment does not automatically decree a similar 
finding under the facts and circumstances in these matters.        
178 Mr. Donnelly testified that he believed the Add-Back Entities were only 
entitled to an exception for a portion of the interest “[b]ecause the basis 
on which we’re proceeding for a refund on the unreasonableness basis is 
effectively to limit the amount of intercompany interest at each company to a 
proportionate amount of the overall third-party debt that Comcast Corporation 
incurred.” 
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formal indicia of debt. This factor favors debt treatment.” 
Assuming arguendo that the Notes
179
 recited language germane to 
debt, the Appeals Court has held that “[w]hen ‘the same persons 
occupy both sides of the bargaining table, form does not 
necessarily correspond to the intrinsic economic nature of the 
transaction, for the parties may mold it at their will with no 
countervailing pull.’” Overnite, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 186 
(citation omitted); National Grid Holdings, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 
515 (“Where the entities involved are under common control, the 
fact that ‘all the formal indicia of an obligation were 
meticulously made to appear’ may be entitled to less weight, as 
the drafters ‘had the power to create whatever appearance would 
be of tax benefit to them despite the economic reality of the 
transaction.’”) (citation omitted).180 As stated by the Board, 
“‘[T]he indebtedness must be indebtedness in substance and not 
merely in form.’” Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 1999-371 (quoting Midkiff v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 
                                                 
179 The appellants represented that their claim for intercompany interest 
expense deductions was limited to entities with Notes in place — the Add-Back 
Entities. This statement was suspect evidentiary-wise. In request No. 180 of 
their request for findings of fact, the appellants requested a finding that 
“Comcast claimed an exception from the interest add back statute only for 
[entities] that had intercompany notes in place.” The appellants referenced 
twelve Notes (out of the more than fifty Notes in the record) as support for 
this request, though they identified fourteen Add-Back Entities. 
180 The lending procedures in Massachusetts Mutual were grounded in reason: 
“The process began with the initiation of a request for funding from the 
subsidiary. MMLIC would then discuss the funding needs and analyze the 
proposed borrowing based on projected cash flows, debt service requirements 
to make the interest payments, and financial ratios indicative of MMH’s 
creditworthiness.” Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2015-287. 
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724, 735 (1991)). At best, the Notes were mere formalities with 
no ostensible substantive purpose. Substantively the Add-Back 
Entities evidenced no intent to abide by the Notes and the 
related lenders evidenced no intent to enforce payment 
obligations under the Notes, failing the fundamental principle 
that true indebtedness requires “both ‘“an unconditional 
obligation on the part of the transferee to repay the money, and 
an unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to 
secure repayment.”’” Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2011-940 (quoting Schering-Plough, 651 F.Supp. 2d at 
244). 
Overnite factor eight concerns subordination of the 
instrument holder’s rights. The appellants contended that 
“[t]here is no subordination provision here” and so “[t]his 
factor therefore favors debt treatment.” The evidence did not 
establish that the Add-Back Entities had other creditors. See 
Overnite, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1999-374 
(“The relative position of the creditor vis-a-vis other 
creditors is inconsequential in the analysis because Overnite 
Holding is the sole stakeholder, whether in debt or equity, of 
Overnite, and no evidence of other debts incurred by Overnite 
appears on the record.”). Consequently, the Board found this 
factor to be neutral.  
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In their analysis of factors ten through fifteen, the 
appellants cited to Massachusetts Mutual for the proposition 
that these factors  
examine whether the following indicia of debt are 
present in the agreement between the parties: a fixed 
rate of interest (indicative of debt); a contingency 
on the obligation to repay (indicative of equity); the 
source of the interest payments (indicative of equity 
if the source is restricted); a fixed maturity date 
(indicative of debt); a provision for redemption by 
the corporation (indicative of debt); and a provision 
for redemption at the option of the holder (indicative 
of debt). 
 
Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2015-324. The appellants argued that “there is no dispute that 
the notes carried a fixed rate of interest (factor 10), were 
payable without contingency or restriction on the source of 
payments (factor[] 11 and factor 12), were fully redeemable 
without penalty (factor 14), and with one exception
181
 had a 
fixed maturity date (factor 13). Thus, all five
182
 factors 
support debt treatment here.” As the Notes in question bore no 
demonstrable relationship to the amounts sought as interest 
expense deductions — and hence no credible purpose in these 
matters — the Board found these factors to be neutral at best. 
                                                 
181 In a corresponding footnote, the appellants stated that “[a] subset of the 
notes (those issued by Comcast of Georgia) were payable on demand without a 
fixed maturity date. Courts have determined, however, that this fact is 
entitled to ‘little weight,’ because demand loans have ‘ascertainable 
(although not fixed) maturity dates.’ Indmar Products Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
444 F.3d 771, 781 (6th Cir. 2006).” 
182 Factors ten to fifteen encompass six factors, not five factors. 
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Overnite factor sixteen addresses the history and timing of 
advances. Citing to Massachusetts Mutual as support, the 
appellants claimed that this factor also favored debt treatment 
because “[t]he notes were issued by mature companies that had 
been in existence for decades, with a history of profitability.” 
The Add-Back Entities were not in existence as Comcast entities 
for decades — they were acquired as part of the AT&T Broadband 
purchase in 2002. In Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports at 2015-325, the Board found that “MMH had been 
in existence for almost ten years and was already the parent 
company of a number of successful businesses.” The present 
record lacked similar indicia of historical success for the Add-
Back Entities.               
Based upon the foregoing and the complete lack of evidence 
supporting true indebtedness, the Board concluded that the 
appellants were not entitled to the requested interest expense 
deductions.   
B. The Unreasonableness Exception of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a)   
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Board were to 
conclude that true indebtedness existed, the appellants 
nonetheless failed to establish entitlement to relief under the 
unreasonableness exception of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a). 
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The Appellants Failed to Meet the Requisite Clear and Convincing 
Evidence Standard for Add-Back Relief Under G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a) 
 
The provisions of G.L. c. 63, § 31J(a) require a taxpayer 
to “establish[] by clear and convincing evidence, as determined 
by the commissioner, that the disallowance of the deduction is 
unreasonable.” The Commissioner’s regulation at 830 CMR 63.31.1 
defines “clear and convincing evidence” as “evidence that is so 
clear, direct and weighty that it will permit the Commissioner 
to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy of the validity 
of the taxpayer’s claim.” 830 CMR 63.31.1 (“This evidentiary 
standard requires a strong showing of proof that instills a 
degree of belief greater than is required under the 
preponderance of evidence standard.”). Also under 830 CMR 
63.31.1,
183
 the Commissioner delineates certain criteria
184
 to 
establish unreasonableness:  
                                                 
183 Though the Commissioner did not promulgate 830 CMR 63.31.1 until June 16 
2006 — subsequent to certain of the tax years 2003 through 2008 applicable to 
the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue — he did issue Technical Information 
Release 03-19 on September 19, 2003, which essentially served as a precursor 
with similar criteria for claiming unreasonableness as ultimately contained 
in the regulation. TIR 03-19 (requiring business purpose other than tax 
avoidance, economic substance, and fair value or fair consideration).           
184 In their reply brief, the appellants accused the Commissioner of “miss[ing] 
the forest for the trees” by not acknowledging the alleged distortion of 
income and instead “woodenly appl[ying] the criteria set forth in the 
regulation without any regard for the underlying purpose of the statute [to 
target abusive schemes designed to shift income from one jurisdiction to 
another].” Statutory purpose does not obviate the need to satisfy statutory 
and regulatory criteria. As the Board observed in Kimberly-Clark, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-33-34, “In passing the Add Back 
statutes, the Legislature explicitly incorporated a heightened standard of 
proof into the review of transactions involving related member interest and 
intangible expenses and costs. Inclusion of the heightened standard of proof 
evinces an unmistakable intent to subject the transactions to closer scrutiny 
and provides a mechanism to effectuate this purpose.” Paradoxically, the 
appellants avoided the proverbial “forest” for years. They added back the 
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The add back will [] be considered unreasonable where 
the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that it incurred the interest or intangible 
expense as a result of a transaction (1) that was 
primarily entered into for a valid business purpose
185
 
and (2) that is supported by economic substance.
186
 
However, a taxpayer will not carry its burden of 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that a 
disallowance is unreasonable unless the taxpayer 
demonstrates that reduction of tax was not a principal 
purpose for the transaction. In cases that pertain to 
an interest expense this exception includes a 
requirement that the taxpayer establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the purported underlying debt 
is bona fide debt. The taxpayer must also establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that its interest or 
intangible expense reflects fair value or fair 
consideration. 
 
830 CMR 63.31.1.
187
 
 In Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports at 2015-332-33, the Board held that “because the 
appellant provided through clear and convincing evidence that 
the MMH Notes were entered into for a valid, non-tax business 
purpose, were supported by economic substance, constituted bona 
fide debt, and the related interest deducted reflected fair 
value and consideration . . . it would be unreasonable, pursuant 
                                                                                                                                                             
alleged intercompany interest expenses on their original returns for the tax 
years 2003 through 2008 and did not claim any exception to G.L. c. 63, 
§ 31J(a) until February 14, 2012, when they filed an amendment to the Refund 
Claims adding the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue. 
185 The regulation defines “valid business purpose” as “a good-faith business 
purpose, other than tax avoidance, that was, either alone or in combination 
with one or more other good-faith business purposes, the primary motivation 
for entering into a transaction.” 830 CMR 63.31.1. 
186 The regulation defines “economic substance” as a transaction that “involves 
material economic risk and has material practical economic consequences other 
than the creation of a tax benefit.” 830 CMR 63.31.1. 
187 The regulation also contains an exception for “significant actual double 
taxation” that is not relevant here. 830 CMR 63.31.1. 
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to G.L. c. 63, §§ 31I and 31J to require that the appellant’s 
interest deductions be added back.” In finding business purpose, 
the Board stated that “the MMH Notes were not entered into as 
part of a tax avoidance scheme, but instead were intended to 
finance the expansion of MMH’s various subsidiaries in a manner 
that benefitted the MassMutual business as a whole by increasing 
MMLIC’s RBC score.” Id. at 2015-330. 
The present matters, by contrast, lacked supportable 
business purpose. While Comcast’s constant need for 
infrastructure improvements was credible as a business purpose 
underlying Comcast’s third-party debt, the critical flaw with 
the appellants’ analysis was the failure to focus on the 
business purpose for the purported debt transactions involving 
the actual entities at issue — the Add-Back Entities — and not 
Comcast. The appellants provided no clear and convincing 
evidence of a business purpose for the intercompany debt 
assigned to each of the Add-Back Entities apart from an 
attendant intercompany interest expense deduction and the bare 
assertion that the Add-Back Entities benefitted from 
infrastructure improvements.
188
 The appellants contended that “it 
was perfectly reasonable for Comcast to put in place 
                                                 
188 While the record referenced infrastructure improvements, including 
improvements in Massachusetts, it did not explain how each of the Add-Back 
Entities benefitted from particular improvements and whether such 
improvements would have been made regardless of whether or not they 
benefitted each of the Add-Back Entities rather than the Comcast enterprise 
as a whole. 
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intercompany debt arrangements with its operating companies to 
ensure that the costs of the [third-party] debt were borne by 
the companies that were actually using it in their business.” 
However, the evidence indicated that the Notes reflected no 
connection to the third-party debt and no connection to the 
amounts claimed as interest expense deductions. Accordingly, the 
appellants’ argument was without merit.  
In finding that the transactions in Massachusetts Mutual 
had economic substance, the Board observed that  
[a]s opposed to the large dividend note in Overnite 
where the debtor took on all of the burden of debt 
without any cash consideration for purely tax-
motivated reasons, MMLIC loaned MMH billions in cash 
which was directly used to fund its subsidiaries’ 
operations and to finance new investments. The 
advances were documented by legally enforceable 
agreements with all of the usual indicia of debt. The 
appellant’s finance department took reasonable 
measures to monitor the outstanding debt and observed 
standard practices for funding and documentation. One 
of the largest credit rating agencies in the country 
was hired by the appellant to independently evaluate 
the MMH Notes each year, which were consistently given 
an investment-grade rating. 
 
Massachusetts Mutual, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 
2015-331. The meticulous steps and scrutiny undertaken by the 
finance department in Massachusetts Mutual contrast with the 
scarcity of care evidenced in these matters. As stated by 
Mr. Dordelman, the current Senior Vice President and Treasurer 
of Comcast and the Vice President of Finance and Treasurer 
during relevant tax years, when asked whether a particular Note 
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had been paid: “I don’t know. I don’t know how I would know 
that.”  
In support of economic substance for the alleged debt 
transactions, the appellants suggested that   
there was no need for any cash to be transferred. The 
funds that Comcast borrowed on a centralized basis 
were deposited into Comcast’s cash management pool and 
expended, as needed, for the benefit of the [Add-Back 
Entities]. The fact that the [Add-Back Entities] 
received the benefit of the borrowed funds directly — 
in the form of improved and upgraded infrastructure — 
rather than cash is irrelevant.  
 
The Board rejected the notion that these nebulous, cashless 
infrastructure benefits substantively transmuted into valid, 
quantifiable debt for each of the respective Add-Back Entities. 
See Overnite, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 187 (“[M]ost remarkably, the 
maker Overnite was not in fact receiving (borrowing) money, it 
was simply promising to pay on stated terms.”). Instead, the 
record in the present matters reflected a dearth of economic 
risk and practical economic consequences.      
The Board likewise concluded that the record reflected an 
absence of bona fide debt, as well as a lack of fair value and 
consideration to the claimed interest expenses. Having 
previously concluded that the appellants failed to establish 
these criteria in its earlier analysis using the lesser 
preponderance of the evidence standard, the Board determined 
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that an analysis under the heightened clear and convincing 
evidence standard would be superfluous.       
Failure to Allow Add-Back Relief Did Not Transgress Due Process 
and Commerce Clause Boundaries 
 
In their post-trial brief, the appellants asserted that  
because of the extreme distortion here — which results 
in Massachusetts taxing an amount of income that is 
far in excess of what the taxpayers’ net income would 
have been on a unitary basis — the result sought by 
the Commissioner is not only impermissible under the 
statute, but also under the Federal Constitution. The 
Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution limit a State to the taxation of an 
apportionable share of a taxpayer’s unitary 
income . . . . The result that the Commissioner is 
arguing for here would far exceed those limits.
189
  
 
Constitutional touchstones temper a state’s interest in 
“pursu[ing] its own fiscal policies” with Due Process Clause and 
Commerce Clause limitations on interstate taxation. Wisconsin v. 
J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (“A state is free to 
pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the 
Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state 
has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has 
given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it 
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized 
                                                 
189 In a corresponding footnote, the appellants stated that “[t]he amount of 
excess taxation would be reduced, or potentially eliminated, if the 
Commissioner had applied costs of performance sourcing to determine 
taxpayers’ sales factors . . . However, the Commissioner has argued against 
both the application of costs of performance sourcing and the deduction of 
intercompany interest - resulting in the distortion identified above.” The 
Costs of Performance Issue and the Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue both 
derived from the appellants’ own original filing methodologies and not 
adjustments made by the Commissioner. 
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society.”); Capital One Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-544, 558 (“Constitutional 
limitations on a state’s power to tax interstate commerce stem 
from both the Due Process Clause . . . and the Commerce Clause. 
Each clause ‘reflect[s] different constitutional concerns.’”) 
(quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992)), 
aff’d, 453 Mass. 1 (2009).  
The Supreme Court has held that “[u]nder both the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a State may 
not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‘tax value earned 
outside its borders.’” Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax 
Board, 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)). The Court 
recognized that “arriving at precise territorial allocations of 
‘value’ is often an elusive goal” and a taxpayer seeking to 
challenge the allocation has the burden of proving so by “clear 
and cogent evidence.” Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).   
Due Process Clause considerations require that “there must 
be ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state 
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’” Truck 
Renting and Leasing Ass'n v. Commissioner of Revenue, 433 Mass. 
733, 736 (2001) (quoting Horst v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
389 Mass. 177, 182 (1983)). Further, the “income attributed to 
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the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values 
connected with the taxing State.’” Truck Renting and Leasing, 
433 Mass. at 736 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 
267, 273 (1978)). “At the center of Due Process jurisprudence 
lies a concern for the ‘fundamental fairness of government 
activity.’” Capital One, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
at 2007-559 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 312). Though the banks 
in Capital One did not escalate a challenge under Due Process 
Clause grounds, the Board nonetheless remarked that “nor could 
they realistically have mounted such a challenge because 
Massachusetts ‘has provided the source [for the income at issue] 
by providing and maintaining the economic setting out of which 
[the Banks reap their] profit.’” Capital One, Mass. ATB Findings 
of Fact and Reports at 2007-559 (quoting Truck Renting and 
Leasing, 433 Mass. at 739). Similarly here, the Add-Back 
Entities have purposefully sought economic advantages in the 
Commonwealth.
190
 
The Commerce Clause “is informed ‘by structural concerns 
about the effects of state regulation on the national economy’ 
and, specifically, any burden on interstate commerce caused by a 
State tax obligation.” Truck Renting and Leasing, 433 Mass. at 
740 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 312). The seminal case of 
                                                 
190 Certain Add-Back Entities, such as Mass I, are Massachusetts domestic 
corporations. 
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Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), 
articulated a four-part test whereby a state tax will be 
sustained against a “Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is 
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services 
provided by the State.” In these matters, the appellants argued 
that by disallowing the add-back exception under G.L. c. 63, 
§ 31J(a), the Commissioner exceeded the apportionable share of 
income allowed within constitutional limitations.      
The Board considered an analogous contention in Sysco. In 
that case, the taxpayer “argued that if the Board were to 
determine that the intercompany advances at issue did not 
qualify as loans, the Commissioner’s proposed adjustments would 
be in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Sysco correctly noted 
that a state cannot tax extraterritorial values.” Sysco, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-951-52 (citing Allied-
Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 
(1992)). The Board found that     
Sysco offered only its unsubstantiated argument that 
the Commissioner’s adjustments would result in 
constitutionally impermissible taxation. During the 
hearing of these appeals, Sysco did not support this 
argument with substantive evidence or analysis 
establishing that the adjustments resulted in taxation 
of extraterritorial values. Thus, the Board found that 
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Sysco’s contentions regarding the constitutionality of 
the Commissioner’s adjustments were unavailing.   
 
Sysco, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-952.   
Similarly in these matters, the appellants failed to 
support their argument — by clear and cogent evidence — that 
constitutional limitations on taxation were breached by 
disallowance of the alleged interest expense deductions.
191
 
Tenneco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2000-639, 676-77 (“Tenneco has failed to prove 
by clear and cogent evidence that the apportionment formulas 
applied during the tax years at issue resulted in the 
apportionment of income to Massachusetts that is out of all 
appropriate proportion to its Massachusetts business or have 
resulted in a grossly distorted result.”) (citation omitted). 
The Board ruled that the appellants’ use of an Illinois unitary-
returns simulation to demonstrate extreme distortion was without 
merit. See, e.g., Cnossen v. Board of Assessors of the Town of 
Uxbridge, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2002-675, 690 
(“[T]he methodology that the appellants’ valuation expert 
applied was replete with dubious assumptions and conjectures 
                                                 
191 In Kimberly-Clark, the Board noted that “as tax deductions are a matter of 
legislative grace, the Legislature could have repealed the deductions 
affected by the Add Back statutes in their entirety. Instead, the Legislature 
chose to impose a higher standard in an area marked by significant abuse and 
litigation.” Kimberly-Clark, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2011-
34 (internal citations omitted). See also Drapkin v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
420 Mass. 333, 343-44 (1995) (“We recognize that the Legislature is entitled 
to ‘the benefit of any constitutional doubt.’ Any modification of c. 62 in 
order to bring it more in line with contemporary business reality is a matter 
for the Legislature and not the courts.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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that did not have adequate foundations.”). And as the Board 
ruled with the Costs of Performance Issue, Comcast deliberately 
maintained separate corporate entities, including the Add-Back 
Entities. Comcast also purposely consolidated third-party 
borrowings at certain top-level Comcast entities for 
advantageous business reasons rather than engaging in borrowing 
at the level of the Add-Back Entities. The resultant 
disallowance of deductions for the fictional allocations of 
third-party debt stemmed from Comcast’s own business decisions 
and not from any constitutional transgression on the 
Commissioner’s part.  
Accordingly, the Board ruled that the appellants had not 
established their rights to abatements based upon the 
Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue. 
III. Federal Changes Issue 
The appellants asserted that they were entitled to 
abatements based upon the filing of federal changes with the 
Commissioner. 
A. The Record Contained Final Determinations Adequate to Trigger 
the Requisites of G.L. c. 62C, § 30 
 
Under G.L. c. 62C, § 30, “a final determination of a change 
by the federal government includes a closing agreement or 
accepted offer in compromise under the Code, as amended and in 
effect for the taxable year, or any similar agreement that 
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results in a change in federal taxable income, whether or not 
the audit or other review is complete with respect to issues not 
addressed in the agreement.” The Commissioner’s corresponding 
regulation at 830 CMR 62C.30.1 defines a “final determination” 
as “a federal determination when there is no right of 
administrative or judicial appeal.”  
The Board determined that the Forms 4549-A and the Form 
870-AD constituted final determinations within the meaning of 
G.L. c. 62C, § 30 and 830 CMR 62C.30.1. 
B. Failure to Provide a Report of Federal Changes to the 
Commissioner Within Three Months of the Final Determination Did 
Not Deprive the Board of Jurisdiction Over the Appellants’ 
Abatement Claim  
 
The Commissioner noted that the appellants were required to 
report federal changes within three months of the final 
determination.
192
 The first paragraph of G.L. c. 62C, § 30 states 
that    
[i]f the federal government finally determines that 
there is a difference from the amount previously 
reported in (1) the taxable income of a person subject 
to taxation under chapter 63, or (2) a federal credit 
to which the person may be entitled, but only if the 
calculation of the credit has an effect on the 
computation of the tax imposed under chapter 63, the 
final determination shall be reported, accompanied by 
payment of any additional tax due with interest as 
provided in section 32, to the commissioner within 3 
                                                 
192 In their post-trial brief, the appellants stated that “Massachusetts law 
requires a taxpayer to report a federal tax adjustment by filing an amended 
return within one year of receipt of notice of the adjustment” and that the 
“[a]ppellants did exactly that when they reported the RAR adjustments to the 
Commissioner.” Neither statement was correct.  
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months of receipt of notice of the final 
determination.  
  
G.L. c. 62C, § 30. The IRS executed Forms 4549-A on February 29, 
2008, June 9, 2009, and January 25, 2011, and the Form 870-AD on 
July 14, 2010. The appellants claimed abatements based upon the 
federal changes by Forms CA-6 filed by Mass I, as the principal 
reporting corporation, on November 29, 2010, which placed the 
appellants outside of three months for reporting three out of 
the four final determinations.
193
 Regardless of the delay, the 
Board concluded that G.L. c. 62C, § 30, in its entirety, 
illustrates that the three-month reporting requirement is not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite for purposes of filing for an 
abatement under G.L. c. 62C, § 37, but a notification requisite 
intended to alert the Commissioner to federal changes and give 
him time to verify whether the federal changes result in 
additional tax due; failure to provide that notice gives the 
Commissioner an additional year to assess and exposes the 
taxpayer to a penalty.  
Ordinarily, the provisions of G.L. c. 62C, § 30 give the 
Commissioner one year from receipt of the report to make an 
assessment based upon federal changes. In the absence of a 
report, the Commissioner is permitted two years to make an 
                                                 
193 The Forms CA-6 filed by the appellants included an option relevant to 
notify the Commissioner of federal changes. The appellants did not include 
the actual final determinations until February 2012, after the Commissioner 
requested supplemental information regarding the federal changes. 
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assessment based upon federal changes.
194
 The statute also 
contains a penalty provision for compliance failure, stating 
that            
[a]ny person or estate failing to comply with the 
first paragraph shall be assessed a penalty of 10 per 
cent of the additional tax found due and such penalty 
shall become part of the additional tax found due. For 
reasonable cause shown, the commissioner may, in the 
commissioner’s discretion, abate the penalty in whole 
or in part.  
 
G.L. c. 62C, § 30.
195
 Accordingly, the consequences of a failure 
to comply with the three-month notice requirement — additional 
time to assess and penalties — are explicitly provided in 
G.L. c.  62C, § 30. Nothing in either G.L. c. 62C, § 30 or the 
general abatement statute of G.L. c. 62C, § 37 can be read to 
impose an abatement bar as a penalty for failure to report, and 
the Board declined to read such a bar into the statute.
196
 See 
                                                 
194 The Commissioner’s regulation at 830 CMR 62C.30.1 provides for the filing 
of reports in scenarios involving increased tax liability, not decreased tax 
liability. The language at 830 CMR 62C.30.1(3)(b) addresses the three-month 
reporting requirement for G.L. c. 63 taxpayers, but incorporates the rules 
for G.L. c. 62 taxpayers at 830 CMR 62C.30.1(3)(a), which states that a 
taxpayer “must report to the Commissioner any changes in federal taxable 
income or federal tax credits resulting in increased Massachusetts tax 
liability.” 
195 Effective as of July 1, 2010, per St. 2010, c. 131, § 41. The statute 
previously read “shall be assessed a penalty in the sum of one hundred 
dollars, or ten per cent of the additional tax found due, whichever sum is 
smaller said penalty to become part of the additional tax found due.” The 
penalty provision of both the current and former versions is clearly intended 
to reach taxpayers in situations where the federal changes result in 
additional tax, not reductions in tax. 
196 General Laws c. 62C, § 38 explicitly states that the filing of a return is 
required for an abatement: “No tax assessed on any person liable to taxation 
shall be abated unless the person assessed shall have filed, at or before the 
time of bringing his application for abatement, a return as required by this 
chapter for the period to which his application relates; and if he filed a 
fraudulent return, or having filed an incorrect or insufficient return, has 
failed, after notice, to file a proper return, the commissioner shall not 
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King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 425 (1914) (“But we have 
no right to conjecture what the Legislature would have enacted 
if they had foreseen the occurrence of a case like this; much 
less can we read into the statute a provision which the 
Legislature did not see fit to put there, whether the omission 
came from inadvertence or of set purpose.”). 
In contrast, Children’s Hospital Medical Center v. Board of 
Assessors of Boston, 388 Mass. 832, 837 (1983), considered the 
question of “whether the filing with the assessors of the 
descriptive list, statement, and certification required by 
G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third(b), and G.L. c. 59, § 29, is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to action by the assessors and 
review by the board.” The Court found     
that the clear terms of the statute compel the 
conclusion that this requirement is jurisdictional. 
Chapter 59, § 5, Third(b), expressly provided that a 
charitable organization ‘shall not be exempt for any 
year in which it omits to bring in to the assessors 
the list and statement required by section twenty-nine 
and a certification under oath that the report for 
such year required by section eight F of chapter 
twelve has been filed with the division of public 
charities in the department of the attorney general.’ 
 
Id. at 837-38. The statute at issue here, G.L. c. 62C, § 30, 
contains no such analogous express language regarding omission 
of the federal changes report as a prohibition to relief. See 
Nynex Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings 
                                                                                                                                                             
abate the tax below double the amount for which the person assessed was 
properly taxable under this chapter.” 
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of Fact and Reports 2002-704, 714 (“Accordingly, the Board 
declined to read into the statute a procedure (the aggregation 
of individual corporations' deductions) that the Legislature did 
not choose to include.”), aff’d, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 575 (2004), 
further appellate review denied, 442 Mass. 1110 (2004). Instead, 
in the absence of such a report, G.L. c. 62C, § 30 extends the 
Commissioner’s time to make an assessment and provides for the 
imposition of a penalty. See Pmag, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 429 Mass. 35, 38-39 (1999) (“The Federal change statute 
operates as follows. First, a taxpayer must provide notice that 
the Federal taxable income as ‘finally determined by the Federal 
government’ is different than originally reported. Second, the 
commissioner must determine, from such report or an 
investigation, whether taxes under c. 63 have been assessed, 
and, if not, make an assessment accordingly. . . . Third, the 
commissioner must assess the excise taxes in compliance with the 
procedures spelled out in G. L. c. 62C, § 26.”).     
C. The Abatement Provisions of G.L. c. 62C, § 30 Do Not Override 
the General Abatement Provisions of G.L. c. 62C, § 37 
 
In his post-trial brief, the Commissioner argued that “the 
[appellants] were not entitled to any abatement based on federal 
changes as none of the abatement applications were filed within 
one year of the final determination of the federal government.” 
While G.L. c. 62C, § 30 permits taxpayers to file for abatements 
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based upon federal changes within one year of the final 
determination,
197
 it does not strip taxpayers of the option to 
file for such abatements within the time limitations set out in 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37. See 830 CMR 62C.37.1.
198
  
In Electronics Corp. of America v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
402 Mass. 672, 676 (1988), the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
“the fact that the Legislature has chosen to grant a specific 
abatement remedy to a taxpayer experiencing a change in Federal 
taxable income does not, without more, imply that a taxpayer 
experiencing such a change is thereby precluded from employing 
the general abatement remedy of § 37 if it otherwise qualifies 
for consideration under that section.”  
The Commissioner’s regulation at 830 CMR 62C.30.1 also 
recognizes the broadening rather than restricting nature of the 
one-year limitation period of G.L. c. 62C, § 30, stating that “a 
taxpayer may apply for an abatement of tax assessed, including 
tax assessed as a result of a change in federal taxable gross 
                                                 
197 “If, as a result of the change by the federal government in a person’s 
federal taxable income, federal credits or federal taxable estate, the person 
or estate believes that a lesser tax was due the commonwealth than was 
assessed, the person or estate may apply in writing to the commissioner for 
an abatement thereof under section 37 within 1 year of the date of notice of 
the final determination by the federal government.” G.L. c. 62C, § 30. 
198 The regulation states that “[i]f, as a result of a change in federal 
taxable income, federal tax credits, or federal taxable estate or in tax due 
to another state or jurisdiction, a person believes that a lesser 
Massachusetts tax was due than was previously assessed, the person may apply 
for an abatement under M.G.L. c. 62C, § 30 or M.G.L. c. 62C, § 30A, 
respectively, within one year of the date of notice of final determination as 
provided under those statutes, or under M.G.L. c. 62C, § 37, and this 
regulation, 830 CMR 62C.37.1, within the limits established under 830 CMR 
62C.37.1(3) and (4).” 830 CMR 62C.37.1. 
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income, federal credit, or federal taxable estate, under the 
general abatement remedy provided by M.G.L. c. 62C, § 37 and 
830 CMR 62C.37.1, within the limits provided in § 37.”    
The Board in Smolak v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB 
Findings of Fact and Reports 1995-93, highlighted the 
applicability of the one-year limitation in G.L. c. 62C, § 30 in 
circumstances where taxpayers have exhausted the time 
constraints of G.L. c. 62C § 37. The Board ruled that “absent 
the federal change, the taxpayer's initial application for 
abatement would have been filed beyond the latest period of 
limitations under G.L. c. 62C § 37. However, the federal 
government's determination that the taxpayer's taxable income 
for tax year 1986 was different than originally reported, and 
the taxpayer's receipt of the notice of federal change, provided 
the taxpayer with an additional one year within which to file an 
application for abatement pursuant to G.L. c. 62C § 30.” Id. at 
1995-100-101 (citation omitted).  
In these matters, the appellants and the Commissioner had 
executed valid Forms A-37 and a Form B-37, consents that 
extended the time limitations for both assessments under 
G.L. c. 62C, § 26 and abatements under G.L. c. 62C, § 37. See 
G.L. c. 62C, § 27; G.L. c. 62C, § 37; 830 CMR 62C.37.1. The 
appellants filed their Forms CA-6 on November 29, 2010, under 
Mass. I as the principal reporting corporation, within the time 
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limitations agreed upon by execution of the consents. 
Accordingly, the filing of their Forms CA-6 were timely under 
G.L. c. 62C, § 37, irrespective of whether they were filed 
within one year of the federal change.   
D. The Appellants Failed to Establish Their Entitlement to 
Abatements Based Upon Federal Changes 
 
Despite counsel for the appellants’ assertion that the 
documents “speak for themselves,” nothing in the record 
permitted the Board to reconcile numbers, adjustments, or 
entities related to the Federal Changes Issue. For the Board “to 
conclude otherwise would be no more than mere speculation on our 
part.” Serot v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-532 (1994). “Proof 
of essential facts can not be left to speculation and 
conjecture.” Swayne Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 335, 
340 (1932) (“Being unable to determine, because of insufficient 
evidence, whether or not the amount of petitioner's consolidated 
invested capital was in excess of the amount computed by the 
respondent, we hold against petitioner.”). It was upon the 
appellants “to remove the cause from the realm of speculation.” 
Cohen v. Henry Siegel Co., 220 Mass. 215, 219 (1915). “Any 
conclusion on the point would be mere speculation, a course in 
which we are not required to indulge, the burden of proof being 
on petitioner.” Estate of Maurice J. Lydon v. Commissioner, 11 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1952) (“Without facts demonstrating by the 
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degree of proof required of petitioner that the money was not 
earned as taxable income in 1945, there is no alternative but to 
find for the respondent in an amount which gives effect to 
respondent's concession above noted.”). 
It is well settled that “[t]he burden of proof is upon the 
appellant to prove its right as a matter of law to abatement of 
the tax.” Erving Paper Mills Corp. and Subsidiaries v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
1997-302, 330 (citations omitted), aff’d, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 14 
(2000). See also National Grid Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 517 (2016) (“We observe, as 
well, that it was the taxpayers who had the burden of proof on 
every material fact regarding their right to an abatement. . . . 
the board properly could find that the taxpayers’ burden was not 
met with documents, drafted by them, that were ambiguous on that 
very point.”) (internal citations omitted); Rosenberg v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1970-201 (1970) (“[P]etitioner 
misconceives the nature of her task before this Court. As we 
have previously pointed out . . . the burden of proof is upon 
the taxpayer.”); Chung Wah Hong Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2013-420, 452 
(“Because the Board found that the evidence was inconclusive as 
to this issue, it found and ruled that the appellant failed to 
demonstrate that it was entitled to credit for cigarette excise 
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paid to Virginia.”). The appellants failed on numerous levels to 
provide the Board with factual and legal bases sufficient to 
prove that they were entitled to abatements based upon federal 
changes. 
The appellants included summary schedules in the record 
purporting to allocate Comcast federal adjustments down to the 
level of individual members of the Mass I combined filing group, 
but provided no explanation as to how these allocations were 
derived. See 830 CMR 62C.30.1 (stating that “[t]he principal 
reporting corporation must provide sufficient detail to properly 
attribute and allocate the federal adjustments to group 
members”). It is unclear whether the allocations were merely the 
result of another formula conceived by Mr. Donnelly, as he did 
with the adjustments underlying the Intercompany Interest 
Expenses Issue.
199
 Guidance was lacking. The various notations 
scattered throughout the exhibits offered by the appellants in 
support of the federal changes presented more questions than 
answers.  
The appellants also neglected to explain the legal grounds 
underlying the export of the Comcast federal changes to 
Massachusetts.
200
 As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court, “A 
                                                 
199 Mr. Donnelly implemented a formula based upon number of subscribers as a 
way to allocate third-party debt expenses.  
200 Some examples of the multitude of changes allocated to entities in the Mass 
I combined filing group included state tax true ups, MediaOne breakup fees, 
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change in Federal taxable income does not automatically result 
in a change in Massachusetts net income. Rather a change in net 
income occurs when the Federal change alters the tax due under 
c. 63.” Pmag, Inc., 429 Mass. at 39. See also Thayer v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
2014-1184, 1204 (“[T]he appellant cited no authority for the 
proposition that the decision of an IRS auditor that no federal 
tax deficiency exists is somehow binding for Massachusetts tax 
purposes. . . . [T]he determination of the IRS' auditor was not 
binding on the amount of expenses which could be deducted for 
Massachusetts income tax purposes.”); National Grid USA Service 
Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2014-630, 644 (“Further, in determining whether 
deductions are allowable, the Board has stated that ‘Federal tax 
concepts are not always dispositive of the interpretation of 
Massachusetts corporate excise statutes . . . In particular, 
courts and the Board are cautious when applying federal tax 
concepts to deductions available under Massachusetts 
statutes.’”), aff’d, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 527 (2016) (“[T]he 
commissioner specifically disputes that the closing agreement 
constitutes a resolution of National Grid's allowable deductions 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schedule K-1 adjustments, I.R.C. § 1031 gain corrections, and AT&T litigation 
settlement. 
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under the provisions of the code.”), further appellate review 
denied, 475 Mass. 1104 (2016).    
Similarly with the adjustments concerning net operating 
losses stemming from the AT&T Solutions abatement approval, 
there was a paucity of factual and legal support to corroborate 
the appellants’ claims. The path of net operating losses leading 
from AT&T Solutions to the entities in the Mass I combined 
filing group was too fraught with uncertainty to make a 
determination that the appellants met their burden of proof.  
The appellants provided no documentary verification as to 
whether the AT&T Solutions net operating losses were correctly 
calculated and how the net operating losses in turn traced down 
to various AT&T Broadband subsidiaries and subsequently to 
relevant AT&T Broadband subsidiaries in their current 
iterations, after their acquisition by Comcast. The appellants’ 
spreadsheets merely delineated an allocation of net operating 
losses without explanatory sustenance, including any pertinent 
legal provisions. The regulation at 830 CMR 63.30.2, for 
instance, states as follows: 
(11) Mergers and Changes of Ownership. 
 
(a) Mergers. In the event of a merger of two or more 
corporations, the surviving corporation retains any 
net operating loss that it separately incurred before 
the merger, subject to the limitations of 830 CMR 
63.30.2(11)(b), below. All of the net operating loss 
of a corporation absorbed in the merger is lost. The 
surviving corporation may not deduct or carry over the 
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net operating loss of a corporation it absorbs. In the 
event of a consolidation of two or more previously 
existing corporations into a new corporation, the new 
corporation starts with no net operating loss. All of 
the net operating loss of the previously existing 
corporations is lost. The new corporation may not 
deduct or carry over any net operating loss incurred 
by any of the previously existing corporations before 
the consolidation. 
 
(b) Changes in Ownership. Where a corporation 
undergoes an ownership change, as defined in Code 
§ 382(g), the amount of the corporation's net income 
that may be offset by pre-change net operating loss in 
any taxable year shall not exceed the limitation 
imposed by Code section 382, provided that the 
limitation shall be adjusted for differences between 
Massachusetts taxable net income and federal taxable 
income determined without regard to the federal net 
operating loss deduction. The adjustment shall be made 
for each taxable year by multiplying the Code § 382 
limitation by Massachusetts taxable net income, 
determined without regard to the net operating loss 
deduction, and dividing the resulting amount by 
federal taxable income, determined without regard to 
the federal net operating loss deduction. Any amount 
of net operating loss that cannot be deducted because 
of the limitation may be carried over as provided in 
830 CMR 63.30.2(7), above. 
 
830 CMR 63.30.2. The appellants neither addressed the 
applicability nor incorporation of any limitations on net 
operating losses due to any mergers and/or ownership change.  
The insufficient factual record and the absence of any 
ascertainable legal foundation would require the Board to make 
numerous speculative assumptions for a determination in the 
appellants’ favor. The Board could not decipher and reconcile 
the adjustments, including the AT&T Solutions net operating 
losses. Further, the appellants provided no explanation as to 
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why the underlying federal adjustments should result in 
adjustments under Massachusetts law. Consequently, the Board 
found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden 
of proof in establishing that they were entitled to abatements 
based upon federal changes. 
IV. Allocable Expenses Issue 
The Allocable Expenses Issue invoked the questions of 
whether equity and good conscience permitted the Board to hear 
the issue and, if so, whether the expenses at issue should have 
been allocated to Pennsylvania and not Massachusetts.  
A. The Provisions of G.L. c. 58A, § 7 Allow the Board to 
Consider the Allocable Expenses Issue 
 
Pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7, “[T]he board shall not 
consider, unless equity and good conscience so require, any 
issue of fact or contention of law not specifically set out in 
the petition upon appeal or raised in the answer.” Similarly, 
Rule 1.22 of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure states 
that “[t]he Board will not consider, unless equity and good 
conscience so require, any issue of fact or contention of law 
not specifically set out in the petition or raised in the 
answer.” 
In their post-trial brief, the appellants stated that they 
“spent considerable time and resources gathering evidence to 
substantiate [their] position that the AirTouch stock was a 
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nonstrategic asset held solely for investment purposes” only to 
have the Commissioner concede the AirTouch Dividends Income 
Issue on the first day of trial and assert a new legal theory in 
its place, the Allocable Expenses Issue. Primarily citing the 
Appeals Court case of Deveau v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
51 Mass. App. Ct. 420 (2001), for support, the appellants urged 
the Board to find that compelling circumstances did not exist to 
permit the Commissioner’s new theory.  
In Deveau, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 427, “[t]he appellants 
contend[ed] that, because the record discloses no factual basis 
on which the board could have determined that equity and good 
conscience required it to consider the commissioner's newly 
advanced legal position, [G.L. c. 58A, § 7] prohibits the board 
from having done so.” The Appeals Court found that  
the board has not made any findings, and the record 
viewed in its entirety is barren of any facts or 
circumstances to support its (implicit) determination 
that equity and good conscience require it to 
entertain the commissioner's newly advanced and 
significantly different legal position. We thus do not 
know what factors the board took into consideration 
and, in such circumstances, deference to the board's 
self-described discretionary consideration of the new 
theory is not warranted.  
 
Id. at 427-28.  
 
The Appeals Court determination in Deveau was not intended 
as a bar against consideration of all newly advanced legal 
theories. To the contrary, the Court stated that “[t]he board's 
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determination of what constitutes in various circumstances the 
demands of equity and good conscience will ordinarily be given 
considerable deference on appeal, so long as the rationale for 
that determination is made clear and it is based on substantial 
evidence.” Id. at 427. In The First Marblehead Corporation v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 470 Mass. 497, 514 (2015), aff’d after 
remand by 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015) on unrelated grounds, 475 Mass. 
159 (2016), the Supreme Judicial Court provided further 
guidance, stating that “[t]he quoted limitation in G. L. c. 58A, 
§ 7, has been interpreted to prohibit more surprising or 
unexpected legal turnabouts, such that one party could not have 
been expected to adequately advance their position under the 
circumstances.” This is not the case here. The position advanced 
by the Commissioner is simply the correlative adjustment to the 
appellants’ claim. 
In Duarte v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2006-490, 512, aff’d, 451 Mass. 399 (2008), the 
Board found that circumstances justified consideration of the 
“question of whether the Commissioner of Revenue is acting in 
accordance with law in forcing [the appellant] to price 
cigarettes above levels which would enable him to compete in the 
New Bedford cigarette retail market.”  
Similarly here, the Board found that “equity and good 
conscience” permitted it to consider the Allocable Expenses 
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Issue. While the Board acknowledges the eleventh-hour nature of 
the Commissioner’s reconfigured argument, the appellants did 
little more than express frustration with the timing. The 
appellants presented no demonstrable prejudice. The appellants 
indicated no factual dispute. The issue instead turns on a 
discrete legal argument — whether certain interest expenses 
should be allocated to the state of commercial domicile if the 
income used to pay those expenses was non-unitary income 
allocated to the state of commercial domicile, and each item 
functioned as an elemental part of an integrated transaction 
used to monetize shares held as a long-term investment. The 
Commissioner’s allocation of expenses merely applies a 
consistent approach to the conceded AirTouch Dividends Income 
Issue. 
B. Constitutional Considerations Support Disallowance of the 
Interest Expenses Underlying the Allocable Expenses Issue 
  
Citing G.L. c. 63, § 30(4), the Commissioner argued in his 
post-trial brief that “[d]eductions that are ‘allocable, in 
whole or in part, to one or more classes of income not included 
in a corporation’s taxable net income . . . shall not be 
allowed.’” The Commissioner stressed that “[t]he plain language 
of the statute is clear: if an expense is associated with income 
allocated to a state other than Massachusetts, the taxpayer is 
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not permitted to claim a deduction for the expense against its 
Massachusetts taxable income.”  
In their reply brief, the appellants demurred, remarking 
that G.L. c. 63, § 30(4), pursuant to the statutory language 
omitted by the Commissioner in his argument, disallows only 
deductions that are “allocable, in whole or in part, to one or 
more classes of income not included in a corporation’s taxable 
net income, as determined under subsection (a) of section 
thirty-eight, shall not be allowed.” G.L. c. 63, § 30(4) 
(emphasis added). The appellants argued that “‘[t]axable [n]et 
[i]ncome’ is a pre-apportionment/pre-allocation concept. Section 
38(a) excludes two classes of income from ‘taxable net income’ — 
95% of certain inter-corporate dividends and certain long term 
capital gains. It is only to these classes of income that the 
§ 30(4) deduction exclusion applies. Here, the AirTouch 
dividends were not excluded from Georgia’s ‘taxable net income’ 
by virtue of [§] 38(a). Therefore, the exclusion does not 
apply.” Alternatively, the appellants asserted that even if the 
Commissioner’s reading of the statute were correct, the 
consequence under G.L. c. 63, § 30(4) would not be disallowance 
of the interest expense deductions but rather inclusion of 5 
percent of the dividends in taxable net income. The pertinent 
statutory language reads that “[i]n lieu of disallowing any 
deduction allocable, in whole or in part, to dividends not 
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included in a corporation’s taxable net income, five per cent of 
such dividends shall be includible therein, as provided in 
[G.L. c. 63, § 38(a)].” G.L. c. 63, § 30(4).          
The intrinsic weakness in both parties’ arguments is their 
reliance upon a statutory-based framework not intended to 
contemplate the constitutional limitations articulated in 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation. 504 U.S. 
768 (1992).
201
 The cited provisions of G.L. c. 63, § 30 and 
G.L. c. 63, § 38 predate the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                 
201 The Commissioner recognized this when he issued Technical Information 
Release 92-5: Effect of Allied-Signal on Apportionment Under G.L. c. 63, 
§ 38, which states in pertinent part as follows: 
 
The literal application of the “full apportionment” principles of 
G.L. c. 63, § 38 to nondomiciliary corporations may encounter the 
jurisdictional limitations enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
situations where a nondomiciliary corporation has income from an 
investment that is unrelated to any business it conducts in 
Massachusetts. It does not appear that the Legislature intended 
to impose tax on activities that are beyond the state’s 
jurisdiction when it adopted G.L. c. 63, § 38. Accordingly, the 
Department will apply the statute in a manner that conforms with 
federal law, as described below. 
 
A nondomiciliary corporation or other nondomiciliary entity 
engaged in interstate business and subject to apportionment under 
G.L. c. 63, § 38 must exclude from its taxable net income any 
item of income (or loss) from the holding or disposition of 
securities if Massachusetts does not have jurisdiction under the 
United States constitution to tax such item of income. Under the 
principles enunciated in Allied-Signal, such income is properly 
excluded if: (1) the relationship between the taxpayer and the 
business represented by the security is not unitary; and (2) the 
acquisition and holding of the security does not otherwise have 
an operational function, such as (but not limited to) the short-
term investment of working capital. If a taxpayer claims that one 
or more items of its income are not subject to Massachusetts tax 
jurisdiction and are therefore not apportionable, the taxpayer 
must disclose its claim on its return and must bear the burden of 
proving its claim. 
 
TIR 92-5. 
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Allied-Signal.202 The appellants looked to Allied-Signal as 
support for their exclusion of the AirTouch dividends income, 
not the provisions of G.L. c. 63, § 30 or G.L. c. 63, § 38.
203
 
Likewise, the Board looked to Allied-Signal for guidance in 
determining whether the related interest expenses should be 
excluded.
204
  
In Allied-Signal, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberated 
whether New Jersey’s inclusion of gain on the sale of a stock 
interest in the taxpayer’s apportionable tax base was 
constitutional: 
This case presents the questions: (1) whether the 
unitary business principle remains an appropriate 
device for ascertaining whether a State has 
transgressed its constitutional limitations; and if 
so, (2) whether, under the unitary business principle, 
the State of New Jersey has the constitutional power 
                                                 
202 See St. 1966, c. 698, § 58 (amending G.L. c. 63, § 38) and St. 1988, 
c. 202, § 9 (amending G.L. c. 63, § 30).  
203 The appellants’ own rationale for debunking the Commissioner’s argument — 
that G.L. c. 63, § 30(4) only disallows deductions allocable to the two 
classes of income excluded by G.L. c. 63, § 38(a) — would have precluded 
allocating the AirTouch dividends income to Pennsylvania in the first 
instance, since the dividends income is not one of the classes of income 
excluded by G.L. c. 63, § 38. 
204 The Commissioner issued 830 CMR 63.38.1 on February 5, 1999, which states 
in pertinent part that “[a] taxpayer must disclose on its return the nature 
and amount of any item of income that is derived from unrelated business 
activities and is excluded from (or is excludable from) taxable net income. 
The taxpayer must also disclose and exclude expenses allocable in whole or in 
part to such unrelated business activities. M.G.L. c. 63, § 30.4.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1 (emphasis added). The regulation further reiterates this concept, 
stating that “[i]n each taxable year in which such expenses are incurred, the 
taxpayer must disclose and exclude expenses allocable in whole or in part to 
unrelated business activities. M.G.L. c. 63, § 30.4. The Commissioner may 
consider a taxpayer’s failure, in any taxable year, to disclose and exclude 
the expenses associated with specific business activities as evidence that 
those activities are not, in fact, unrelated business activities.” 830 CMR 
63.38.1 (emphasis added). Despite the regulation’s reference to G.L. c. 63, 
§ 30(4), the regulation clearly is intended to reach a situation such as the 
one at hand. 
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to include in petitioner’s apportionable tax base 
certain income that, petitioner maintains, was not 
generated in the course of its unitary business.  
 
504 U.S. at 773 (“A State may not tax a nondomiciliary 
corporation’s income . . . if it is ‘derived from “unrelated 
business activity” which constitutes a “discrete business 
enterprise.”’”) (citations omitted). New Jersey had taken the 
position “that multistate corporations like [the taxpayer] 
regard all of their holdings as pools of assets, used for 
maximum long-term profitability, and that any distinction 
between operational and investment assets is artificial.” Id. at 
784.  
“[T]he unitary business rule,” noted the Court, “is a 
recognition of two imperatives: the States’ wide authority to 
devise formulae for an accurate assessment of a corporation’s 
intrastate value or income; and the necessary limit on the 
States’ authority to tax value or income that cannot in fairness 
be attributed to the taxpayer’s activities within the State. It 
is this second component, the necessity for a limiting 
principle, that underlies this case.” Id. at 780 (holding that 
“capital gains should be treated as no different from 
dividends”). The Court opined that “the relevant unitary 
business inquiry . . . focuses on the objective characteristics 
of the asset’s use and its relation to the taxpayer and its 
activities within the taxing State. It is an inquiry to which 
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our cases give content, and which is necessary if the limits of 
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are to have substance in a 
modern economy. In short, New Jersey’s suggestion is not in 
accord with the well-established and substantial case law 
interpreting the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.” Id. at 785. 
The Court recognized that “any number of variations on the 
unitary business theme ‘are logically consistent with the 
underlying principles motivating the approach,’ and [that] the 
constitutional test is quite fact sensitive.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). Further, the Court found that “the unitary 
business principle is not so inflexible that as new methods of 
finance and new forms of business evolve it cannot be modified 
or supplemented where appropriate.” Id. at 786-87 (“It does not 
follow, though, that apportionment of all income is permitted by 
the mere fact of corporate presence within the State; and New 
Jersey offers little more in support of the decision of the 
State Supreme Court.”). 
Applying the Allied-Signal principles to the Allocable 
Expenses Issue, if the AirTouch dividends income was fully 
allocable to Pennsylvania as income derived from unrelated 
business activities, then the interest expenses should be 
subjected to the same inquiry. The Court explicitly recognized 
this concept in Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of 
California, 528 U.S. 458, 460 (2000), a case concerning a 
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California statute that permitted interest expense deductions 
“only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state 
income arising from the unrelated business activity of a 
discrete business enterprise, i.e., income that the State could 
not otherwise tax.” In that case, the Court found that “[i]f 
California could show that its deduction limit actually 
reflected the portion of the expense properly related to 
nonunitary income, the limit would not, in fact, be a tax on 
nonunitary income. Rather, it would merely be a proper 
allocation of the deduction.” Id. at 465-66 (“This Court has 
consistently upheld deduction denials that represent reasonable 
efforts properly to allocate a deduction between taxable and 
tax-exempt income, even though such denials mean that the 
taxpayer owes more than he would without the denial.”). “The 
California statute, however,” the Court noted, “pushes this 
concept past reasonable bounds. In effect, it assumes that a 
corporation that borrows any money at all has really borrowed 
that money to ‘purchase or carry’ its nonunitary investments (as 
long as the corporation has such investments), even if the 
corporation has put no money at all into nonunitary business 
that year.” Id. at 466.      
In these matters, the Board found that no “reasonable 
bounds” were transgressed by allocating the interest expenses on 
the Centaur Notes to Pennsylvania. The objective characteristic 
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of the interest expenses was their deliberate use in the 
monetization of the AirTouch shares. If the AirTouch dividends 
income lacked the requisite constitutional link under the 
unitary business principle, then a related expense vital to the 
overall monetization transaction lacked the requisite connection 
as well. See Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 777 (“The principle that 
a State may not tax value earned outside its borders rests on 
the fundamental requirement of both the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses that there be ‘some definite link, some minimum 
connection, between a state and the person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax.’”). 
Accordingly, the Board ruled that the appellants had not 
met their burden of proof in establishing that the expenses at 
issue should be allocated to Massachusetts rather than 
Pennsylvania. 
V. Comcast Sales Factor Issue 
As with the Allocable Expenses Issue, the Comcast Sales 
Factor Issue raised the question of whether equity and good 
conscience permitted the Board to hear the issue. Additionally, 
the issue concerned whether reimbursements at cost should be 
included in Comcast’s sales factors for tax years 2007 and 2008. 
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A. The Provisions of G.L. c. 58A, § 7 Allow the Board to 
Consider the Comcast Sales Factor Issue 
 
As the Board cited in its analysis of the Allocable 
Expenses Issue, the provisions of G.L. c. 58A, § 7 do not allow 
the Board to “consider, unless equity and good conscience so 
require, any issue of fact or contention of law not specifically 
set out in the petition upon appeal or raised in the answer.” 
The Board is not barred from hearing a newly advanced legal 
theory “so long as the rationale for that determination is made 
clear and it is based on substantial evidence.” Deveau, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 427. In these matters, the appellants complained 
about the lateness of the Commissioner’s substitution of the 
Comcast Sales Factor Issue for the Comcast Nexus Issue, but 
actually concurred with the Commissioner’s theory — that 
reimbursements at cost are not sales for purposes of calculating 
sales factor apportionment. See The First Marblehead 
Corporation, 470 Mass. at 514. The Board determined that the 
appellants were not prejudiced by a theory with which they 
concurred.  
B. Any Programming Reimbursements and Other Reimbursements at 
Cost Should Be Removed from the Sales Factor 
 
The Commissioner’s regulation at 830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(b)(8) 
states that “[t]he value of gross receipts or gain205 in 
                                                 
205 The words “or gain” were added by the version of the Commissioner’s 
regulation promulgated October 20, 2006. 
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intercompany sales transactions between affiliated taxpayers is 
the fair market value of the property or services provided in an 
arms-length transaction, subject to adjustments or rules adopted 
by the Commissioner pursuant to M.G.L. c. 63, §§ 33, 39A.” The 
Commissioner contended that reimbursements of programmer 
expenses at cost to Comcast for the tax years 2007 and 2008 
should not constitute sales for purposes of calculating 
Comcast’s sales factors. The appellants disagreed that their 
sales factors included such costs, though the evidence was not 
conclusive. The appellants, however, maintained that Comcast’s 
sales factors included other reimbursements at cost that they 
agreed to remove. Consequently, the Board ruled that to the 
extent that programmer expenses reimbursed at cost and other 
expenses reimbursed at cost were included in Comcast’s sales 
factors, they should not constitute sales for purposes of 
calculation of the sales factor under G.L. c. 63, § 38 and 
830 CMR 63.38.1. 
VI. Processing Error Issue 
The appellants contended that a processing error on the 
Commissioner’s part concerning Mass I’s non-income measure for 
the tax year 2004 should have resulted in an abatement.  
The Supreme Judicial Court has held that “[a]n 
administrative agency has no inherent or common law authority to 
do anything. . . . [and] may act only to the extent that it has 
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express or implied statutory authority to do so. Thus the board 
may grant abatements only if it is authorized to do so by 
statute.” Commissioner of Revenue v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 
414 Mass. 489, 493 (1993) (internal citations omitted). 
In Marr Scaffolding, the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
the question of whether the Board could grant an abatement of 
sales tax solely on the basis that the Commissioner was estopped 
from denying an abatement. See id. at 489-90. The Court noted 
that “the board may ‘make such abatement206 as it sees fit,’ but 
only if ‘the person making the appeal was entitled to an 
abatement.’” Id. at 494 (quoting G.L. c. 62C, § 39). In defining 
the limits of the term “entitled,” the Court stated that it 
“would not construe the board’s abatement granting authority 
. .  . to be broader than the Commissioner’s abatement granting 
authority itself.” Id.  
The Commissioner has the authority to grant abatements 
under G.L. c. 62C, § 37 if a tax is “excessive in amount or 
illegal.” G.L. c. 62C, § 37. The Court in Marr Scaffolding, 
414 Mass. at 494, found that “[t]he sales taxes that the 
Commissioner assessed against Marr were not illegal (or 
excessive). Marr and the Board agree that the sales taxes at 
issue were lawful in the sense that the circumstances of the 
                                                 
206 The provisions of G.L. c. 62C, § 39 during times relevant to these appeals 
were amended to encompass “abatement or refund as it sees fit.” St. 2003, 
c. 143, § 2B (emphasis added). 
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sales transactions required the payment of sales taxes.” 
Similarly in the present matters, the non-income measure at 
issue is a lawfully self-assessed tax that the Commissioner 
failed to capture when Mass I filed its Form 355C reporting the 
$764,786. This error was rectified during his audit of the 
appellants for the tax years 2002 through 2008. In the interim, 
the $764,786 payment made by Mass I was treated as an 
overpayment, as stipulated to by the Commissioner and the 
appellants, which benefitted Mass I by reducing tax in a 
subsequent tax year. See Goddard v. Goucher, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 
41, 45 (2016) (stating that “[n]othing is more common in 
practice or more useful in dispatching the business of the 
courts than for counsel to admit undisputed facts” and that 
“[g]enerally, such stipulations are binding on the parties”).  
In their request for findings of fact, the appellants urged 
the Board to find that “Mass I had sufficient funds to cover its 
2004 nonincome measure and any deficiency assessment resulting 
from the MASSTAX system’s error should be abated.” Sufficiency 
of funds at the time of the original filing does not merit an 
abatement where an error in processing the earlier payment 
reallocated those funds to reduce tax in a subsequent tax year. 
Regardless of the injustice the appellants felt had befallen 
them due to the reallocation of funds to an unintended tax year, 
they did not articulate an actionable remedy. See Marr 
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Scaffolding, 414 Mass. at 494 (“Although the assessment of a tax 
in the circumstances may be inequitable, the statute does not 
authorize an abatement of an inequitable tax assessment, but 
only an illegal (or excessive) one.”).       
The appellants, in effect, sought a $764,786 windfall due 
to the Commissioner’s error rather than an abatement of an 
excessive or illegal tax. See Keeler v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1996-387, 391 (“Keeler 
failed to prove, or even allege, that the tax was excessive in 
amount or illegal. He never showed or attempted to show: (1) 
that the tax due from Goods was excessive or illegal; (2) that 
he was not personally and individually liable for the tax due 
from Goods; or, (3) that the deemed assessment against him for 
the tax originally due from Goods was excessive in amount or 
illegal.”). The Board is not the venue to provide a remedy of 
this nature. Id. at 392 (“Not every alleged error by the 
commissioner is subject to the Board's review and correction.”). 
See also John S. Lane & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
396 Mass. 137, 142 (1985) (“We cannot agree that Lane's 
constitutional rights are violated by allowing the Commissioner 
to collect a tax that is lawfully due under procedures that were 
firmly established at the time the deficiencies were assessed. 
This result is not changed by the fact that Lane failed to pay 
the full amount of its taxes because of an error made by the 
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Commissioner.”). Accordingly, the Board ruled that the 
appellants were not entitled to an abatement due to the 
Commissioner’s processing error.  
CONCLUSION 
The Board’s analysis of the record and applicable legal 
provisions and case law led to the following conclusions:  
 The appellants deliberately maintained the separate 
Cable Franchise Companies to function as cable 
franchise licensees. Consequently, the Board’s 
examination looked to the Cable Franchise Companies 
and not to Comcast in the Costs of Performance Issue.  
 
 The Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue embodied the 
same refrain — third-party lending was intentionally 
consolidated at top-level members of the Comcast group 
for business reasons, yet the appellants wanted the 
benefit of interest expense deductions to flow down to 
the separate Add-Back Entities.  
 
 Both the Costs of Performance Issue and the 
Intercompany Interest Expenses Issue also involved 
dubious numerical allocations upon which the Board 
could not rely to make a finding in favor of the 
appellants.  
 
 With respect to the Federal Changes Issue, the 
appellants failed to offer any substantive argument, 
evidence, or legal authority to support their claims.  
 
 Procedurally, the Board concluded that equity and good 
conscience allowed it to hear the Allocable Expenses 
Issue and the Comcast Sales Factor Issue. 
 
 Substantively, the Board concluded that the interest 
expenses underlying the Allocable Expenses Issue were 
appropriately allocated to Pennsylvania as they were 
sufficiently related to the dividends income allocated 
to Pennsylvania.  
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 While the appellants, in the Comcast Sales Factor 
Issue, contended that Comcast’s sales factors did not 
incorporate reimbursements for programming expenses, 
in substance the appellants concurred with the 
Commissioner that reimbursements at cost should not be 
included in Comcast’s sales factors for the tax years 
2007 and 2008.  
 
 The Commissioner’s admitted allocation of a payment to 
an unintended tax year in the Processing Error Issue 
could not result in the relief sought by the 
appellants — a windfall of Mass I’s full amount 
validly due for the tax year 2004’s non-income 
measure. 
 
Based upon the foregoing and as discussed in these findings 
of fact and report, the Board found and ruled that the 
appellants failed to meet their burden of proof in these 
appeals. Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the 
Commissioner. 
 
 
     THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
 
    By:         
     Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman 
 
 
 
A true copy, 
 
Attest: _____________________________ 
     Clerk of the Board 
 
